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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") seek review of the Third District
Court's dismissal of their Complaint pursuant to the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and the Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
IL STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Do Plaintiffs have standing to obtain a judicial determination of the applicability
of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC") based on: (1) their
assertions that non-party, expectant mothers' constitutional rights are violated by the State
of Utah's interpretation of the ICPC; and (2) the fact that the State Defendants have ordered
them to comply with the State Defendants' interpretation of the ICPC and failure to comply
with the ICPC can result in licensing violations? Plaintiffs are correct in their statement as
to the proper standard of review. "Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a
question of law, we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial
court." Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895, 897 (Utah 2001).
2. Do Plaintiffs state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Association
Defendants, when the only conduct for which Plaintiffs complain is the issuance of an
advisory opinion regarding the interpretation of the ICPC, which the State Defendants
adopted? Though not addressed by Plaintiffs in their brief, this was the principal issue
raised in the Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 238-52) which was granted by
1

the District Court. The District Court granted this Motion without analysis. However, the
Utah Supreme Court in Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002) stated:
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground
or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or
theory differs from that stated by the trial court... and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court.
See also Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well settled that an appellate
court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other ground.") As with the first issue, the propriety of a motion to dismiss
is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Krouse, 20 P.3d 895.
3. Does the ICPC apply to situations where an expectant mother crosses state lines
to give birth to a child and place that child for adoption where "placement" is defined as
"the arrangement for the care of a child . . ."? {emphasis added) Plaintiffs correctly state
that the District Court did not address this issue because it dismissed this case on other
grounds, and resolution of this issue was unnecessary. The Association Defendants argue
the District Court was correct in dismissing this case and not reaching this issue. However,
if, and only if, this Court determines the District Court's decision was in error, this Court
may, as urged by Plaintiffs, address this issue. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah
1991), State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) and State in Interest ofJP.,
921 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the event this Court decides to address this issue,
the Association Defendants submit a response, which is set forth herein.
2

"Correctness" would normally be the appropriate standard when reviewing a court's
interpretation of a statute. See Bearden v. Croft, 31 P.3d 537 (Utah 2001) However, in the
present case, the court is being asked to review the Utah Department of Human Services'
interpretation of a statute, the ICPC, and its implementation and enforcement of a rule
consistent with that interpretation. In Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dept of Workforce
Services, 984 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the court stated, "It is a long standing
principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing
statutes, (citation omitted) Nevertheless, we grant an administrative rule a presumption of
validity in determining whether the rule is consistent with governing statutes." See also
South Central Telephone Ass 'n., Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n.,
951 P.2d 218,223 (Utah 1997) ("When determining whether an administrative rule is valid,
we grant the rule a presumption of validity.")
Additionally, as the court stated in Waterfront Comm 'n of New York Harbor v. Const.
And Marine Equip. Co., 928 F.Supp. 1388, 1400 (D.NJ. 1996):
A court must accord substantial deference to the regulations
adopted by administrative agencies, based on our recognition
that certain subjects are within the peculiar competence of that
agency. In re Amendment of NJ.A.C, 575 A.2d 481 (N.J.
1990). Thus, agency regulations are accorded a presumption of
reasonableness. Dougherty v. Dep yt of Human Servs., 449 A.2d
1235 (N.J. 1982). In addition, courts generally place
considerable weight on the construction of a statute given by
the agency charged with enforcing i t . . . .

3

As a result, if the court decides to review this issue, it should give the Department's
interpretation and implementation & presumption of validity and place considerable weight
on that interpretation.
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
§ 62A-4a-701. Utah Code Annotated. - Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
ARTICLE I - Purpose and Policy
It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each other in
the interstate placement of children so that:
(1) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to
be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having
appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide necessary and desirable care.
(2) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may
have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed
placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements
for the protection of the child.
(3) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made may
obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a
projected placement before it is made.
(4) Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the children will
be promoted.
ARTICLE II - Definitions
As used in this compact:
(1) "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to
parental, guardianship, or similar control.
(4) "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free,
adoptive, or boarding home, or in a child-caring agency or institution but does
not include any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or
epileptic or any institution, primarily educational in character, and any
hospital or other medical facility.

4

ARTICLE III - Conditions for Placement
(1) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into
any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary
to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and
every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the
receiving state governing the placement of children therein.
(2) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be sent or brought into
a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities
in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place
the child in the receiving state. The notice shall contain:
(a) The name, date, and place of birth of the child.
(b) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
(c) The name and address of the person, agency, or institution to or with
which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
(d) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of
the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
(e) Any public officer or agency in a receiving agency state which is in receipt
of a notice pursuant to Paragraph (2) of this article may request of the sending
agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending
agency's state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or
additional information as it may deem necessary under the circumstances to
carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
(f) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into
the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving
state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the
proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the
child.
ARTICLE VII - Compact Administrator
The executive head of each jurisdiction party to this compact shall designate
an officer who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact
in his jurisdiction and who, acting jointly with like officers of the party
jurisdictions, shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.

5

ARTICLE X - Construction and Severability
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the
purposes thereof... .
§ 78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated. - Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or
statutes may be determined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or
whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Association Defendants do not disagree with the Plaintiffs' Statement of the
Case.

V. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The ICPC is a uniform law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the District

of Colombia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The ICPC establishes procedures for the
interstate placement of children and fixes responsibility for those involved in placing the
child. {Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 7 ^ 1; R. 182; and R. 364 %/.)
2.

The ICPC has been adopted by the State of Utah, and is codified at Utah Code

Annotated. § 62A-4a-701 et seq. (R. 238-52 \2; andR. 364 \2.)

6

3.

Each state appoints a Compact Administrator and one or more Deputy

Administrators who oversee or perform the day-to day tasks associated with the
administration of the ICPC. In Utah, the Compact Administrator's office is located within
the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), which is a division of defendant
Department of Human Services (the "Department"). The Department, through the DCFS,
is responsible for accepting and reviewing information submitted in connection with
placement of children across state lines pursuant to the ICPC. {Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts,
pg. 7\2; andR. 182.)
4.

Plaintiffs are three adoption agencies licensed by the state of Utah. {Plaintiffs'

Statement of Facts, pg. 7% 3.)
5.

Defendant Michael Chapman has been appointed as the Deputy Compact

Administrator for the State of Utah, and until recently he was also president of the
Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
("AAICPC"). {Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 8 V; andR. 182.)
6.

Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams is the Executive Director of the

Department. {Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 8 ^1; and R. 183.)
7.

Defendant Janice P. Knaphus is a Licensing Specialist in the Office of

Licensing of the Department with responsibilities for adoption agencies. {Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts, pg. 8 ^1; andR. 18 3.)
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8.

Defendant Dennis Eshman is the Secretariat of the AAICPC. {Plaintiffs3

Statement of Facts, pg 8 \2; R183; andR. 365 p.)
9.

Defendant AAICPC is a private organization, the members of which are the

Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators of the various states.
{Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 8 \2; R. 183; and R. 364 y.)
10.

Defendant American Public Human Services Association ("APHSA") is a

nonprofit corporation that provides secretariat (administrative) services for the AAICPC,
and other related organizations. {Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 8 %1; R. 183; andR. 365

w
11.

On or about November 19, 2001 the State Defendants took the position that

Plaintiffs must comply with the ICPC before a birth mother may travel to Utah to deliver
her child and place it for adoption in Utah. {Plaintiffs' Statement ofFacts, pg. 9 %2; and R.
184.)
12.

The State Defendants based their position, in part, on a June 30,1986 opinion

issued by the Secretariat of the AAICPC, Secretariat Opinion #49 {"Opinion #49"),
(Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 9 ^2; and R. 184.)
13.

By Plaintiffs' own admission, Opinion #49 does not have the force of law.

{R. 5 W9.) It is simply the AAICPC's interpretation of the ICPC.
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14.

Opinion #49 states that the ICPC applies to a situation where "a birth mother.

. .comes to State A from another state in order to give birth and then places her child with
a State A couple .. ." (Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg 9 \3; R. 184; and R. 208-210.)
15.

On December 3,2001, Janice P. Knaphus sent a letter to each of the Agencies

informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Department would apply the ICPC to
situations where an expectant mother travels to Utah to give birth and place her child for
adoption. (Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 10 %/; R. 184; andR. 211-13.)
16.

On June 10,2002, after Plaintiffs' first Complaint had been dismissed by the

Federal District Court for lack of standing, Plaintiffs re-filed this action against the State
Defendants in the Third District Court.1 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
asking the court to declare that the ICPC did not apply to the situation where a mother
travels to Utah to deliver and place her child for adoption. (Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case,
fn. 1, Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 11 ^1; and R. 1-12.)
17.

After this litigation was commenced, defendant Chapman sought guidance

from the AAICPC regarding the subject of Opinion #49. The AAICPC responded with a
letter in which it reaffirmed its position stated in Opinion #49, and arguing that the ICPC

1

There is a constitutional component to standing or the lack thereof. Without
standing, a court cannot lawfully proceed to adjudicate a claim. See Baker v. Can% 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). More importantly, the federal court's prior determination that
Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this issue, a ruling which Plaintiffs did not appeal,
may very well be dispositive even if the federal court was wrong in its decision. See
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 392 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
9

does apply when an expectant mother travels to Utah to deliver and place her child for
adoption. (Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 11 ^2; and R. 124-34.)
18.

Because of this involvement by the AAICPC [its drafting of Opinion #49 and

its continued adherence to it] Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on September
3,2002, naming the AAICPC, its president at the time (Michael Chapman), its secretariat
(Dennis Eshman) and the agency providing secretariat services (APHSA). (Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts, pg. 11 ^3; andR. 147-61.)
19.

On July 1, 2002, the State Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that

the Plaintiffs had not stated a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act
and that they lacked standing to raise the constitutional rights of the birth mothers.
(Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 12 \1; and R. 23-56.)
20.

On October 17,2002 the Association Defendants joined the State Defendants'

Motion and filed a Motion to Dismiss of their own. The Association Defendants' Motion
argued the Plaintiffs did not state a claim for relief against them as the only conduct alleged
by Plaintiffs was the Association Defendants' issuance and affirmation of Opinion #49.
(Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 12 %1; and R. 238-252.)
21.

On October 16, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment asking the district court to declare that the ICPC could not be interpreted to apply
where expectant mothers travel to Utah to deliver and place their children for adoption.
(Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 12 ^2; and R. 178-232.)
10

22.

Following oral argument, on February 25,2003, the District Court entered an

Order granting the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Association Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
{Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, pg. 12 ^3; and R. 363-69.)
23.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the Court did consider whether Plaintiffs had

standing on their own. The Court specifically ruled, "plaintiffs lack standing because they
fail to request relief for an alleged violation of their own constitutional rights." (R. 367 %?.)
The Court then went on to rule that Plaintiffs also lacked standing based on their assertion
of expectant mothers' rights. (R. 367 ^4-5.)
24.

The Court granted the Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denied

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment without analysis. (Plaintiffs' Statement ofFacts,
pg. 13 Tff7-2; andR. 367-68.)
V I SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs' Complaint
does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Association Defendants.
The only claims asserted against the Association Defendants are that they issued Opinion
#49, continued to affirm the position taken by Opinion #49, and encouraged the State
Defendants to adopt the position taken by Opinion #49. Opinion #49 does not have the
force of law. Rather, it is the AAICPC's interpretation of the ICPC. This interpretation was

11

adopted and enforced by the State Defendants. These facts do not establish a valid claim
against the Association Defendants.
Plaintiffs also lack standing to assert these claims as they have not presented a
justiciable controversy on their own behalf. Additionally, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring
or assert the rights of expectant mothers because their relationship with third-party
expectant mothers is not "substantial," expectant mothers are capable of asserting their own
rights, and failure to allow Plaintiffs to do so will not dilute the expectant mothers' rights.
Finally, if, and only if, this Court determines Plaintiffs do state a claim against the
Association Defendants, and that they have standing to assert these claims, this Court has
the discretion to pass upon and determine whether the ICPC applies when an expectant
mother travels to Utah to deliver and place her child for adoption. In making this
determination, this Court must presume the State Defendants' interpretation of the ICPC is
valid. Additionally, the State Defendants' interpretation is the correct interpretation. The
ICPC does apply to this situation.

In contrast, Plaintiffs, by their interpretation, are

intentionally attempting to circumvent the requirements of the ICPC, which only serve to
protect children, by manipulating the delivery point, all in the interests of speed and
economy.

12

VII. ARGUMENT
A.
PLAINTIFFS DO NOT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE
ASSOCIATION DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED
On page nine (9) of Plaintiffs' Brief, they correctly state that on June 30, 1986, the
Secretariat of the ICPC issued Opinion #49. Opinion #49 expresses the AAICPC's view
that the ICPC applies to expectant mothers who travel to a state in order to deliver and place
their child for adoption in that state. Over fifteen (15) years later, in November and
December of 2001, the State Defendants adopted the position announced in Opinion #49,
and informed Plaintiffs that they would be enforcing the ICPC consistent with that position
in the future. Following commencement of this litigation, one of the State Defendants (Mr.
Chapman) requested guidance regarding the application of the ICPC to the scenario
described above. The AAICPC responded by letter dated July 9,2002, in which it adhered
to its previous opinion that the ICPC does apply to this scenario.
Plaintiffs have not made a single allegation directly against Mr. Eshman, Mr.
Chapman (is his capacity as president of the AAICPC), or the APHS A. The actions
complained of concern only the AAICPC. As Plaintiffs admit, the AAICPC is a non-profit
corporation. There are no allegations that the actions complained of should be attributed
to any entity beyond the AAICPC, or that would justify disregarding the corporate identity.
Plaintiffs' naming of Mr. Chapman, Mr. Eshman and APHS A is totally inappropriate, and
the Court properly granted the Association Defendants' Motion as to these defendants.
13

Additionally, Plaintiffs' only allegations against the AAICPC are those identified above;
namely, the issuance of Opinion #49, its continued adherence to the opinion expressed in
Opinion #49, and the AAICPC's advice to the State Defendants that they adopt the
AAICPC's interpretation of the ICPC as set forth in Opinion #49. These allegations are not
sufficient to state a claim against the Association Defendants.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may
move for dismissal based on a plaintiffs "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
As the Utah Supreme Court has ruled, "A motion to dismiss is . . . appropriate where it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of its claim." Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'I
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). In making this determination the court is "obliged
to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all
reasonable inferences in its favor." Id. SeealsoMounteerv.

Utah Power & Light Co., 823

P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). In the present case, even construing the Complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs, and indulging all reasonable inferences in their favor, Plaintiffs
have completely failed to state a claim against the Association Defendants. Plaintiffs have
not made a single allegation directly against Mr. Eshman, Mr. Chapman (as president of the
AAICPC) or the APHSA. Further, Plaintiffs' only allegations against the AAICPC are the
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issuance of an opinion regarding the interpretation of a statute, and its continued adherence
to that opinion.
As stated by Plaintiffs, it was the State Defendants that adopted the AAICPC's
interpretation of the ICPC, as set forth in Opinion #49. It is the State Defendants that are
charged with interpreting and enforcing the ICPC. It is the State Defendants that control
licensing violations of which Plaintiffs express concern.

The AAICPC is a private

association that issued an opinion regarding its interpretation of the ICPC. That opinion
does not have the force of law and the AAICPC has no power to enforce that opinion. This
is evident by the fact that Opinion #49 was issued in 1988 and the views expressed in that
opinion were of no force within the State of Utah until the State Defendants adopted that
opinion in 2001, fifteen years later.
This situation is analogous to an attorney general reading an opinion issued by the
American Bar Association, of which she is a member, agreeing with that opinion, and
implementing that reasoning in her duties. In such a situation it is the attorney general who
has applied and enforced the subject matter of the opinion. For an aggrieved party to file
suit against the American Bar Association is ridiculous. It is in fact the state official, the
attorney general in this example, who is responsible for interpretation, implementation, and
enforcement of the subject matter of the opinion. Such is the case at hand. Opinion #49 is
nothing more than a private organization's interpretation of a statute.
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The District Court did not set forth its analysis regarding this issue when granting
the Association Defendants' Motion. However, this Court may uphold the trial court's
ruling on any legal ground apparent on the record, even if that ground is different than that
stated by the trial court. In Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002) the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground
or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or
theory differs from that stated by the trial court... and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court.
See also Debiy v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well settled that an appellate
court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other ground.") As a result, the Association Defendants urge this Court to
affirm the District Court's granting of the Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B.

PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE STANDING EITHER ON THEIR
OWN OR ON BEHALF OF EXPECTANT MOTHERS

Plaintiffs do not have standing, on their own, to obtain the relief they have sought.
In Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We have previously held that four requirements must be
satisfied before the district court can proceed in an action for
declaratory judgment: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse;
(3)the parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible
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interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the
parties must be ripe for judicial determination.
See also Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978). The Court continued, "Plaintiff must be
able to show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury..." Jenkins, 675 P.2d
at 1148. "The courts are most competent in the exercise of their function when they have
a 'concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action/" Id. at 1149, quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy three of
the four factors identified in Jenkins, First of all, Plaintiffs have not shown that they have
a legally protectible interest. In In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074,1082 (Utah 2000),
the court stated, "a legally protectible interest is one that the substantive law recognizes as
belonging to or being owned by the [plaintiff]." (Citation omitted).
In US v. Students Challenging Regulatoiy Agency Procedures et al, All U.S. 669,
688-89 (1973) the United States Supreme Court stated, "pleadings must be something more
than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has
been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can
imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action. And it is
equally clear that the allegations must be true and capable of proof at trial." Plaintiffs have
not established anything more than a conceivable harm, and do not have a legally
protectible interest under this standard. Plaintiffs general allegations that their business will
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suffer, or that they may face licensing violations are not sufficient. As the Court stated in
Jenkins, "A mere allegation of an adverse impact is not sufficient." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at
1150.
Plaintiffs also have not stated a justiciable controversy. In Baird v. State, 51A P.2d
713 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff filed a declaratory action challenging the application of the
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act. Plaintiff made a similar argument that the
Declaratory Judgment Act should be "liberally construed." Addressing this argument, the
court stated:
[W]hile statutes authorizing courts to render declaratory relief
should be liberally construed, the courts must, nevertheless,
operate within the constitutional and statutory powers and
duties imposed upon them. The courts are not a forum for
hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.
To maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiff must show
that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in
ordinary actions are present, for a judgment can be rendered
only in a real controversy between adverse parties.
Id. at 715 (citing Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951)). The court continued, "The
use of the term 'rights, status and other legal relations' in the declaratory judgment statute
(§ 78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953) relates to a justiciable controversy where there is
an actual conflict between interested parties asserting adverse claims on an accrued state of
facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts." Id. Still further, the court stated, "A
Declaratory Judgment Statute cannot be so construed as to authorize the courts to deliver
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advisory opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract questions, but there must be the
invariable justiciable controversy present in such cases." Id. at 716.
Plaintiffs have not stated a justiciable controversy under this standard. Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint2 demonstrates this fact. Paragraph 17 of that Complaint states,
"Plaintiffs are often contacted by expectant mothers outside of the state who are
contemplating placing their children for adoption." {emphasis added.) Paragraph 18 states,
"Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant mothers travel
to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely."
{emphasis added) Paragraph 19 states, "The children are then delivered in Utah facilities
and may be placed for adoption through plaintiffs' agencies. . ." {emphasis added.)
Paragraphs 35 through 40 identify a specific situation that is now moot. As Plaintiffs admit,
"Plaintiffs believe that while this specific situation may be resolved... this type of situation
is clearly capable or repetition while evading review." Paragraph 40. Plaintiffs' Complaint
alleges possible and hypothetical fact scenarios. It does not present an actual conflict.
Plaintiffs have not stated a justiciable controversy.
Plaintiffs also do not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of expectant
mothers. Plaintiffs have not challenged this aspect of the trial court's ruling. Plaintiffs have
instead tried to refocus their argument arguing that they have standing on their own> This
argument must fail for the reasons cited above. Additionally, as the District Court correctly
2

Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief R. 147 to 161.
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ruled, Plaintiffs do not have standing to raise the issue of expectant mothers' constitutional
rights.
In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786,789 (Utah 1992) the court stated, "The general rule
is that a litigant 'must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" (citing Worth v. Seldin, All U.S. 490
(1975).) The court continued:
However, a party may assert the constitutional rights of a third
party if certain factors are met: first, the presence of some
substantial relationship between the claimant and the third
parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting
their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a
dilution of third parties' constitutional rights.. .
Id. at 789. As correctly determined by the District Court, Plaintiffs have not met these
factors, and do not have standing to assert the rights of expectant mothers because Plaintiffs
do not have a substantial relationship with expectant mothers. Indeed, Plaintiffs have not
made any claims other than the fact that expectant mothers "often" contact Plaintiffs, and
"sometimes" travel to Utah to facilitate adoptions. This is clearly insufficient.
Second, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show that expectant mothers
are incapable of raising their own constitutional rights. As the District Court correctly
noted, "third party mothers are capable of asserting their own constitutional rights;" (R.361.)
Moreover, as the District Court noted, "there is no evidence that failure to permit third party
standing will somehow dilute the expectant mothers' constitutional rights." (R.361.) Again,
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Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence supporting an argument that failure to allow
Plaintiffs to pursue these claims would dilute expectant mothers' rights. Based on the
foregoing, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit on behalf of expectant mothers. This Court
should uphold the District Court's granting of the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
C.
THE ICPC DOES APPLY WHEN EXPECTANT MOTHERS
TRAVEL TO UTAH TO DELIVER AND PLACE THEIR CHILD FOR
ADOPTION
Plaintiffs have argued that the ICPC does not apply when expectant mothers travel
to Utah to deliver and place their child for adoption. Plaintiffs argue this is because the
ICPC applies to the placement of a "child." This issue was not addressed because the trial
court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims prior to reaching it. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs now urge this
Court to address this issue. Consequently, if this Court remands this case, determining that
Plaintiffs do have standing, and that they have stated a claim against the Association
Defendants, this Court has discretion to address this issue. In State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,
795 (Utah 1991), the court stated, "Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to
be presented on remand should be addressed by this court. See also State v. Penman, 964
P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) and State in Interest ofIP., 921 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). As a result, if this Court decides to address this issue, the Association Defendants
submit the following response:
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In the present case, Plaintiffs are challenging the Utah Department of Human
Services' interpretation of the ICPC, and their enforcement of that interpretation. In
Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dept. of Workforce Semices, 984 P.2d 399,402 (Utah Ct. App.
1999), the court stated, "It is a long standing principle of administrative law that an
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes, (citation omitted)
Nevertheless, we grant an administrative rule a presumption of validity in determining
whether the rule is consistent with governing statutes." See also South Central Telephone
Ass'n.f Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Comm }n.± 951 P.2d 218, 223 (Utah
1997) ("When determining whether an administrative rule is valid, we grant the rule a
presumption of validity.") Additionally, as the court stated in Waterfront Comm 'n of New
York Harbor v. Const. And Marine Equip. Co., 928 F.Supp. 1388, 1400 (D.N.J. 1996):
A court must accord substantial deference to the regulations
adopted by administrative agencies, based on our recognition
that certain subjects are within the peculiar competence of that
agency. In re Amendment of N.J.A.C, 575 A.2d 481 (NJ.
1990). Thus, agency regulations are accorded a presumption of
reasonableness. Dougherty v. Dep 't ofHuman Servs., 449 A.2d
1235 (1982). In addition, courts generally place considerable
weight on the construction of a statute given by the agency
charged with enforcing it. . .
In the present case, the Department of Human Services has made a determination that
the ICPC applies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to deliver and place their child for
adoption. This Court should give that determination a presumption of validity and place
considerable weight on this interpretation. Additionally, this is the correct interpretation.
22

The Department's interpretation, and the Association Defendants' interpretation as
contained in Opinion #49, is not based on the definition of the word "child." Rather, it is
based on a process, or the placement of a child for adoption, that triggers the ICPC.
Article III, Section (1) of the ICPC is at the heart of this controversy. This Section
states:
No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or
brought into any other party state any child for placement in
foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the
sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement
set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the
receiving state governing the placement of children therein.
{emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated § 62A-4a-701. Key to the understanding of Section (1) is the
definition of "placement" provided in Article II, Section (4). This definition, in relevant
part, states, "' Placement' means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free,
adoptive, or boarding home, or in a child-caring agency or institution. . ." Id. (emphasis
added)
This case is not about circumstances where an expectant mother crosses state lines
for an unrelated purpose, gives birth, and just happens to decide to give her child up for
adoption in that state once it is born. Rather, it is about expectant mothers intentionally
traveling to Utah, prior to the birth of the child, to facilitate the adoption in an attempt to
avoid the application of the ICPC. This travel is part of the arrangement made to facilitate
the adoption. As Plaintiffs have admitted, they "are often contacted by expectant mothers
23

outside of the state who are contemplating placing their expected children for adoption."3
"Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant mothers travel
to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely."4
Plaintiffs continue, "A substantial part of plaintiffs' businesses involve expectant mothers
who travel to Utah . . . to place them for adoption."5 It is clear, even from Plaintiffs'
statements, that their allegations concern mothers that cross state lines with the intention
of placing their children for adoption in that state.
This activity clearly constitutes the "arrangement" for the care of a child. It is
irrelevant that the child is not yet bom. Nobody is adopting fetuses here. Rather, by
making arrangements for adoption, which includes crossing state lines to deliver, the
expectant mother is making arrangements for the care of her child no differently than if the
child was already bom. This is exactly the activity which the ICPC does and should
regulate.
Article X of the ICPC states, "The provisions of this compact shall be liberally
construed to effectuate the purposes thereof. . . ." Utah Code Annotated, § 62A-4a-701.
The purpose of the ICPC are set forth as follows:

3

R.147-161,% 17.

4

R.147-161, \ 18 {emphasis added).

5

R.147-161, ^120.
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It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each
other in the interstate placement of children so that:
(1) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum
opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment...
(2) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed
may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed
placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements
for the protection of the child.
(3) The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is
made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to
evaluate a projected placement before it is made.

Id.
The purpose of the ICPC is to protect children.

Further, the ICPC requires

"maximum opportunity," "full compliance," and the "most complete information," about
a potential adoption, all to ensure that children are protected. As the AAICPC stated in
Opinion #49, "In enacting the Compact the intent of the state legislatures was not to make
the protections of placements depend on mechanical manipulation of the delivery point.
Such logistic calculations are nothing more than subterfuges and studied efforts to avoid the
intended and normal consequences of the law. .. If the arrangement process is interstate,
placement is interstate." (R.209.)
Plaintiffs cite Yopp v. Batt, 467 N.W.2d 868 (Neb. 1991) in support of their position.
In this 13 page opinion by the Nebraska Supreme Court, only one paragraph6 is dedicated
to the applicability of the ICPC. This paragraph provides little, if any, analysis of this issue,

6

467 N.W.2d at 878.
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does not cite any case law or relevant language from the ICPC, and simply upholds the
lower court's decision that the ICPC does not apply. Yopp concerned a birth mother who
tried to recover possession of her child after she had relinquished it for adoption. One of
the grounds she argued for this recovery was that the ICPC had not been followed. Clearly
the motivations and issues before the court in Yopp and those before this court are much
different. Additionally, as the court later stated, "The fact that Batt may or may not have
been in violation of the [ICPC] has absolutely no bearing on whether Yopp's relinquishment
of her child was valid." Id. at 879.
In Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 789 (W.Va. 1998) the court ultimately ruled
that the ICPC did not apply to the facts of that case because placement was made into
Canada, which is not a state or nation which has entered into the ICPC. However, Kessel
hints strongly that had the ICPC been applicable, it would have applied it to the situation
where a mother travels to another state to deliver and place her child for adoption. The
court quoted the trial court's findings as follows:
Construing the above-stated ICPC provisions in conjunction
with its interpretation of the pertinent facts, the circuit court
found: Where an expectant mother crosses a state line as a part
of a placement plan and arrangement for adoption, the
transaction should be viewed as an interstate placement. To
hold otherwise would permit expectant mothers to avoid the
safeguards of the ICPC to children by mechanically
manipulating the delivery point. Article 10 of the ICPC directs
that the compact be '. . . liberally construed to effectuate its
purposes . . .' And that purpose is to protect children, not to
protect the rights of parents. . . . Therefore, as a matter of law,
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this Court finds [the ICPC] applies to the facts of this case...
Id. at 787-788. The trial court used a jury instruction applying this interpretation of the
ICPC. While the Supreme Court of Appeals did not specifically reach this issue (as they
determined the ICPC did not apply to placements in non-party states) they did determine
it was "harmless error" for the Circuit Court to apply the ICPC in this manner.
Florida v. Friends of Children, Inc., 653 Fo.Supp. 1221 (N.D. Florida 1986) cited by
Plaintiffs in support of their position, does not even involve an analysis of the ICPC but,
rather, Florida adoption statutes that are totally inapplicable to the present case.
Furthermore, in Standi v. Brock, 425 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), the court dealt with
a case where the defendants, residents of Kentucky, "executed an Interstate Compact
Placement Request stating their intent to place their then-unborn child with plaintiffs in
North Carolina." Id. at 448. {emphasis added). While the court did not specifically address
the present issue, they did uphold the applicability of the ICPC, and did not question the
ICPC request being filed to facilitate the adoption of a child who had not yet been born.
And the court in Oktibbeha County Dept ofHuman Services v. N.G., 782 So.2d 1226, 1233
(Miss. 2001) discussed Standi, and stated:
In [Standi] the parents of an unborn child were Kentucky
residents and had agreed to allow their child to be adopted by
a couple who were North Carolina residents . . . The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina concluded that since the Kentucky
couple had requested the placement of their child in North
Carolina, they were the 'sending agency' of their unborn child;
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and therefore, under Article V of the ICPC5 Kentucky courts
retained jurisdiction... {emphasis added)
Again, while not specifically addressing this issue, the courts in both Standi and Oktibbeha
did not even question the application of the IPCP to an unborn child.
This is a case of first impression in Utah. Further, the above-cited cases appear to
be the only reported cases in the nation that deal, directly or not, with this issue. As a result,
a decision in this case cannot be made by relying on other authority alone. The Association
Defendants request this court adopt the arguments given by the trial court in Kessel and
stated in Opinion #49. Where an expectant mother travels to Utah in order to deliver and
place her child for adoption, that travel is part of the placement plan or arrangement for the
adoption of a child. As such, this scenario should be viewed as an interstate placement. To
hold otherwise would allow parents to mechanically manipulate the delivery point in order
to purposefully avoid the application of the ICPC.
The purpose of the ICPC is to protect children by requiring: "maximum opportunity"
to be placed in a suitable environment; "full compliance" with applicable requirements; and
the "most complete information," about a potential adoption. These purposes should be
protected by this court whether a mother delivers her child in another state and gives it for
adoption in Utah the very next day, or travels to Utah the day before delivery to deliver and
place her child for adoption. There is no practical distinction between these two scenarios.
The children in both scenarios deserve the same level of protection. This Court, if it reaches
28

this issue, should hold that the ICPC applies when an expectant mother travels to Utah to
deliver and place her child for adoption, when that travel constitutes part of the
arrangements preliminary to the adoption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against the Association Defendants upon which
relief can be granted. The only conduct of which Plaintiffs complain is that the Association
Defendants stated their interpretation of the ICPC, contained in Opinion #49, and that they
advised the State Defendants to follow that interpretation. Opinion #49 does not have the
force of law. It is nothing more than an opinion, and the State Defendants were free to
follow, or not follow, that interpretation. This is demonstrated by the fact that Opinion #49
was in existence for fifteen (15) years, and had no effect in the State of Utah until the State
Defendants determined to implement that interpretation in 2001. The District Court
correctly granted the Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and this Court should
uphold that decision.
Plaintiffs do not have standing. Plaintiffs do not have standing on their own, as they
have not stated a justiciable controversy. They have not alleged any particular set of facts,
but rather, base their claim on generalizations and hypothetical claims. Plaintiffs also do
not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of expectant mothers. Plaintiffs have not
established a substantial relationship with expectant mothers, have not shown that expectant
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mothers cannot protect their own rights, and have not shown any dilution in expectant
mothers rights absent Plaintiffs' actions.
Finally, if this Court determines that Plaintiffs have standing, and that they have
stated a claim against the Association Defendants, it may address the applicability of the
ICPC upon remand. In that case, this Court should hold that the ICPC does apply to
situations where an expectant mother travels to Utah to deliver and place her child for
adoption. The ICPC was enacted to protect children by ensuring that states have full
information available regarding such adoptions, and that all applicable regulations are
followed. To allow parents and/or adoption agencies to avoid the application of these laws,
reducing the protection afforded to the children involved, only in the interests of speed and
economy, by artificially manipulating the delivery point, would render the ICPC useless.
Rather, this Court should ensure that children, for whom arrangements for interstate
adoption are being made, whether born prior to or after these arrangements are made, are
afforded the maximum protection of the laws. Based on the above, the Association
Defendants respectfully request this Court uphold the District Court's decision granting the
State and Association Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and dismissing Plaintiffs'
Complaint,

30

/3

DATED this J_3_ day of June, 2003.
SUITTERAXLAND

Michael W. Homer
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Children; and The American Public Human
Services Association
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Supreme Court of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Russell Eugene BISNER, Defendant and Appellant

Prosecution's duty under Brady to disclose to the
defense material, exculpatory evidence arises
regardless of whether the defense requests the
evidence, since failure to disclose such evidence
violates due process irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution U S C A
Const Amend 14

No. 20000026.
Nov 20, 2001
Reheanng Denied Jan 3, 2002

[5] Criminal Law €==>700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases
[5] Criminal Law €=>700(4)
110k700(4) Most Cited Cases

Defendant was convicted m the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, J Dennis Frederick, J , of
murder and aggravated robbery, and he appealed
The Supreme Court, Russon, Associate C J, held
that (1) Brady violation did not occur by state's
failing to disclose cooperation agreement with its
witness, (2) defendant's mother voluntarily
consented to warrantless search of their home, and
(3) convictions did not merge
Affirmed

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €==>1156(1)
1 lOkl 156(1) Most Cited Cases
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion
for a new trial, the Supreme Court will not reverse
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court
[2] Criminal Law €=>l 134(4)
110k 1134(4) Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews for correctness the legal
standards applied by the trial court in denying a
motion for a new trial
[3] Criminal Law €==>700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases
Under both the state and federal constitutions, the
prosecution bears a fundamental duty to disclose
material, exculpatory evidence to the defense in
criminal cases
[4] Criminal Law €==>700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases

Prosecution's duty under Brady to disclose to the
defense material, exculpatory evidence applies both
to substantively exculpatory evidence and to that
which may be used for impeachment
[6] Criminal Law €^>700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases
The government's failure to disclose potentially
exculpatory information does not violate Brady
where a defendant knew or should have known the
essential facts permitting him to take advantage of
any exculpatory information, or where the evidence
is available to defendant from another source
[7] Criminal Law €=>700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases
A Brady violation occurs only where the state
suppresses information that (1) remains unknown
to the defense both before and throughout trial, and
(2) is material and exculpatory, meaning its
disclosure would have created a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different
[8] Criminal Law €=^700(4)
110k700(4) Most Cited Cases
Brady violation did not occur m murder prosecution
by state's failing to disclose cooperation agreement
with its witness, pursuant to which witness would
receive a reduction in jail time and fine for an
unrelated misdemeanor, defendant knew of the
alleged agreement and used that information to
impeach witness at trial U C A 1953, 76-5-203
[9] Constitutional Law €^=>268(5)
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92k268(5) Most Cited Cases

[13] Criminal Law €=^1035(10)
110kl035(10) Most Cited Cases

[9] Criminal Law €^700(2.1)
110k700(2 1) Most Cited Cases
Under Brady, prosecutorial nondisclosure of
information favorable to the accused does not by
itself constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal
of a conviction, rather, nondisclosure violates due
process only if the evidence at issue is material and
exculpatory, and if the defense did not become
aware of the evidence until after trial U S C A
Const Amend 14
[101 Criminal Law €=>700(4)
110k700(4) Most Cited Cases
Brady violation did not occur in murder prosecution
by reason of state's failing to disclose alleged
cooperation agreement with its witness, pursuant to
which witness would not be prosecuted for selling
LSD to defendant and another on the night victim
was murdered, defendant knew of the alleged
inducement before trial ended and failed to make
use of that knowledge during trial U C A 1 9 5 3 ,
76-5-203
[11] Criminal Law €=^1037.1(1)
110kl037 1(1) Most Cited Cases
Murder defendant waived appellate review of claim
that state committed Brady violation by failing to
disclose leniency agreements it allegedly entered
into with its witnesses concerning the charges they
faced for their actions in the events leading to
victim's death, as defendant failed to properly raise
claim at trial U C A 1953, 76-5-203
[12] Criminal Law €=^700(4)
110k700(4) Most Cited Cases
State did not commit Brady violation m murder
prosecution by failing to disclose leniency
agreements it allegedly entered into with its
witnesses concerning the charges they faced for
their actions in the events leading to victim's death,
because the necessary information from which the
credibility of witnesses' testimony could be
questioned actually came out at trial and before,
state did not withhold exculpatory information
U C A 1953,76-5-203

Murder defendant waived appellate review of claim
that state violated his right of confrontation by
failing to disclose leniency agreements it allegedly
entered into with its witnesses concerning the
charges they faced for their actions m the events
leading to victim's death, where defendant did not
lodge his arguments before the trial court
U C A 1953,76-5-203
[14] Criminal Law € ^ H 3 4 ( 3 )
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
[14] Searches and Seizures €==>201
349k201 Most Cited Cases
Whether a party has voluntarily consented to a
search is a question of law, and the Supreme Court
therefore reviews it for correctness
[15] Criminal Law €=^1158(1)
1 lOkl 158(1) Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court will reverse the trial court's factual
findings only if they are clearly erroneous
[16] Criminal Law 0=>1158(1)
110k 115 8( 1) Most Cited Cases
In determining whether a trial court's factual
findings are clearly erroneous, Supreme Court
rejects those findings that are not supported by
substantial, competent evidence
[17] Searches and Seizures €=>24
349k24 Most Cited Cases
Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment unless conducted
pursuant to a recogmzed exception to the warrant
requirement U S C A Const Amend 4
[18] Searches and Seizures €=>171
349kl71 Most Cited Cases
Search conducted pursuant to consent is a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement
U S C A Const Amend 4
[19] Searches and Seizures €=>179.1
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349k 179 1 Most Cited Cases

entirely separate person U S C A Const Amend 4

To be valid, a consent to a warrantless search must
have been given voluntarily and not have been
obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality
U S C A Const Amend 4

[24] Searches and Seizures €=^>181
349k 181 Most Cited Cases

[20] Searches and Seizures € ^ 1 8 0
349k 180 Most Cited Cases
Consent to a warrantless search is not voluntary if it
is obtained as the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied U S C A Const Amend 14
[21] Searches and Seizures €=^180
349k 180 Most Cited Cases

Police officer's possibly stepping inside front door
of house of murder defendant's mother was not a
show of authority that rendered mother's consent to
warrantless search of their home involuntary, police
officer's indication that he may have been "just
mside the door" when requesting search of home
was consistent with his statements that the
discussion occurred "at the door" U S C A
Const Amend 4, U C A 1953, 76-5-203
[25] Searches and Seizures €^>181
349kl81 Most Cited Cases

Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion m
consenting to a warrantless search, which should be
assessed m the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances, include (1) the absence of a claim
of authority to search by the officers, (2) the
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, (3)
a mere request to search, (4) cooperation by the
owner of the property, and (5) the absence of
deception or trick on the part of the officer
U S C A Const Amend 4

Fact that police officer told murder defendant's
mother to "go back into the kitchen" did not render
mother's consent to warrantless search of their home
involuntary, police officer's statement was not a
show of authority, but, rather, was an instruction
that reflected officer's desire to protect the mother
and her family, who were assembled m the kitchen
during the search U S C A Const Amend 4,
U C A 1953,76-5-203

[22] Searches and Seizures €==>181
349kl81 Most Cited Cases

[26] Criminal Law €=^1153(1)
HOkl 153(1) Most Cited Cases

Police officers1 exhibition of authority and force
while arresting murder defendant did not render his
mother's consent to warrantless search of their home
involuntary, as officer's actions toward defendant
were wholly irrelevant to whether they exhibited
force toward his mother, although police officers
pointed their weapons at defendant as he came
outside to surrender, they holstered their weapons
when they approached the house to have a
discussion with defendant's mother, who remained
inside dunng the arrest U S C A Const Amend 4,
U C A 1953, 76-5-203

Supreme Court reviews under an abuse of discretion
standard a trial court's decision to admit evidence of
pnor crimes or other bad acts Rules of Evid, Rule
404(b)

[23] Searches and Seizures €=>180
349k 180 Most Cited Cases

[28] Criminal Law €=>371(4)
110k371(4) Most Cited Cases

Examination of whether police officers used duress
or coercion to obtain consent to warrantless search,
so as to render consent involuntary, is limited to
whether duress or coercion was exerted on the
person who consented to the search, not to an

[28] Criminal Law €==>371(12)
110k371(12) Most Cited Cases

[27] Criminal Law €==>369.2(1)
110k369 2(1) Most Cited Cases
In the proper exercise of discretion to admit pnor
bad acts evidence, trial judges must scrupulously
examine the evidence before it is admitted Rules
of Evid, Rule 404(b)

Prior bad acts evidence of drug debt that victim
owed murder defendant was admissible as relevant
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to defendant's motive and intent to assault and kill
victim U C A 1 9 5 3 , 76-5-203, Rules of Evid,
Rule 404(b)

erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm
will come by departing from precedent

[29] Criminal Law €=^369.2(1)
110k369 2(1) Most Cited Cases

[34] Criminal Law €^>30
110k30 Most Cited Cases

Evidence is relevant under rule governing prior bad
acts evidence if it tends to prove some fact that is
material to the crime charged Rules of Evid , Rule
404(b)

Trial court properly refused to merge defendant's
convictions for aggravated robbery and murder,
where it was not undisputed that defendant was
convicted of felony murder U C A 1953, 76-5-203,
76-6-302
*1076 Mark L Shurtleff, Att'y Gen, Jeffrey W
Gray, Asst Att'y Gen, Robert L Stott, Salt Lake
City, Lana Taylor, Bountiful, for plaintiff

[30] Criminal Law €^>371(4)
110k371(4) Most Cited Cases
[30] Criminal Law €^371(12)
110k371(12) Most Cited Cases
Probative value of prior bad acts evidence of drug
debt that victim owed murder defendant, to prove
defendant's motive and intent to assault and kill
victim, was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial impact U C A 1 9 5 3 , 76- 5-203, Rules
of Evid, Rule 404(b)
[31] Homicide €==>1372
203k 1372 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 203k309(l))
Manslaughter jury instruction, which related to the
necessity of convicting defendant for manslaughter
rather than murder if he was found to have been
acting under an "extreme emotional disturbance,"
was valid as against defendant's contention that it
was confusing because it implied that manslaughter
excluded all knowing and intentional homicides,
even when the accused suffered from an extreme
emotional disturbance U C A 1953, 76-5- 203
[32] Criminal Law C=>1134(1)
110k! 134(1) Most Cited Cases
Those asking Supreme Court to overturn prior
precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion,
which is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis
[33] Criminal Law €=>H34(1)
110k 1134( 1) Most Cited Cases
To convince Supreme Court that a previous rule
should be overturned, an appealing party must
clearly demonstrate that the rule was originally

Richard P Mauro, Michael R Sikora, Salt Lake
City, for defendant

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice
f 1 Defendant Russell Eugene Bisner ("Bisner")
appeals from convictions of murder, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-203
(1999), and aggravated robbery, also a first degree
felony, m violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302
(1999) We affirm
BACKGROUND
I FACTS
H 2 On the night of January 5, 1999, sometime
between 9 00 and 10 30, Bisner and his friend
Derek Pearson ("Pearson") visited Chnstopher
Lyman ("Lyman") at Lyman's apartment to
purchase LSD While at Lyman's apartment, Bisner
told Lyman that he was going to meet somebody
later that mght who owed him "something in th[e]
area" of $300 Then, as Bisner and Pearson left
Lyman's *1077 apartment, Bisner declared,
"Somebody is going to die tonight"
K 3 After leaving Lyman's residence, Bisner and
Pearson proceeded to the home of Justin Koontz
("Koontz"), where they gathered with several other
friends to "hang[ ] out" and "partyf ] " At the party,
the friends consumed alcohol and used various
illegal drugs, including marijuana and LSD
During one of the conversations at the party, Bisner
mentioned to his friends that he was owed a $350
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drug debt by Darby Golub ("Golub") Shortly
thereafter, Bisner telephoned Golub and left him a
message that the drug debt was supposed to have
been paid that day Subsequently, at approximately
2 00 on the morning of January 6, Golub called
Koontz's house Golub first spoke with Koontz,
and after an angry exchange then spoke with Dustin
Symes ("Symes"), another of Bisner's friends
attending the party Golub and Symes also
engaged in a vehement argument about the late
nature of the calls to the respective residences
This conversation ended with the parties agreeing to
meet at a nearby strip mall to settle the dispute
H 4 Following his conversation with Golub, Symes
informed Bisner, Koontz, and Pearson of the result
of the discussion Anticipating a fight, the four
considered but eventually decided against taking
guns with them to the strip mall Instead, they
quickly left in Symes's truck to meet Golub
% 5 When the friends arrived at the strip mall,
Golub was not there Symes therefore drove his
truck to a neighboring convenience store where
Koontz's mother was working and from which the
strip mall could be seen Approximately five
minutes later, Golub arrived and parked his own
truck in the parking lot of the strip mall Upon
seeing this, Symes called, "There he is " The four
friends waiting at the convenience store then
reentered Symes's truck and drove together to the
stop mall
K 6 At the strip mall, Symes parked his truck
approximately twenty feet from Golub's truck
After Symes parked, Golub stepped just outside of
his truck and stood alone with an assault rifle
cradled m his arms Bisner and his friends then
exited Symes's truck and advanced on Golub As
the group approached, Golub backed away, neither
firing his rifle nor threatening to do so Then,
Symes, who was carrying an aluminum baseball bat,
thrust the bat at Golub, cutting his head, knocking
him down, and causing him to drop the assault rifle
Koontz followed Symes's lead by punching Golub
in the leg Golub responded to this attack with
confusion, asking, "Why are you doing this 7 "
H 7 Having disarmed Golub, Koontz and Symes
retreated to Symes's vehicle Meanwhile, Bisner
and Pearson remained at Golub's truck, forcing him
to the ground and beating on him for approximately

thirty to forty-five seconds At that point, S>mes
yelled for his friends to return to the vehicle
Pearson complied with Symes's request, and just as
he, Koontz, and Symes were climbing into their
vehicle, Golub lifted himself from the ground and
began speeding away in his truck As Golub began
to flee, Bisner took the assault rifle from the
ground, cocked it, and fired three times at Golub
Bisner's shots missed, but as Golub continued to
speed away through the parking lot, Bisner fired the
rifle three additional times One of those rounds
struck Golub in the back of the head and killed him
U 8 Less than an hour later, at approximately 2 40
a m , Sandy City Police Officer Greg Severson
("Officer Severson") arrived at the strip mall in
response to the shooting At the scene, Officer
Severson learned from Koontz's mother, who
remained at the convenience store, that Bisner,
Koontz, Pearson, and Symes had been involved m a
confrontation that ultimately led to the shooting
Accordingly, Officer Severson proceeded to
Koontz's home, where Koontz and Pearson were
taken into custody While at the Koontz residence,
Officer Severson further learned that Bisner had just
telephoned Koontz Using the number that Bisner
had called from, which was recorded on the
Koontzes' caller identification service, Officer
Severson obtained Bisner's address and traveled
there with another Sandy City officer and three
sheriff s deputies
% 9 The police arrived at Bisner's home at
approximately 5 00 a m They then secured the
premises, called Bisner on the telephone, and took
him into custody at gunpomt after *1078 he exited
the house With Bisner safely in custody, Officer
Severson and the Sandy City officer accompanying
him holstered their weapons and approached the
house to speak with Bisner's mother The two
officers explamed that they were still looking for
one suspect involved in the shooting and asked
Bisner's mother for permission to search her home
Bisner's mother gave her permission for the search,
telling the two officers to "go ahead "
K 10 Beginning their search, the two officers
moved to the basement of the house, where, Bisner's
mother had informed them, Bisner lived Bisner's
room had been created at the end of a hallway in the
basement, and was separated from the adjoining
room by a cloth that had been draped from the
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ceiling and hung the length of the wall As the
officers descended the stairway into the basement,
Officer Severson observed through an opening in
this draped entry to Bisner's bedroom a shotgun and
an assault rifle resting m a gun rack on the floor of
the room In the basement, Officer Severson also
examined, but did not enter, a doorless closet
leading out of the hallway adjacent to Bisner's
room However, seeing "just clothing" inside the
closet, the officers proceeded to search the house
for Symes
T| 11 Having cleared the house for any possible
suspects, Officer Severson determined an additional
search would be necessary due to his discovery of
the two weapons in Bisner's room Officer
Severson therefore contacted his commanding
officer and requested that a detective be sent to
assist him in the search While Officer Severson
was waiting for the detective to arrive, he obtained
a "permission to search" form from his patrol car
and requested that Bisner's mother sign it so that he
could again search her home The form stated in
pertinent part
Knowing of my
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
not to have a search made of the premises and
property owned by me [without a search warrant]
, I willingly give my permission to the above
named officer(s) to conduct a complete search of
the premises and property, including all buildings
and vehicles, both inside and outside of the
property [referred to herein]
Bisner's mother read the permission form and
signed it at approximately 5 30 a m Bisner's sister,
who had been present throughout both the search
and her mother's conversations with Officer
Severson, also signed the form as a witness thereto
U 12 When Detective Mark Soper ("Detective
Soper") arrived at approximately 5 35 a m , Officer
Severson advised him of the progress of the search
Detective Soper then asked to speak privately with
Bisner's mother
During their conversation,
Detective Soper reviewed the permission to search
form that she had signed Bisner's mother
reaffirmed that she had read and signed the form,
and indicated that she did not have any questions
about its meaning Detective Soper then verbally
requested permission to search her home, and
Bisner's mother again consented to the search
However, Bisner's mother further advised Detective
Soper that Bisner was "supposed to pay rent" for his
Copr © West 2003 No Claim

room but had not done so for "the last two months
because he was unemployed "
K 13 Upon learning of Bisner's arrangement to pay
rent to his mother for use of his room, Detective
Soper determined that he would search the house
without entering the areas occupied exclusively by
Bisner until he could obtain a search warrant
allowing him to do so Commencing his search,
Detective Soper, like Officer Severson, was able to
view through an opening in the draped entry to
Bisner's room the shotgun and assault rifle
discovered there in the earlier search Detecti\e
Soper also examined, but did not enter, the doorless
closet near Bisner's room Looking into the closet,
Detective Soper saw various clothing that matched
a description of Bisner's attire from the day of the
shooting
Partially underneath some of the
clothing, Detective Soper observed the 'black
stock" of what "appeared to be [the mid-section of]
an assault-type rifle "
K 14 Subsequently, at approximately 10 30 that
morning, Detective Soper obtained a duly executed
search warrant commanding a daytime search of
Bisner's residence for, among other things, "[a]ny
firearms," "[a]ny ammunition," "[a]ny spent shell
casings," the clothes Bisner was described to have
been wearing just pnor to the shooting, and "[a]ny
other fruits or instrumentalities that are evidence of
the crime of criminal homicide " *1079 Using this
search warrant, Detective Soper returned to Bisner's
basement bedroom and confiscated
various
evidence, including the shotgun and assault rifle
seen in Bisner's room and the assault rifle m the
nearby closet The assault rifle confiscated from
Bisner's closet was the weapon used to kill Golub
II PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1 15 On January 11, 1999, the State charged
Bisner by information with murder and aggravated
robbery, both first degree felomes On February
22, 1999, Bisner served the State with a written
request for discovery In the interrogatory, Bisner
requested production of, among other things, a
[l]ist of all witnesses the [S]tate mtends to call at
the preliminary hearing, including
information
regarding the details of any cooperation
agreements (written or unwritten) between either
police officerfs] or the [district attorney]'s office
and potential witnesses, including offers of
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immunity, offers of lemency[,] or other incentives
designed to elicit cooperation such as the threat
of prosecutfion] for the homicide as a party
The State answered this request on March 16,
1999, noting, "The State has not yet determined its
witnesses for the preliminary hearing "
% 16 On May 10, 1999, Bisner next requested
from the State production of a "[l]ist of all
witnesses the State intends to call at trial, including
any information regarding the detail of any
written or oral cooperation agreement between any
police agency or officer, the State[,] and potential
witnesses " The State answered this request on May
18, 1999, informing Bisner that it would provide its
list of likely witnesses "[w]hen finalized "
K 17 Subsequently, on May 11, 1999, Bisner
moved the trial court to "suppress all evidence
found m [Bisner]'s house, including the gun
allegedly used by him m this case " According to
the motion, all of the evidence seized from Bisner's
residence was inadmissible since the search warrant
Detective Soper used to confiscate the evidence was
based on information gamed dunng Officer
Severson's "warrantless search," which violated
Bisner's Fourth Amendment right agamst unlawful
searches and seizures In response to this motion,
the State argued that Detective Soper's search
warrant was valid and constitutional because it was
obtained only on the basis of information gathered
during searches conducted with the express consent
of Bisner's mother, who owned the home at issue
f 18 On May 17, 1999, the trial court held a
preliminary hearing to consider Bisner's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from his residence
After considering evidence on the matter from both
sides, the court denied Bisner's motion to suppress,
concluding that his mother, as owner of the house,
voluntarily consented to both of the pre-warrant
searches that yielded the information from which
Detective Soper ultimately obtained his search
warrant and seized the evidence at issue In its
subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the matter, the trial court found
[Bisner's mother] gave her permission
[for the
officers] to make a cursory search of her home to
determine if any other suspects were inside
[Following this preliminary search, Bisner's
mother again] willingly gave her permission for
the police to complete a search of her premises
Copr © West 2003 No Claim

and property and to take any property which they
desired as evidence
The court therefore ruled, "From the totality of
circumstances, [Bisner's mother]'s consent to
search on both occasions was given voluntarily
[Thus,] [b]oth pre-warrant searches conducted by
Officer Severson and Detective Soper were valid
and lawful Neither violated any of the defendant's
constitutional rights "
\ 19 Thereafter, on August 19, 1999, less than a
week before trial, Bisner moved to exclude "[a]ny
evidence as to a monetary debt from a drug deal"
between Bisner and Golub In support of this
motion, Bisner asserted that evidence of the drug
debt was irrelevant, constituted "inadmissible
character evidence" pursuant to Utah Rule of
Evidence 404(b), and was thus more prejudicial
than probative
^ 20 Then, approximately three days before trial,
Bisner's attorney learned that Lyman might have
entered into two agreements *1080 with the
prosecution for his testimony in Bisner's trial
Specifically, after learning from the State that
Lyman would be testifying at trial,
A defense investigator contacted Lyman to
discuss his expected testimony and learned that at
the time Lyman first spoke to police he had a
pending misdemeanor charge, and that after he
gave his statement [to the police], someone spoke
to the judge on his behalf and he got eight days
off of a ten day sentence, the dismissal of a fine[,]
and "something else "
Bisner's attorney suspected that the "something
else" referred to by Lyman possibly included a "no
prosecution" agreement from the State on potential
drug distribution charges arising out of his sale of
LSD to Bisner and Pearson Accordingly, on the
first day of trial, August 24, 1999, Bisner moved to
have the trial court exclude the testimony of "any
[S]tate witness [for] whom the State has not
provided full disclosure of any agreements,
inducements, offers of leniency, or other
understandings that the witness would receive some
benefit for cooperating or testifying" m Bisner's
trial The basis for this motion was that by failing
to disclose any cooperation agreements it had made,
the State violated Bisner's due process rights m
contradiction to Brady v Maryland, 373 U S 83,
83 SCt 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)
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H 21 After the jury had been impaneled for trial,
the trial court conducted a hearing on Bisner's
motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub
owed Bisner Ruling that the drug debt evidence
was admissible to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e]
gathering that resulted in Golub's death," the trial
court denied Bisner's motion
U 22 At trial, the State first called Lyman to the
witness stand On cross- examination, Bisner's
attorney questioned Lyman at length about any
incentive he received for testifying in Bisner's trial
Bisner's attorney first asked Lyman whether he had
received "any sort of a deal" for testifying, and
Lyman responded "No, I was not given immunity
or any kind of written statement
that I would not
be prosecuted" Bisner's attorney then questioned
Lyman about any incentives he had received for
giving his statement concerning the case to the
police Lyman stated
When I ga\e the statement [to the police], there
really was no agreement They told me [that
they] couldn't promise anything
, [that] they
wouldn't even be able to tell me whether or not
they could knock any time off I basically told
[them] what I told you so far[,] and they said
they'd see what they could do I wasn't
guaranteed anything at the time of the statement
However,
after
further
questioning
Lyman
admitted that for giving his statement to the police,
he did eventually have to serve only "two days [in
jail] instead of ten days" for a misdemeanor he had
committed in events unrelated to Golub's death, and
that he "apparently" also avoided imposition of a
fine for that crime
K 23 As a result of this admission, Bisner moved
the trial court to strike Lyman's testimony from the
record Bisner's attorney argued
The [basis] for the motion
to strike the
testimony of Chris Lyman [is] on due process
grounds due to an undisclosed cooperation
agreement for his testimony
[T]here is a
dispute as to whether there was any deal in this
case The Prosecutor has indicated to me that
there was none The evidence elicited from
Chris Lyman himself was that there was none
[But i]t is my view that his testimony indicates a
de facto deal
Mr Lyman agreed that he stated to my
investigator that there was [a] jail sentence that

he got help on, a fine, and something else
[And] I believe that
Mr Lyman was told,
perhaps through counsel, that he would not be
prosecuted for certain admitted drug distribution
charges [arising from his sale of LSD to Bisner
and Pearson], which would be second degree
felonies
The State then responded to this argument,
attesting that it had not abstained from prosecuting
Lyman m exchange for his testimony
Yes, Mr Lyman's attorney was concerned [that
Lyman would be prosecuted for drug distribution
based on his testimony at trial] I told him
simply that because we had no corpus of this
crime, we *1081 wouldn't be able to prosecute his
client because we had no evidence other than his
statements that there was a crime committed So
there was no inducement I didn't promise him I
wouldn't prosecute him for his testimony I just
told him a simple fact [ ] I couldn't prosecute him
After considering this evidence, the trial court
denied Bisner's motion to strike Lyman's testimony
Finding that Bisner's attorney knew of any potential
agreement between Lyman and the authorities
involved in his unrelated misdemeanor charge prior
to trial—and that it was "quite clear" Lyman had not
received "an inducement encouraging him to
testify" from the State—the court concluded, "I am
just not persuaded that there has been a [due
process] violation [in this case] " The court
therefore also denied a motion for directed verdict
Bisner had made on the basis that without Lyman's
testimony, the State could only prove Bisner had
committed manslaughter and not murder because
intent could not be established
H 24 Bisner then rested without presenting
evidence, and the jury was sent out Following its
deliberations, the jury found Bisner guilty of both
murder and aggravated robbery The jury further
found that Bisner had used a dangerous weapon m
the commission of Golub's murder
K 25 Subsequently, on September 14, 1999,
Bisner moved the trial court to merge his
aggravated robbery and murder convictions To
support this motion, Bisner argued that despite this
court's holding to the contrary in State v McCovey,
803 P 2d 1234 (Utah 1990), "aggravated robbery is
a lesser included offense of murder," and thus, he
could not "be convicted of both offenses" pursuant
to section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code Relying
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on McCovev the court denied Bisner's motion
% 26 Thereafter, on October 1, 1999, the trial
court sentenced Bisner to an indeterminate prison
term of not less than five years for murder and not
less than five years for aggravated robbery, with a
one-year dangerous firearm enhancement in the
commission of murder, all sentences running
consecutively
% 27 Following his sentencing, Bisner moved for a
new trial on the ground that the State violated his
due process rights by "fail[mg] to disclose a
cooperation agreement for Chris Lyman
m which
the State agreed not to prosecute Lyman for drug
distribution charges" The court denied Bisner's
motion for a new trial in a ruling dated November
23,1999

grant a new trial, since the State violated Bisner's
due process rights by failing to disclose its alleged
cooperation agreements with Koontz, Lyman,
Pearson, and Symes, (2) that the court committed
reversible error by failing to exclude from evidence
all information obtained pursuant to Detective
Soper's search warrant, which Bisner contends was
gained "in violation of the Fourth Amendment", (3)
that the court erred by refusing to exclude evidence
of the drug debt Golub owed Bisner, (4) that the
court misled the jury by giving a "confusing" *1082
instruction concerning the necessity of convicting
Bisner of manslaughter rather than murder if he was
found to have been acting "under an extreme
emotional disturbance", and (5) that the trial court
should have merged his charges for aggravated
robbery and murder We address each issue m turn
I DUE PROCESS

f 28 Accordingly, on December 1, 1999, Bisner
moved the trial court to reconsider his motion for a
new tiial pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 24 To support this motion, Bisner
argued first that his previous motion "was denied
without the hearing requested," and second, that he
subsequently "obtained new evidence that the State
also failed to disclose cooperation agreements" with
Koontz and Pearson
K 29 However, before the trial court could rule on
Bisner's motion to reconsider, he appealed his
conviction on December 30, 1999
Then,
attempting to obtain a ruling on his motion to
reconsider, Bisner moved to have his appeal
dismissed without prejudice, and we denied his
motion in an order dated August 31, 2000
Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal without
prejudice while the trial court considers
defendant's motion to reconsider
is denied
Dismissal of this appeal would necessarily be with
prejudice, resulting in loss of defendant's appeal
The trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
anything further in this case because defendant
timely filed his notice of appeal on December 30,
1999
Consequently, Bisner's appeal of his conviction is
now before us
ANALYSIS
f 30 On appeal, Bisner raises numerous claims of
error (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to
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[1][2] T| 31 Bisner first contends that by failing to
disclose alleged cooperation agreements it entered
into with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and Symes, the
State violated his due process right to a fair trial,
and thus, the trial court should have granted his
motion for a new trial made on that basis "When
reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new
trial, we will not reverse 'absent a clear abuse of
discretion by the trial court' " State v Colwell,
2000 UT 8, U 12, 994 P 2d 177 (quoting State v
Harmon 956 P 2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)), see
also State v Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 28, 979 P 2d
799, State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 245 (Utah
1992) At the same time, however, we review the
legal standards applied by the trial court m denying
such a motion for correctness Bakalov, 1999 UT
45 at H 28, 979 P 2d 799, see also State v James,
819 P 2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)
{3][4][5] H 32 Under both the Utah and United
States Constitutions, the prosecution bears a
"fundamental"
duty
"to
disclose
material,
exculpatory evidence to the defense" m criminal
cases Bakalov 1999 UT 45 at f 30, 979 P 2d 799
This duty, enunciated first by the United States
Supreme Court in Brady v Maryland, 373 U S 83,
87, 83 SCt 1194, 10 LEd2d 215 (1963), arises
regardless of whether the defense requests
production of the favorable evidence at issue,
United States v Bagley, 473 U S 667, 682, 105
SCt 3375, 87 LEd2d 481 (1985), since failure to
disclose such evidence "violates due process
Ong U S Govt Works
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irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution" Brady 373 U S at 87, 83 S Ct 1194
Likewise, the duty applies both to substantively
exculpatory evidence and to that which may be used
for impeachment Bagley 473 U S at 676, 105
SCt 3375, Gigho v United States, 405 U S 150,
154-55, 92 SCt 763, 31 LEd2d 104 (1972),
Bakalov 1999 UT 45 at H 30, 979 P 2d 799
[6]U] 1f 33 Despite the strictures imposed on
prosecutors by this constitutional duty of disclosure,
the United States Supreme Court has held that it is
m the specific instance where there is "discovery,
after trial, of information which had been known to
the prosecution but unknown to the defense" that
reversal of a conviction for nondisclosure is
required United States v Agurs All U S 97, 103,
96 SCt 2392, 49 LEd2d 342 (1976) (emphasis
added), see also Bagley 473 U S at 678, 105 S Ct
3375 Accordingly, courts universally refuse to
overturn convictions where the evidence at issue is
known to the defense prior to or during trial, where
the defendant reasonably should have known of the
evidence, or where the defense had the opportunity
to use the evidence to its advantage during tnal but
failed to do so [FNl] As the *1083 Sixth Circuit
held in United States v Mulhns,
FNl
See
eg
United States v
Wadhngton 233 F 3d 1067, 1076 (8th
Or 2000) (refusing to find a Brady
violation where the defendant "was already
aware of the substance of the [undisclosed]
statements pnor to trial"), United States v
Quintamlla, 193 F3d 1139, 1149 (10th
Cir 1999) (holding that a defendant's
"independent awareness of the exculpatory
evidence is critical" because "[i]f a
defendant already has a particular piece of
evidence," production by the prosecution
"is considered cumulative"), Rector v
Johnson, 120 F 3d 551, 560 (5th Cir 1997)
(finding that evidence is not suppressed if
the defendant "knew, or should have
known of the essential facts permitting him
to take advantage of any exculpatory
evidence"), United States v Zackson, 6
F3d 911, 919 (2d Cir 1993) (rejectmg a
claim of a Brady violation because the
defendant "was
aware that [a witness's]
cooperation may have warranted some

additional investigation"), United States v
Aichele 941 F 2d 761, 764 (9th Cir 1991)
("When
a defendant has enough
information to be able to ascertain the
supposed Brady material on his own, there
is no suppression by the government"),
United States v Peidomo 929 F 2d 967,
973 (3d Cir 1991) (employing the Rector
standard), United States v Clark 928
F2d 733, 738 (6th Cir 1991) (using the
Mulhns standard), United States v Wilson
901 F2d 378, 380 (4th Cir 1990)
(following the Eleventh Circuit's approach
m Davis ), United States v Pandozzi 878
F2d 1526, 1528 (1st Cir 1989) (finding no
Brady violation where defense could have
obtained the information " 'with any
reasonable diligence' " (quoting Jarrell v
Balkcom 735 F 2d 1242, 1258 (11th
Cir 1984))), United States v Adams 834
F2d 632, 634 (7th Cir 1987) ("Brady
does not mandate pretrial disclosure
Instead, 'the appropriate standard to be
applied
is whether the disclosure came
so late as to prevent the defendant from
receiving a fair trial' " (citations omitted)),
United States v Davis 787 F 2d 1501,
1505 (11th Cir 1986) (M[T]he Brady rule
does not apply if the evidence m question
is available to the defendant from other
sources"), Xydas v United States 445
F2d 660, 668 (DC Cir 1971) (holding
that the prosecution's failure "to disclose
the contested grand jury statement was not
reversible
error,
since
under
the
circumstances
reasonable pre-trial
preparation by the defense would either
have confirmed, denied, or rendered
immaterial" the evidence m dispute)
[T]he government's failure to disclose potentially
exculpatory information does not violate Brady
"where a defendant 'knew or should have known
the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory information,' or
where the evidence is available to defendant from
another source "
22 F3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir 1994) (quoting
United States v Clark 928 F 2d 733, 738 (6th
Cir 1991) (quoting United States v Grossman 843
F2d 78, 85 (2d Cir 1988))) Indeed, any mandate
to the contrary would belie the fundamental
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objective of the prosecution's duty to disclose, for
the purpose of this requirement is to ensure a fair
trial The United States Supreme Court has itself
observed "[The] purpose [of the Brady rule] is not
to displace the adversary system as the primary
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure
that a miscarriage of justice does not occur Thus,
the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire
file to defense counsel, but only to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused that, if
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair
trial[]" Bagley 473 U S at 675, 105 S Ct 3375
(footnotes omitted), see also United States v
LeRoy 687 F 2d 610, 619 (2d Cir 1982) In short,
a Bradv violation occurs only where the state
suppresses information that (1) remains unknown to
the defense both before and throughout trial and (2)
is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure
would have created a "reasonable probability" that
"the result of the proceeding would have been
different" Bagley 473 U S at 682, 105 S Ct 3375
% 34 In this case, Bisner contends that the State
committed multiple due process violations m
contravention to the Brady rule, requiring us to
overturn his convictions on appeal Specifically,
Bisner argues that the State failed to disclose
cooperation agreements it allegedly entered into
with a number of its witnesses, including Lyman,
and also Koontz, Pearson, and Symes
A Nondisclosure of the Alleged Agreement with
Lyman
[8] ^1 35 Bisner asserts that the State failed to
disclose two separate incentives it allegedly
provided to Lyman for testifying in Bisner's trial
first, a reduction in the jail time Lyman was
required to serve and the fine he was ordered to pay
for an unrelated misdemeanor he committed, and
second, a "promise not to prosecute" Lyman for
selling Bisner and Pearson LSD on the night of
Golub's death According to Bisner, the State's
failure to disclose these alleged incentives "is
reversible error "
[9] ^ 36 However, as explained above,
prosecutorial
nondisclosure
of
information
favorable to the accused does not by itself constitute
prejudicial error requiring reversal of a conviction
See eg Bagley 473 U S at 675, 105 S Ct 3375,
LeRoy 687 F 2d at 619 Rather, nondisclosure
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violates due process under Brady only if the
evidence at issue is material and exculpatory and if
the defense did not become aware of the evidence
until after trial See Bagley 473 U S at 678, 105
S Ct 3375, Agurs 421 U S at 103, 96 S Ct 2392,
Mulhns 22 F3d at 1371, see also supra note 1
Accordingly, even assuming that the cooperation
agreements alleged here by Bisner actually
existed—and observing that their substance would
qualify by definition as Brady material for its
impeachment value, see Gigho 405 U S at 154-55,
92 S Ct 763-the State's nondisclosure of such
evidence necessitates reversal only upon a
determination that the defense was never afforded
an opportunity to impeach Lyman with the
information because the defense did not become
aware of it until after Bisner's trial ended
K 37 Importantly, there is no question in this case
that the defense knew days before trial about the
State's alleged agreement to *1084 reduce the jail
sentence and fine imposed m Lyman's unrelated
misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony m
Bisner's trial The defense itself admitted in its
motion for a new trial
A few days prior to trial,
[a] defense
investigator contacted Lyman to discuss his
expected testimony and learned that at the time
Lyman first spoke to police he had a pending
misdemeanor charge, and that after he gave his
statement [to the police], someone spoke to the
judge on his behalf and he got eight days off of a
ten day sentence, the dismissal of a fine[,] and
"something else "
Indeed, it was because he was aware of the
possibility of this agreement with Lyman that
Bisner's attorney was able to use this information
extensively at trial m an attempt to impeach
Lyman's testimony Bisner's attorney asked Lyman
whether he received "any sort of deal for
giving
th[e] information" about what Bisner had said to
him earlier that night, whether he had "talk[ed]
[with the police] about getting out of some jail time
if [he would] cooperate," and whether it was his
"understanding that if [he] cooperate[d] and g[a]ve
a statement to the pohce[,] that [he] would not have
to serve
eight [additional] days" m jail In fact,
Lyman conceded during this questioning that he had
received a reduction m his sentence, stating that he
had to serve only "two days [m jail] instead of ten"
and that he "apparently" also avoided an imposition
of a fine for his commission of the misdemeanor
Ong U S Govt Works
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As a consequence, Bisner's claim that his due
process rights were violated by the State's failure to
disclose this alleged agreement with Lyman is
wholly without merit Not only does the defense
admit that it knew about this alleged agreement
days before trial, but Bisner's attorney actually used
the information for the precise purpose the
Constitution requires its disclosure impeachment
See Gigho 405 U S at 154-55, 92 S Ct 763
Therefore, the State's nondisclosure of its alleged
agreement to seek a reduction m Lyman's
misdemeanor sentence in exchange for his
testimony does not constitute a Brady violation
See Mulhns 22 F 3d at 1371, Grossman, 843 F 2d
at 85, see also, eg, United States v Gnntjes, 237
F3d 876, 880 (7th Cir2001) ("Bradv applies only
where the allegedly exculpatory evidence was not
disclosed in time for the defendant to make use of
it"), United States v Adams, 834 F 2d 632, 634-35
(7th Cir 1987) (same), United States v Sweeney,
688 F2d 1131, 1141 (7th Cir 1982) (holding that
the defendants' due process rights were not violated
by the nondisclosure of evidence because the
defense used the same evidence to impeach the
witnesses at issue durmg trial)
[10] \ 38 Likewise, Bisner has no claim that the
State's failure to disclose its alleged promise not to
prosecute Lyman for drug distribution violated his
right to a fair trial While the record does not
reflect the precise moment at which the defense
became aware of this alleged promise, it is clear
that the defense knew about the possibility of the
inducement well before the trial concluded~at the
very least, by the end of the State's case in chief In
the hearing on his motion to strike Lyman's
testimony, held just after the State exammed its last
witness, Bisner's attorney specifically alleged it was
his "view that [Lyman's] testimony indicates a de
facto deal" on the State's part not to prosecute
Lyman for drug distribution Bisner's attorney
stated further, "I believe that
Mr Lyman was
told, perhaps through counsel, that he would not be
prosecuted for certain admitted drug distribution
charges " In response, counsel for the State
acknowledged that he had told Lyman's attorney
that the State "wouldn't be able to prosecute
[Lyman] because [the State] had no evidence other
than his statements that there was a crime
committed"
However,
despite
the
State's
acknowledgment m this regard-and despite Bisner's
assertion that Lyman had received a "de facto deal"

of
nonprosecution
in
exchange
for
his
testimony-the defense utterly failed to make use of
this knowledge during trial Following the hearing
on his motion to strike Lyman's testimony, Bisner
could have recalled Lyman as a witness to question
him specifically about the nature of the alleged "de
facto deal" guaranteeing that the State would not
prosecute him for drug distribution
Bisner
similarly could have sought a continuance or recess
in order to further investigate the exculpatory
potential of the evidence But the defense did not
capitalize on either of these possibilities Instead,
*1085 when asked by the trial court whether it
wished to call any witnesses, the defense declined,
noting that it was "satisfied with the state of the
evidence " Consequently, we hold that because the
defense was afforded a full opportunity "to make
use of the disclosed information," but failed to do
so, the State's nondisclosure of its alleged promise
not to prosecute Lyman did not violate Bisner's due
process rights Adams, 834 F 2d at 635, see also
Gnntjes, 237 F 3d at 880 (holding that no Brady
violation occurred where the defendant failed to use
the allegedly exculpatory information disclosed
during trial), Mulhns, 22 F 3d at 1371-72 (finding
no Brady violation where information "was known"
by the defendant "in time for him to attempt to
make use of it"), United States v Ramirez, 810
F 2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir 1987) (same)
B Nondisclosure of the Alleged Agreements with
Koontz, Pearson, and Symes
[11] f 39 Bisner also claims that the State violated
his due process nghts under Brady by failing to
disclose leniency agreements it allegedly entered
into with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes concerning
the charges they faced for their actions in the events
leading to Golub's death However, Bisner failedto
properly preserve this claim at the trial level, and
thus waived his nght to raise the issue on appeal.
While Bisner did move for a new trial on the basis
that the State had failed to disclose the inducements
it allegedly offered Lyman for his testimony, Bisner
never properly raised before the tnal court his
assertion, made now on appeal, that the State also
failed to disclose cooperation agreements it
allegedly entered into with Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes Indeed, the only time Bisner ever brought
the issue of the alleged agreements with Koontz and
Pearson before the tnal court was in his December
1, 1999, motion requesting that the court reconsider
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its decision denying his initial motion for a new
trial Significantly, the trial court never ruled on
this motion to reconsider, as Bisner filed his notice
of appeal on December 30, 1999, divesting
jurisdiction from the trial court See Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass'n v Foothills Water Co
942 P2d 305, 306 (Utah 1996) (holding that filing
notice of appeal "divests the trial court of
jurisdiction and transfers it to the appellate court"),
see also Cheves v Williams 1999 UT 86, ^ 45,
993 P2d 191, White v State 795 P 2d 648, 650
(Utah 1990) In fact, we have already ruled in this
case that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Bisner's motion to reconsider since Bisner filed
notice of appeal before the trial court could enter a
final order on the issue See supra 1f 29
("Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal without
prejudice while the trial court considers defendant's
motion to reconsider
is denied The trial court
lacks jurisdiction to consider anything further m this
case because defendant timely filed his notice of
appeal on December 30, 1999 ") Similarly, Bisner
did not argue even once to the trial court that the
State had failed to disclose a cooperation agreement
with Symes [FN2] Accordingly, because Bisner
failed to preserve the issue below, he cannot now
claim that the State violated his due process rights
by failing to disclose alleged leniency agreements
with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes See State v
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P 3d 346
("[CJlaims not raised before the trial court may not
be raised on appeal
[This] preservation rule
applies to every claim, including constitutional
questions "), Monson v Carver, 928 P 2d 1017,
1022 (Utah 1996) (holding that constitutional
claims not raised in the district court are deemed to
be waived), see also *1086State v Thomas, 1999
UT 2, H 29, 974 P 2d 269, State v Lopez, 886
P 2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)

FN2 In fact, even Bisner's December 1,
1999, motion to reconsider addressed only
the testimony of Lyman, Koontz, and
Pearson Yet two months after Bisner
filed his motion to reconsider, he
submitted to the trial court a document
entitled "supplement to record of motion
for new trial," which mcluded a transcript
of Symes's sentencing hearing that Bisner
now relies on m support of his argument
that Symes entered into a leniency

agreement with the State However, at no
point in this "supplement" does Bisner
ever assert that the alleged agreement
between Symes and the State violated his
due process rights Instead, as explained
above, Bisner so argues for the first time
on appeal See supra f 39 Further,
Bisner submitted this "supplement" to the
trial court on February 1, 2000—more than
a month after he filed his notice of appeal
on December 30, 1999, and thus well after
the trial court had been divested of
jurisdiction to consider the matter See
supra ^ 39

[12][13] 1| 40 Moreover, even if Bisner did not
waive his right to raise the issue on appeal, the
State's nondisclosure of its alleged leniency
agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes did
not violate Brady As with the inducements
allegedly promised to Lyman, the State's alleged
leniency agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes fall withm Brady 's purview solely for their
impeachment value See Gigho 405 U S at
154-55, 92 SCt 763 However, both Koontz and
Pearson admitted at trial that they had pled guilty to
reduced misdemeanor charges despite the fact that
they had initially been charged with felonies, and
Symes testified at Bisner's preliminary hearing that
the State would inform his sentencing judge that he
had testified cooperatively in Bisner's case
Specifically, Koontz acknowledged that he had
been charged with "murder" but "ended up pleading
to attempted notmg, class A, and a class B assault"
Pearson likewise testified that he had been charged
with "felony not" but "pled guilty to
a class B
and a class A
attempted not and simple assault"
And Symes testified that the State had agreed to
"[i]nform the court of my testimony and [that] I was
cooperative" following his appearance as a witness
in Bisner's case Accordingly, because the
necessary information from which the credibility of
their testimony could be questioned actually came
out at trial and before, the State cannot be said to
have withheld exculpatory information
The
defense could have further exposed any potential
leniency agreements with the smallest amount of
"reasonable diligence" by simply asking Koontz and
Pearson why their charges had been reduced, and
Symes had already disclosed the nature of his
agreement with the State in the presence of Bisner's
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attorney and while under oath See United States v
Campagnuolo 592 F 2d 852, 861 (5th Cir 1979),
see also eg Grintjes 237 F 3d at 880, Jan ell v
Balkcom 735 F 2d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir 1984)
Given these circumstances, the defense reasonably
should have known of the possibility of the alleged
agreements, as Bisner's attorney possessed the
"essential facts permitting [Bisner] to take
advantage of any exculpatory evidence" related to
Koontz's, Pearson's, and Symes's testimony Rector
120 F 3d at 560 Thus, no Brady violation could
have occurred See United States v Zackson 6
F 3d 911, 919 (2d Cir 1993) (rejecting a claim of a
Brady violation because the defendant "was
aware that [a witness's] cooperation may have
warranted some additional investigation"), United
States v Aichele 941 F 2d 761, 764 (9th Cir 1991)
("When
a defendant has enough information to
be able to ascertain the supposed Biady matenal on
his own, there is no suppression by the
government"), see also e g United States v
Perdomo 929 F 2d 967, 973 (3d Cir 1991), LeRoy
687 F 2d at 618 [FN3]

FN3 Bisner also urges that the State's
failure to disclose its alleged cooperation
agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson,
and Symes violated his constitutional right
to confront these witnesses and his
discovery rights pursuant to Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure
16(a)
However,
Bisner did not lodge these arguments
before the trial court Thus, he has waived
his right to raise them on appeal See
State v Holgate 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10
P3d 346, State v Thomas, 1999 UT 2, %
29, 974 P 2d 269, Monson v Carver 928
P2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996), State v
Lopez 886 P 2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)

the warrant was obtained unconstitutionally
Specifically, Bisner asserts (1) that his mother did
not give Officer Severson "voluntary consent to
conduct [the]
search" of her home immediately
following Bisner's arrest, and (2) that the
subsequent search conducted by Detective Soper
also was unconstitutional since the written consent
given by Bisner's mother was involuntary, as it "was
obtained by exploiting the prior unlawful,
warrantless search"
[14][15][16] U 42 The question of whether a party
has voluntarily consented to a search is a question
of law, and we therefore review it *1087 for
correctness State v Harmon 910 P 2d 1196, 1199
(Utah 1995), see also Landes v Capital City Bank
795 P2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) Conversely, we
will reverse the trial court's factual findings only if
they are clearly erroneous Harmon 910 P 2d at
1199, see also State v Arroyo 796 P 2d 684, 687
(Utah 1990) In determining whether a trial court's
factual findings are clearly erroneous, we reject
those findings that are not "supported by
substantial, competent evidence " Arroyo, 796 P 2d
at 687
A Applicable Law

II CONSENT TO SEARCH

[17][18][19] ^[ 43 Warrantless searches are per se
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
unless conducted pursuant to a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement Katz v
United States 389 U S 347, 353, 88 S Ct 507, 19
LEd2d 576 (1967), State v Brown, 853 P 2d 851,
855 (Utah 1992) One such exception includes
searches
conducted
pursuant
to
consent
Washington v Chrisman, 455 U S 1, 9-10, 102
SCt 812, 70 LEd2d 778 (1982), State v Harris,
671 P2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983) However, for a
consent search to be valid, consent must have been
given voluntarily and not have been "obtained by
police exploitation of
prior illegality " State v
Thurman, 846 P 2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)

T| 41 Bisner's second contention on appeal is that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence removed from his living
quarters in his mother's basement, namely, the
assault rifle used to kill Golub Bisner premises
this contention on the argument that the warrant
employed to confiscate the assault rifle was
ineffective because the information used to secure

H 44 In support of his contention that his mother
did not voluntarily consent to Officer Severson's
initial search of her house, Bisner urges that consent
is voluntary only if
"(1) [t]here [is] clear and positive testimony that
the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and
'freely
and intelligently given', (2) the
government
prove[s] consent was given
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without duress or coercion, express or implied,
and (3)
there [is] convincing evidence that [the
party] waived [its constitutional nght against
unreasonable searches and seizures] "
State v Ham, 910 P 2d 433, 439 (Utah
CtAppl996) (citations omitted) This test for
determining voluntarmess was adopted by the Utah
Court of Appeals in State v Marshall, 791 P 2d
880, 887-88 (Utah CtAppl990), and has been
applied in myriad of that court's cases over the past
decade [FN4] While this test correctly requires
absence of duress or coercion for consent to be
deemed voluntary, it also mandates a showing that
the consenting party affirmatively waived its
constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures See Ham, 910 P 2d at 439 In fact,
m adopting this test the court of appeals expressly
relied on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Villano v
United States, 310 F 2d 680, 684 (10th Cir 1962),
which also required affirmative waiver for consent
to be voluntary

FN4 See, eg, State v Hansen, 2000 UT
App 353, 1ffl 18-25, 17 P 3d 1135, Ham,
910 P2d at 439, State v Genovesi, 871
P2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct App 1994), State
v Carter, 812 P 2d 460, 467 (Utah
Ct App 1991), cert denied, 836 P 2d 1383
(Utah 1992), State v Grovier, 808 P 2d
133, 136 (Utah Ct App 1991), State v
Sterger, 808 P 2d 122, 127 (Utah
Ct App 1991)

H 45 However, eleven years after the Tenth
Circuit handed down Villano, the United States
Supreme Court flatly rejected the requirement that
the prosecution establish waiver in order to
demonstrate voluntariness
In Schneckloth v
Bustamonte, the Court held "Nothing, either in the
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and
'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical
application of such a requirement suggests that it
ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures" 412
U S 218, 241, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L Ed 2d 854
(1973) Consequently, the Court ruled that
voluntariness must be determined, not from a
demonstration of waiver, but from "the totality of
all the circumstances " Id at 227, 93 S Ct. 2041
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11 46 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision
m Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit has since
abandoned the Villano test See United States v
Price, 925 F 2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir 1991) ("In
light of the Schneckloth decision, we
find
the
Villano test's application of the presumption against
waiver improper ") Likewise, this court has itself
repeatedly followed the Schneckloth "totality of all
the circumstances" analysis in lieu of any potential
waiver test See, eg, Harmon, 910 P 2d at 1206,
State v Dunn, 850 P 2d 1201, 1217-18 (Utah 1993)
, Thurman, 846 P 2d at 1262-63, Arroyo 796 P 2d
at 689 Indeed, this court must follow Schneckloth
's interpretation of consent under the Fourth
Amendment, for the United States Supreme *1088
Court has been vested with final authority in
interpreting the federal Constitution since the
inception of our republic [FN5] See U S Const
art III, § 2, cl 1, Marbury v Madison, 5 U S (1
Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L Ed 60 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is ")

FN5 In addition to his claim that the
searches at issue violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, Bisner claims that the
searches also constituted violations of his
nghts pursuant to article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution However, Bisner
neither proffers any explanation as to how
this court's analysis should be conducted
under this section nor cites even one case
m support of this argument We have
repeatedly reminded that this court " 'is not
simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument
and research' " State v Bishop, 753 P 2d
439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson
v Opsahl, 92 111 App 3d 1087, 48 111 Dec.
510, 416 N E 2 d 783, 784 (1981)); see
also MacKay v Hardy, 973 P 2d 941, 948
n 9 (Utah 1998) Accordingly, we
decline to address this claim separately
State v Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 12 n 3, 999
P2d7

[20][21] K 47 Accordingly, to the degree it hinges
consent upon waiver- and to the extent our prior
cases have not made our position perfectly clearOng U S Govt Works
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we today explicitly reject the court of appeals'
voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its
progeny When assessing whether consent to a
warrantless search was given voluntarily, courts m
Utah must follow the same analysis we have
repeatedly applied since Schneckloth Consent is
not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of
duress or coercion, express or
implied"
Schneckloth 412 U S at 227, 93 S Ct 2041, see
also eg Haimon 910 P 2d at 1206, State v
Whittenback 621 P 2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)
Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion,
which should be assessed m the "totality of all the
surrounding circumstances," include,
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by
the officers, 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers, 3) a mere request to search,
4) cooperation by the owner of the [property],
and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the
part of the officer
Whittenback 621 P 2d at 106, see also Harmon
910 P 2d at 1206
B Consent for Officer Severson's Search
% 48 Applying these factors to the case at hand,
we now turn to the question of whether Bisner's
mother voluntarily consented to Officer Severson's
search Bisner asserts that the police coerced his
mother's consent to this search by making a "show
of authority" and an "exhibition of force," which in
turn transformed their petition to search her house
into "more than a 'mere request' to search"
Specifically, Bisner argues that the police exhibited
force and showed authority by having "several
uniformed officers" present during Bisner's arrest,
by "physical[ly] touching" Bisner and drawing their
weapons while taking him into custody, by stepping
"inside the front door [of the house] before asking
permission to search," and by telling Bisner's
mother and sisters to stay in their kitchen while
Officer Severson searched the house
[22][23] K 49 Despite Bisner's contention to the
contrary, however, the officers' actions directed at
him dunng his arrest are wholly irrelevant to
whether the officers exhibited force toward his
mother While we do review the totality of the
circumstances in assessing whether the officers used
duress or coercion to obtain consent to search, that
examination is limited to whether duress or
coercion was exerted on the person who consented
to the search, Bisner's mother, not to an entirely

separate person, Bisner See Harmon 910 P 2d at
1206-08, Thwman
846 P 2d at 1262-63
Moreover, Bisner does not challenge the trial
court's factual findings in respect to the search, and
those findings indicate that the officers did not
exhibit force against Bisner's mother during her
son's arrest The officers telephoned Bisner from
outside the house, requesting that he come outside
and surrender himself, which he did When Bisner
exited the house, the officers had their weapons
drawn, but they were pointed at Bisner, not at his
mother Indeed, Bisner's mother remained in her
house throughout Bisner's arrest And when
Officer Severson and his assisting
officer
approached the house, their guns were holstered,
where they remained throughout the officers'
discussion with Bisner's mother
*1089 [24] f 50 Similarly, there is no indication
that the officers' possible stepping inside the house's
front door constituted a "show of authority" as
Bisner contends In support of this argument,
Bisner relies entirely on Officer Severson's
statement that he "was just inside the door" when he
asked Bisner's mother for her consent to search
However, Bisner takes this statement out of context
m order to assert that Officer Severson entered the
house intending to search before asking permission
to do so In fact, Officer Severson repeatedly
characterized the discussion he had with Bisner's
mother as occurring "at the door" of the house
When asked where their discussion took place,
Officer Severson stated, "We were at the door" He
also averred that their discussion occurred "on the
front of the step" of the house and "on the porch"
Indeed, when stating that their discussion may have
gone on inside the house, Officer Severson testified
that he "d[id]n't remember if [he] was inside" the
house, but that "if [he] was inside, [he] was just
inside the door"—a conclusion entirely in
conformity with his other statements that the
discussion occurred "at the door" Importantly,
these statements amply support the trial court's
factual finding that Officer Severson merely "spoke
to [Bisner's mother,] who identified herself as the
home owner," in an effort to tell her that "he wanted
to make a cursory search of her home," not that he
barged into her home without permission as Bisner
implies

[25] K 51 Finally, the record does not support
Bisner's
argument
that the
"police used
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'commanding language' " by "ordering [his] family
to stay in the kitchen dunng [Officer Severson's]
search" Although Officer Severson testified that
he and his accompanying officer "had all of the
family members stay up in the kitchen and living
room area," nothing in his testimony indicates that
he "commanded" or "ordered" them to do so
Rather, the only testimony Bisner cites in support of
this contention is his mother's But she simply
stated that she had asked the police if she could
accompany them on their search, since she was
afraid their presence would "frighten [her] mother
[who was] m bed" When the officers declined her
request, she opened the door to her mother's
bedroom and stated, "[M]om, stay calm Just stay
in bed
[T]he police are here " Subsequently, the
police "told [her] to go back in the kitchen"
Again, nothing in these statements indicates that
Officer Severson "commanded" or "ordered"
Bisner's family members to remain in their kitchen
m an effort to coerce Bisner's mother into
consenting to the search To the contrary, Officer
Severson specifically testified that Bisner's mother
had told the officers to "go ahead" with their search
Moreover, the statements of both Officer Severson
and Bisner's mother in regard to the officers'
instructions that the family should stay in the
kitchen reflect, not the officers' use of authority and
force, but their desire to protect Bisner's family, as
the officers "believed that three [suspects] were m
custody [but that] one was still outstanding" and
may have been inside the house
Tf 52 Therefore, having exammed the record in the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court properly found the police officers made
no showing of force or authority, but merely
requested permission to search See Whittenback,
621 P2d at 106 As a result, we hold that Bisner's
mother voluntarily consented to Officer Severson's
search of her home See Harmon, 910 P 2d at 1208
C Consent for Detective Soper's Search
% 53 Bisner also argues that the wntten consent
from Bisner's mother for Detective Soper's
subsequent search of the house was given
involuntarily However, Bisner does not argue that
the police exercised duress or coercion in securmg
this consent, only that it "was obtained by
exploiting the prior unlawful, warrantless search "
Copr © West 2003 No Claim

While Bisner correctly states that consent obtained
"by exploitation of prior police illegality" may be
deemed involuntary under certain conditions, eg
State v Arroyo, 796 P 2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), we
have already determined in this case that the search
by Officer Severson was entirely proper and legal
See supra 1fl[ 48-52 Consequently, we find
Bisner's argument that the consent for Detective
Soper's search was given involuntarily to be without
merit, and thus, hold that the trial court did not err
in denying his motion to *1090 suppress the
evidence seized from his living quarters in his
mother's basement
III PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
[26][27] U 54 Bisner's third contention on appeal
is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owed him
We review a trial court's decision to admit
evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts under an
abuse of discretion standard State v Widdison
2001 UT 60, \ 42, 28 P 3d 1278, State v Decorso
1999 UT 57, \ 18, 993 P 2d 837, cert denied
528 U S 1164, 120 S Ct 1181, 145 LEd2d 1088
(2000) "However, in the proper exercise of that
discretion, trial judges must 'scrupulously' examine
the evidence before it is admitted " Widdison 2001
UT 60 at \ 42, 28 P 3d 1278 (quoting Decorso,
1999 UT 57 at \ 18, 993 P 2d 837)
11 55 Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits
admission of "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts" if offered "to prove the character of a person
m order to show action in conformity therewith "
Utah R Evid 404(b) Such evidence, however, is
admissible "for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident" so long as it is also relevant and more
probative than prejudicial Id, see Utah R Evid
402, 403 Accordingly, when deeming evidence of
poor bad acts admissible, the trial court must first
determine that the evidence is being offered for a
proper, noncharacter purpose under rule 404(b),
that it " 'tends to prove some fact that is material to
the crime charged
other than the defendant's
propensity to commit crime' ", and that the
evidence's probativeness m this regard is not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact
State v Nelson- Waggoner 2000 UT 59, f 26, 6
P3d 1120 (quoting Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1J 22,
Ong U S Govt Works
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993 P 2d 837), see also State v Mead 2001 UT
58, 1ffl 61-64, 27 P3d 1115, £tecora> 1999 UT
57 at UU 20-23, 993 P 2d 837, Utah R Evid 402,
403, 404(b)
K 56 In this case, Bisner argues that evidence of
Golub's drug debt to him "was not relevant because
the shooting and confrontation [at the strip mall]
were unrelated to any alleged drug deal"
Therefore, Bisner contends, evidence of the drug
debt was inadmissible because it could only prove
his propensity to commit crime, and was thus
"unfairly prejudicial, confusing [,] and misleading "
Conversely, the State advanced the position at trial
that the drug debt owed by Golub provided Bisner
with the motive and intent to assault and kill Golub
In support of this theory, the State questioned
Lyman about his meeting with Bisner just prior to
Golub's death, and the following colloquy occurred
Q What else was said by Mr Bisner9
A He mentioned that someone owed him a small
amount of money, $300, something m that area,
and that they were going to be meeting with this
individual that night
Q He say anything else about that9
A Yeah , kind of on the way out he said,
"Somebody is going to die tonight"
In addition to Lyman's testimony, Pearson and
Symes stated at trial that Bisner had informed his
friends at the party that Golub owed him $350 for
drugs Bisner moved the trial court to exclude this
evidence, but the court ruled that it was admissible
to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e] gathermg that
resulted in Golub's death "
[28] K 57 We agree with the trial court that the
evidence of the drug debt between Bisner and
Golub was admissible under rule 404(b) There
was no question in this case about Bisner's identity
or acts The only question for the jury was whether
Bisner killed Golub intentionally or, as the defense
asserted, was instead acting "under an extreme
emotional disturbance" caused by his drug use
earlier m the evemng Evidence of the drug debt
therefore was not introduced to establish Bisner's
propensity to commit crime, but was admissible for
the noncharacter purpose of proving his motive and
intent m killing Golub See State v Pearson, 943
P 2d 1347, 1351-52 (Utah 1997)
[29] H 58 Similarly, evidence of the drug debt was
relevant as to motive and intent Evidence is

relevant under 404(b) if it " 'tends to prove some
fact that is material to the crime charged
Nelson-Waggoner 2000 UT 59 at U 26, 6 P 3d
1120 (quoting Decorso 1999 UT 57 at U 22 993
P2d 837) *1091 Here, Lyman's testimony,
particularly when buttressed by the testimony of
Pearson and Symes, tended to prove the material
fact of Bisner's motive by presenting the jury with a
reason Bisner had to kill Golub, thus making ' more
plausible
the State's theory that he did so
intentionally rather than" under a drug-induced
emotional disturbance Pearson 943 P 2d at 1351,
see also Mead 2001 UT 58 at H 63, 27 P 3d 1115,
Nelson Waggoner 2000 UT 59 at 1) 27, 6 P 3d
1120
[30] H 59 Finally, the probative value of the drug
debt evidence was not substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial impact As explained above,
evidence of Golub's drug debt to Bisner was highly
probative of Bisner's motivation to kill Golub
intentionally—especially
given
that
Bisner
mentioned the debt repeatedly during the night of
Golub's death and that he also told Lyman,
"Somebody is going to die tonight" Moreover,
Bisner's pnor crime, selling illegal drugs, was quite
minor in relation to the crimes with which he was
charged, first degree felonies of murder and
aggravated robbery See Decorso 1999 UT 57 at
K 34, 993 P2d 837 The evidence also "did not
suggest a proclivity for violence or even a
significant criminal character," as it reflected only
that Bisner had sold Golub $350 m drugs Pearson,
943 P2d at 1351 Indeed, these factors all suggest
that the evidence was not prejudicial m proving
Bisner's bad character, but was relevant to the issues
of motive and intent Id at 1351-52, see also State
v Shickles 760 P 2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)
(explaining factors that should be considered in
determining whether pnor bad act evidence is more
probative than prejudicial) Consequently, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Bisner's motion to exclude evidence of
Golub's drug debt to him
IV MANSLAUGHTER JURY INSTRUCTION
[31] H 60 Bisner next contends that the trial court
erred by giving over his objection jury instruction
25 That instruction, which related to the necessity
of convicting Bisner for manslaughter rather than
murder if he was found to have been acting under
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an "extreme emotional disturbance," stated in
pertinent part
For manslaughter to apply, the "extreme
emotional disturbance" must be triggered by
something external to the accused, and his
reaction to such external stimulus must be
reasonable The terms used must be given the
meaning you would give them m common
everyday use
Such disturbance, therefore,
cannot have been brought about by the
defendant's own peculiar mental processes or by
his own knowing or intentional involvement in a
crime
Bisner asserts that this instruction "is confusing"
because it implies that manslaughter excludes "all
knowing and intentional homicides, even when the
accused suffers from an extreme emotional
disturbance "
[32][33] H 61 Despite Bisner's argument, we
recently upheld a manslaughter instruction that used
language identical to instruction 25 Unanimously
rejecting a challenge that the instruction at issue
erroneously directed "the jury that manslaughter
cannot involve a knowing or intentional mental
state," we held
[Defendant's argument confuses knowledge and
intent in causing the death of the victim with
knowing or intentional involvement in a crime
which in turn brings about an extreme emotional
disturbance The instruction merely explains that
the manslaughter statute excludes defendant's
intentional involvement in a crime from the class
of circumstances that can give rise to an extreme
emotional disturbance which mitigates murder to
manslaughter
State v Piansiaksone 954 P 2d 861, 872 (Utah
1998) (emphasis in original) Given our holding in
Piansiaksone we reiterate today what we have
repeatedly held in the past that "[t]hose asking us
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial
burden of persuasion" State v Menzies, 889 P 2d
393, 398 (Utah 1994) Indeed, "[t]his burden is
mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis," and to
convince us that a previous rule should be
overturned, an appealing party must clearly
demonstrate " 'that the rule was originally erroneous
or is no longer sound because of changing
conditions and that more good than harm will come
by departing from precedent' " Id at 398, 399
(quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in
Judicial *1092 Decision 2 Vill L Rev 367, 367

(1957)) In this case, Bisner's argument that the
manslaughter instruction "is confusing," which he
bolsters with absolutely no case law, statutory
analysis, or other legal authority, "does not even
approach the high bar required to override stare
decisis " City of Hildale v Cooke 2001 UT 56, U
36, 28 P 3d 697 Accordingly, we rule that the trial
court did not err in giving the instruction over
Bisner's objection
V MERGER
[34] % 62 Finally, Bisner challenges the trial
court's refusal to merge his convictions for
aggravated robbery and murder
Specifically,
Bisner argues that section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah
Code, which states that a "defendant may be
convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense," Utah
Code Ann § 76-1-402(3) (1999), mandates that we
"dismiss, or in the alternative [,] merge [his]
aggravated robbery charge with the [felony] murder
charge " Bisner's argument, however, must fail for
at least two reasons
U 63 First, like Bisner's challenge to the
manslaughter jury instruction given in this case, we
have already decided the issue of whether the
legislature intended the crime of felony murder to
merge with the underlying felony of aggravated
robbery In State v McCovey, we held
[T]he Utah State Legislature did not intend the
multiple crimes of felony murder to be punished
as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be
enhanced to second degree felony murder m
addition to the underlying felony To conclude
otherwise would be to defeat the deterrent
purpose of the felony murder statute and result in
unjust consequences A true lesser included
relationship does not exist in the felony murder
statute
803 P2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1990) Asserting that
McCovey does not apply to the case now before us,
Bisner argues that McCovey "does not preclude
[merger of aggravated robbery and felony murder]
under the appropriate factual circumstances"
because our holding in that case was "based largely
on the existence of two separate victims"
However, while we did note in McCovey that the
existence of two different victims was one factor
that distinguished the case factually from prior
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merger decisions, we did not base our interpretation
of the felony murder statute on that distinction
Rather, we explicitly premised our holding on the
legislature's intent in enacting the statute Id see
also id at 1238 (noting that the modern felony
murder statute differs in aim and purpose from the
common law doctrine) Likewise, Bisner's reliance
on our earlier decision m State v Shaffer 725 P 2d
1301 (Utah 1986), is misplaced Shaffer dealt with
the meiger of aggravated robbery and aggravated
murder under Utah Code section 76-5-202 and is
thus inapposite to Bisner's conviction here for
murder under Utah Code section 76-5-203 Id at
1313-14
U 64 Moreover, unlike McCovey it is not
undisputed in this case that Bisner was convicted
for felony murder See 803 P 2d at 1234 ("The fact
that McCovey was convicted for second degree
felony murder
is undisputed") The State
charged Bisner with murder under three alternate
theories—that he killed Golub intentionally or
knowingly, that he did so with the intent to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or that he did so
while in the commission of aggravated robbery
Importantly, however, the State introduced
overwhelming evidence at trial that Bisner killed
Golub intentionally or knowingly Bisner declared
just hours pnor to Golub's death that "[s]omebody
is going to die tonight" When Bisner and his
friends met Golub at the strip mall, Bisner assaulted
Golub after Koontz and Symes had knocked him to
the ground Then, even though Bisner's friends
withdrew and urged Bisner to join them, he
remained As this occurred, Golub, who had been
disarmed, fled to his truck and began speeding
away Despite this fact, Bisner shot at Golub three
times When he realized his shots missed, Bisner
fired three more rounds, killing Golub This
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that
Bisner killed Golub intentionally or knowingly

process grounds, nor did it err in admitting into
evidence the assault rifle seized from Bisner's
closet The trial court also acted properly in
denying Bisner's motion to exclude evidence of the
drug debt Golub owed him, in instructing the jury
concerning manslaughter, and in refusing to merge
Bisner's charges for aggravated robbery and
murder
Accordingly,
we
affirm
Bisner's
convictions as entered below

K 67 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice DURHAM,
Justice DURRANT, and Justice WILKINS concur
in Associate Chief Justice RUSSON's opinion
37 P 3d 1073, 435 Utah Adv Rep 3, 2001 UT 99
END OF DOCUMENT

U 65 As a result, we hold that, in accordance with
our decision in McCovey, the trial court did not err
by denying Bisner's motion to merge his convictions
for aggravated robbery and murder 803 P 2d at
1239
*1093 CONCLUSION
f 66 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Bisner's motion for a new trial on due
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IN THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL BISNER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. 020911933

Respondent.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for partial dismissal without
prejudice and for partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's
motion and supporting memorandum, the petitioner's opposition in the form of a motion for leave to
file an amended complaint, and the State's reply memorandum. Now being fully advised in the
premises, the Court makes the following findings of undisputed fact, conclusions of law, and enters
the following order granting the State's motion.

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT
The Crimes
1. Petitioner was convicted of murder and aggravated robbery following a jury trial.
Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, attached as Exhibit A.1 The State presented the
following evidence at petitioner's trial:
2. In the early morning hours of 6 January 1999 petitioner fatally shot Darby Golub with an
assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 890: 145-46,159 (Trial Transcript Vol. I),
attached as Exhibit B; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60, 269-70 (Trial Transcript Vol. II), attached
as Exhibit C.2
3. Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, petitioner and his friend Derek
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 889: 3-4, 21 (Partial Trial
Transcript: Testimony of Christopher Bruce Lyman), attached as Exhibit D. The two visited Lyman
for fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 889: 4-5, 22. During their conversation, petitioner told Lyman that
he was going to meet someone that night who owed him money. R. 889: 05. As the two left
Lyman's apartment, petitioner declared, "Someone is going to die tonight." R. 889: 5; see also R.
889: 22-24.
4. After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where other
friends had gathered to party. See R. 890: 56-57; see also R. 890: 4-5, 93-94. Justin's mother was
The exhibits referred to are attached to the State's memorandum supporting its motion.
References to transcripts are to the record as paginated for appeal. For example, R. 890
refers to trial record page 890, which is volume one of the trial transcript. The numbers following
the colon refer to the specific pages of the transcript. Therefore, the citation "R. 890: 145-46," refers
to pages 145-46 of volume one of the trial transcript.
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working that evening at a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. R. 890: 10-11,1415, 94, 99. The friends partied downstairs into the early morning hours of the next day, drinking
alcohol and using drugs. R. 890: 5-6, 10, 57, 94,113-14. 3
5. Petitioner had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. See R. 890:
8-9, 58-59. From the party, petitioner telephoned Darby and left a message that he was st&pposed to
have paid the drug debt that day. R. 890: 58-59.
6. Darby returned the call at approximately 2:00 a.m. R. 890: 6, 9-10, 94-96. Darby yelled
at Justin because of a late call to his house and Justin rejoined with a similar complaint. R. 890: 95,
112.
7. After speaking with Justin, Darby spoke with Dustin Symes, another of petitioner's
friends. R. 890: 4-6, 34, 58-59, 94. Darby again complained of the late call to his house. R. 890: 78. He also threatened to kill petitioner and his friends. R. 890: 7-8, 35, 88-89. After the angry
exchange, Darby agreed to meet petitioner and his friends in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a
nearby shopping center, to settle the dispute. R. 890: 13-14, 34-35, 51, 60-61.4 Petitioner and his
friends went expecting a fight. R. 890: 12, 36, 60, 88-89.

Derek Pearson, who had accompanied petitioner to Lyman's house, testified that he had
been smoking marijuana most of the night and that he took six "hits" of LSD at approximately 11:00
that evening. R. 890: 57, 79. Justin Koontz also acknowledged at trial that he had smoked
marijuana that evening. R. 890: 114.
The Canyon Center, similar to a strip mall, includes a Smith's grocery store on the west
end, a Shopko at the east end, and a variety of smaller businesses in between. A large parking lot lay
to the south of the businesses. R. 890: 13-14, 36, 162, 168. A Rainbo Mart and a 7-Eleven sit on the
southern-most borders of the Canyon Center parking lot, facing 9400 South—the Rainbo gas station
sits directly south of the middle businesses and the 7-Eleven sits in the southeast corner. R. 890: 14,
146, 163; R. 891: 176. Witnesses referred to the parking lot as either the Shopko or the Smith's
parking lot. SeeR. 890: 8, 13-14, 36, 61, 64, 97, 100, 114, 140-41; R. 891: 175.
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8. After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with petitioner, Derek, and Justin, and
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 890: 9-10, 35-36, 60-62, 78.5 Anticipating a fight, the
four left in Dustin's truck to meet Darby at the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 890: 8-12, 36, 39, 53,
61-62, 98.
9. Finding no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on the southeast corner of the
parking lot where Justin's mother was working that evening. R. 890: 13-14, 61-62, 99. Petitioner,
Dustin, and Derek remained outside, talking with Justin's mother who was on break smoking a
cigarette. R. 890: 14, 37, 62-63, 78-79, 138-39, 152. Justin went inside, helped himself to the
condiment bar, and spoke with another 7-Eleven employee. R. 890: 15, 63, 78, 99, 137-38,152.
10. After a few minutes at the 7-Eleven, the three friends outside saw Darby's truck pull into
in the Canyon Center parking lot just south of the middle businesses. See R. 890: 14-16, 37-39, 6364, 73-74, 99, 139. Justin's mother went back into the convenience store and notified her son of
Darby's arrival. SeeR. 890: 140.
11. Extremely agitated and upset, Justin ran out of the store and joined his friends in
Dustin's truck. R. 890: 17, 64, 99-100. As Justin exited the store, either he or his mother-exclaimed,
'That chicken shit wouldn't show up." R. 890: 140, 153. After Justin left, his mother remarked to
her co-worker, "I just sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not a very good mother
to send him down to do that." R. 890: 140.

Although both Dustin and Justin denied any talk of weapons, R. 890: 43, 98, 115, Derek
testified they did have that discussion. R. 890: 60, 62, 78.
4

12. Dustin parked his truck kitty-corner to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet away. R.
890: 17-18, 38, 64-65, 100-01, 116, 141-42, 154. Darby, who was alone, exited his truck and stood
with an assault rifle cradled in his arms. R. 890: 19-21, 38-39, 41, 54, 65,101-02.
13. Petitioner and his Mends exited their truck and quickly advanced on Darby. R. 890: 1823, 66-68, 102-05. As Dustin described it, the four "walk[ed] extremely fast" towards Dcfrby. R.
890:20-21.
14. Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as the four advanced and made no
threat with the weapon. R. 890: 103.6 He did not fire the rifle nor did he use it to otherwise defend
himself. R. 890: 21, 66-68, 90,105.
15. Dustin, who brought with him an aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting
his forehead, knocking him backward, and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 890: 12-13, 21-23,4344? 46, 54-55, 68, 103-04. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg. R. 890: 104-05.
16. Having disarmed Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 890: 23-24,
44-45, 105, 120-22. Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 890: 69, 83. Darby was
eventually forced to the ground as petitioner and Derek continued to beat him for some thirty
seconds. R. 890: 22-24, 44-45, 66-68, 83, 104-05, 143. Dustin yelled for his friends to get back in
the truck and all but petitioner complied. R. 890: 24-25, 47, 69, 84,105-06, 121.
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Dustin Symes testified that he never saw Darby point the gun at them, R. 890: 19-20, 3839, 41, 54, and Justin Koontz testified that he didn't remember Darby pointing the gun at them. But
see R. 890: 102 (claiming Darby was waiving the gun). Only Derek Pearson, who acknowledged he
was high on alcohol and drugs, testified that Darby pointed the gun at them. R. 890: 65-66, 82.
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17. Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the parking lot. R.
890: 144,157.
18. Meanwhile, petitioner picked up the rifle, cocked it, and fired three successive rounds at
Darby as he fled in his truck. R. 890: 25-27, 70-71, 106-08, 123,128-29. Although the shots missed
Darby, at least one round broke one of the truck's windows. See R. 890: 27; R. 891: 185, 196-97,
252.
19. The witnesses estimated that Darby was some one to three car lengths away when
petitioner fired the first series of shots. R. 890: 27, 50, 54,144, 158. An accident reconstructionist
testified that the shattered glass was about 65 feet from the first set of three shell casings found in the
parking lot. R. 891: 185,192.
20. As Darby continued to speed away through the parking lot, petitioner fired another three
rounds. See R. 890: 145, 159; R. 891: 183, 192, 197. This time, one of the rounds grazed the
driver's door, pierced the window, and fatally struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 890:
145-46, 159; R. 891: 183, 201, 245-47, 251-60, 269-70.
21. Based on the tire marks and the estimated speed of Darby's truck, the accident
reconstructionist opined that Darby "was rapidly trying to turn away from something or get away
from something." R. 891: 186. The reconstructionist estimated Darby's truck to be traveling "about
39 miles an hour" at one point. Id.
22. The reconstructionist testified that the second location of shattered glass was
approximately 145 feet from the shell casings found in the parking lot. R. 891: 192. The medical
examiner agreed that "this was not a close shooting." R. 891: 251.
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23. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet had struck the truck's doorframe
before piercing Darby's skull. R. 891: 246, 250, 253-56. The medical examiner recovered from
Darby's skull pieces of black plastic material consistent with the material on the truck's door frame.
R. 891: 246,250, 254. The trial court also received into evidence State's Exhibit 22, a photograph
showing where the bullet had stuck the truck's doorframe. R. 891: 255-56.
24. After Darby was struck by the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station. It ran over a parking island and small tree, jumped over
a curb and snowbank bordering the gas station, ran over a second tree, and hit a concrete trash can,
causing the truck to spin out of control before resting in the Rainbo parking lot. R. 890: 27-28, 72,
146, 148; R. 891:180-81,183.
25. By the time witnesses reached the truck, Darby was dead, slumped over onto the floor of
the passenger side. R. 890: 148-49, 164-65. After petitioner shot Darby, Dustin drove away in his
truck with Derek and Justin, while petitioner fled on foot through an alleyway between the stores at
the shopping center. R. 890: 28, 48, 72, 109.
26. Petitioner was taken into custody a few hours later at his home. R. 891: 215r-Once
petitioner was in custody, police searched the home where petitioner lived with his mother and other
family members. R. 891: 204-05. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby partially hidden
behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 891: 206-12.
27. The State charged petitioner with murder and aggravated robbery, both first degree
felonies. Information, attached as Exhibit E.
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28. Petitioner was represented at trial by Ralph Dellapiana and Matthew Nielsen of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Association. Minutes, Jury Trial, dated 24 August 1999, attached as Exhibit
F.
29. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was performed on
the victim.
Relevant Procedural History
30. Petitioner filed motions to quash the bindover and to suppress evidence seized from his
house, including the murder weapon. Motion to Quash Bindover, attached as Exhibit G; Motion to
Suppress Evidence and Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhbit H.
31. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions. Minutes, Law
& Motion dated 17 May 1999, attached as Exhibit I; Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
attached as Exhibit J.
32. Petitioner filed a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying his motion to
suppress, which the Utah Supreme Court denied. Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order, attached as Exhibit K; Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 18 August 1999, attached as
Exhibit L.
33. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict after the State rested. Minutes,
Jury Trial, dated 25 August 1999, attached as Exhibit M; R. 891: 283.
34. The defense rested without presenting evidence. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 287-88. In his
closing argument, petitioner's counsel conceded that petitioner was the one who shot Darby, but
argued that petitioner acted under an extreme emotional disturbance and was therefore only guilty of
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manslaughter. R. 894: 32-33 (Partial Trial Transcript: Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings &
Exceptions), attached as Exhibit Q.
35. The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts and further found that a dangerous
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the murder. Exhibit A; Minutes, Jury Trial,
Notice, dated 26 August 1999, attached as Exhibit N.
36. Nineteen days after the verdict, but before sentencing, petitioner unsuccessfully moved
to merge the aggravated robbery conviction with the murder conviction. Motion to Arrest Judgment,
attached as Exhibit 0; Exhibit A at 2; R. 895: 3-8 (Sentencing Transcript), attached as Exhibit P.
37. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced petitioner to consecutive prison terms of five-yearsto-life on each count plus an additional one-year term for use of a firearm. Exhibit A; R. 895: 26-27.
38. In pronouncing sentence the trial court remarked, "In particular, it seems to me it's tragic
that the victim here was trying to get away, that he sought to retreat, that he was in his truck
speeding away from the scene, trying to flee; yet you, in a cold and calculating way, continued to
fire the weapon multiple times after this victim under no threat of any kind whatsoever." R. 895: 2627.
The Alleged "Cooperation Agreements "
39. Christopher Lyman. On cross-examination, petitioner's counsel asked Lyman if he
had made any agreement with the State in exchange for his testimony. R. 889: 6. Lyman responded
"No, I was not given immunity or any kind of written statement. . . that I would not be prosecuted."
R. 889: 6-7. He also explained, "they could not promise but they told me they wouldn't be
prosecuting me." R. 889: 7.
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40. When asked whether he had discussed "getting out of some jail time" if he would give a
statement, Lyman responded, "In a sense, yes." R. 889: 8-9. Lyman explained that at the time he
gave his statement to police, he was facing a jail sentence often days and that he ended up serving
only two days. R. 889: 10-11. A fine was also waived. R. 889: 18-19. Nevertheless, there was
never any agreement to reduce his jail time in exchange for his statement. R. 889: 11-12.**
41. Petitioner's counsel was able to elicit, however, Lyman's acknowledgement that the
investigating officer had told him the officer would not make an explicit deal because "it would
make it look like a deal was made for [Lyman] to talk," and it would not appear to a jury that
Lyman's statement was willingly given. R. 889: 15-17.
42. Petitioner's counsel also suggested that the prosecution had agreed that in exchange for
Lyman's testimony it would not prosecute Lyman for his admitted drug dealings with petitioner. R.
891: 279-80. The prosecutor explained, however, that no such deal was ever made. R. 891: 282-83.
Rather, the State simply told Lyman that it could not prosecute him for his admitted drug distribution
because the only evidence it had of the crime was Lyman's admission, and his admission alone was
insufficient to support a prosecution on drug distribution charges. R. 891: 282-83.
43. In his closing argument, petitioner's counsel argued that Lyman was a "little liar" who
"made a deal to stay out of jail by giving some testimony," but is "still trying to deny it." R. 894: 38
(Partial Trial Transcript of Motion in Limine / Openings, Closings & Exceptions), attached as
Exhibit Q. Petitioner's counsel argued that the jury should completely disregard Lyman's testimony
because he had lied about his alleged deal with the prosecution. R. 894: 38-40.
44. Derek Pearson & Justin Koontz. In a sworn affidavit, the prosecutor stated that prior
to trial he had told petitioner's counsel that "both Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz had pled guilty
10

to one count of attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor and one count of assault, a class B
misdemeanor, reduced from the original charge of riot, a third degree felony, and that they were
expected to testify truthfully for the State." Affidavit of Robert L. Stott, attached as Exhibit R.
45. During trial, Pearson testified that although he was charged with riot, a third degree
felony, for his involvement in the murder he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdefrieanor,
and assault, a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 76-77.
46. During trial, Koontz similarly testified that although he was originally charged with
murder for his involvement in the crimes he pled guilty to attempted riot, a class A misdemeanor,
and assault a class B misdemeanor. R. 890: 109-10, 134-35.
47. Koontz also testified at trial that although he believed AP&P had recommended that he
serve 18 months in jail, he only served 71 days. R. 890: 135.
48. Dustin Symes. At petitioner's preliminary hearing, Symes "testified that the State had
agreed to '[ijnform the court of my testimony and [that] I was cooperative' following his appearance
as a witness in [petitioner's] case." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,140, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as
Exhibit S.
49. This specific agreement was not discussed at trial. Symes did testify, however, that he
had been charged with aggravated assault, a felony, and that it was his intention to plead guilty as
charged. R. 890:30-31.
50. Specific Procedural History. Prior to trial, petitioner filed a motion to exclude
testimony from any State witnesses with whom the State made any undisclosed "agreements,
inducements, offers of leniency, or other understandings" for their cooperation or testimony. Motion

11

to Exclude Testimony of Certain Witnesses, attached as Exhibit T. The trial court did not
immediately rule on the motion to strike.
51. In conjunction with his motion for a directed verdict following the State's evidence,
petitioner also argued that the testimony of Chris Lyman, a State witness, should be stricken because
the State did not disclose an alleged "cooperation agreement" with Lyman. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891:
278-83. That motion was denied. Exhibit M at 2; R. 891: 283-85.
52. Petitioner timely moved for a new trial, renewing his argument that the State did not
disclose the alleged "cooperation agreement" with Chris Lyman. Motion for New Trial and
Supporting Memorandum, attached as Exhibit U. The trial court denied the motion. Minute Entry
Ruling, dated 23 November 1999, attached as Exhibit V; Order Denying Defendant's Motion for
New Trial, attached as Exhibit W.
53. After the trial court announced its decision denying the motion, but before it entered a
final written order, petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for a new trial.
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for New Trial, and Supporting Memorandum, attached as
Exhibit X. That motion was never decided by the trial court and petitioner timely filed a-notice of
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit Y.
54. In an effort to obtain a ruling on his motion to reconsider, petitioner moved to dismiss
the appeal without prejudice pending disposition of his motion to reconsider. This Court denied the
motion, holding that a motion to reconsider is not valid under the rules and that "[t]he trial court
lacks jurisdiction to consider anything further in this case because petitioner timely filed his notice
of appeal." Order from Utah Supreme Court dated 31 August 2000, attached as Exhibit Z.
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The Appeal
55. Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising five claims of error. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, f 30, 37 P.3d 1073, attached as Exhibit S. He was represented on appeal by Richard Mauro and
Michael Sikora. Id. at 1076
56. Petitioner first claimed that "the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial, since
the State violated [petitioner's] due process rights by failing to disclose its alleged cooperation
agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and Symes." Id. at f 30.
57. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim. With respect to Lyman, the Court held that
"the defense knew days before trial about the State's alleged agreement to reduce the jail sentence
and fine imposed in Lyman's unrelated misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony in [petitioner's]
trial." Id. at f 37. Moreover, the Court held that "[petitioner's] attorney was able to used this
information extensively at trial in an attempt to impeach Lyman's testimony." Id.
58. With regard to the alleged agreement not to prosecute Lyman for drug distribution, the
Court held that the defense "was afforded a full opportunity" to question Lyman regarding the
alleged deal but failed to do so. Id. at f 38. Therefore, the was no violation of petitioner^ rights
with regard to any alleged failure to disclose agreements with Lyman. Id. atffl[37-38.
59. Likewise, regarding the alleged failure to disclose agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes, the Court held that petitioner's rights were not violated because his counsel was aware of
any agreements and had the opportunity to question the witnesses at trial regarding the agreements.
Id. at % 40. Furthermore, the Court observed that both Koontz and Pearson testified at trial regarding
the agreements. Id.
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60. Petitioner's second contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence removed from his living quarters in his mother's basement, namely,
the assault rifle used to kill Golub." Id. at f 41.
61. The Court rejected this claim, holding that petitioner's mother voluntary consented to the
warrantless searches of her home and therefore "the trial court did not err in denying his rfiotion to
suppress the evidence seized from his living quarters in his mother's basement." Id. atfflf52-53.
62. Petitioner's third contention on appeal was "that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owned him." Id. at f 54. The Court rejected this
claim, holding that the evidence was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence because
it was relevant as to petitioner's motive and intent, and its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Id. at Iffi 56-59.
63. Petitioner's fourth contention on appeal was that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury regarding manslaughter. Id. at f 60. The Court noted, however, that it had previously upheld an
identical manslaughter instruction and therefore rejected petitioner's claim. Id. at f 61.
64. Petitioner's fifth contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in refusing to merge
his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. Id. at \ 62. The Court rejected this claim,
holding that under the facts of this case the two crimes did not merge. Id. at f 63-65.
65. The Utah Supreme Court also observed that "the State introduced overwhelming
evidence at trial that [petitioner] killed Golub intentionally or knowingly." Id. at 64. The Court then
went on to detail the supporting evidence, including evidence that petitioner shot Darby as he was
"speeding away" in his truck. Id.
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The Post-Conviction Petition
66. Petitioner claims he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the following grounds:
a. His trial counsel was ineffective because he:
1. failed to investigate witnesses that would have testified as to P's state of
mind at the time of the crime;
2. refused to argue that the crime was committed in "self-defense";
3. failed to investigate and impeach the state's witnesses by mentioning the
plea agreements they had entered;
4. failed to argue to the jury that the bullet that struck the victim ricocheted
off the truck and was not a direct hit;
5. failed to call expert witnesses to testify about the results of gun-shot
residue tests on the victim's hands;
6. failed to call experts to testify regarding the victim's state of mind;
7. failed to provide petitioner with the discovery he received from the State
and failed to keep petitioner informed of the defense he was preparing;
b. The police conducted an illegal search of his room; and
c. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal, the above
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Petition at 7-9.
67. Petitioner fails to specifically identify any additional witnesses defense counsel should
have called or proffer what their testimony would have been.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All of petitioner's claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally
barred because petitioner could have raised them on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a106(l)(c).
15

2. Petitioner's claim alleging that the search of his bedroom was illegal is procedurally
barred because it was already litigated both at trial and on direct appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7835a-106(l)(b).
3. Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on appeal,
his allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. To demonstrate that his appellate counsel was
ineffective, petitioner must show that his counsel overlooked a "dead-bang winning" claim, in other
words, a claim that was 1) obvious from the record; and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal.
See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^48, 44 P.3d 636 (citing Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515
(10th Cir. 1995)). Each of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fail as a
matter of law except for his first claim, which is inadequately pled.
a. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate witnesses who would
have testified as to petitioner's state of mind. This claim is inadequately pled because petitioner
fails to specifically allege which additional witnesses his trial counsel should have called and proffer
what their testimony would have been. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice
and with leave to amend.
b. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to argue that petitioner acted in selfdefense. The undisputed facts at trial conclusively refuted any claim that petitioner acted in selfdefense. Petitioner would not have been entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. Therefore,
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim by omitting this issue.
c. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate and impeach the
State's witnesses with their plea agreements. Trial counsel impeached Christopher Lyman with
his plea agreement and argued that he was a liar who had tried to conceal the agreement. The jury
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was also aware of the State's plea agreements with Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz. Therefore,
appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's
questioning of these witnesses.
The State apparently agreed to inform the court handling Dustin Symes' trial that he was
cooperative and had testified in petitioner's trial. Symes' agreement was not discussed aP
petitioner's trial. Nevertheless, 1) Symes' agreement lacked the impeachment value of the other
witness's agreements because the State had not agreed to reduce his charges; 2) the jury was aware
of the other witness's plea agreements and still chose to believe their testimony, and 3) the State
produced overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt. Therefore, appellate counsel did not overlook
any "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to trial counsel's questioning of Symes.
d. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to argued that the fatal bullet had
ricocheted. The medical examiner testified that the fatal bullet struck the truck's doorframe before
piercing Darby's skull and State's Exhibit 22 was a photograph showing where the bullet struck the
truck's doorframe before hitting Darby. Because the jury heard evidence that the fatal bullet had
ricocheted, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" claim that trial counsetwas
ineffective for allegedly failing to present this evidence.
e. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to present evidence of gun-shot residue tests
on the victim's hands. There is no evidence in the record that a gun-shot residue (GSR) test was
performed on the victim's hands. Petitioner's belief that a test was performed apparently stems from
his misinterpretation of the transcript of his police interrogation. Petitioner has not provided the
Court with a copy of the transcript and no copy appears in the record. According to petitioner, the
interrogating officer allegedly stated, "The GSR kit says that it went off in your hand. It's all over
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actually. It's on both your hands." Clearly the officer refers to both ofpetitioner's hands, rather
than to petitioner's and Darby's hands. Because petitioner's claim has no basis in fact appellate
counsel was not ineffective for omitting it.
In any event, even if a GSR test indicated that Darby had fired some weapon at some time,
there was still no evidence to support a theory that petitioner acted in self-defense. The undisputed
evidence at trial established that Darby was unarmed and fleeing in his truck when petitioner shot
him. Therefore, even if such GSR test results existed, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang
winning' claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the evidence at trial.
f. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's failure to call experts to testify regarding the
victim's state of mind. Evidence of the victim's state of mind would have been inadmissible
hearsay. See state v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1964) (citing State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937
(Utah 1988)). It would have also been irrelevant because there was no evidence that the killing was
a suicide, a result of self-defense, or an accident to which the victim contributed by acting as an
aggressor. See id. Appellate counsel was unlikely to succeed on a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce inadmissible, irrelevant evidence.
In any event, the jury heard evidence that Darby was angry, had threatened to kill petitioner
and his friends, and that petitioner and his friends were expecting a fight when they met Darby.
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" argument with respect to this
claim because counsel could not have demonstrated that petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's
performance.
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g. Neglecting to raise trial counsel's alleged failure to provide petitioner with discovery
and keep him informed of the defense. Trial counsel's decisions regarding whether to provide his
client with discovery and which defense to present are matters of trial strategy that ultimately fall
within counsel's discretion. See People v. Davidson, 686 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (111. App. Ct. 1997)
(discovery); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (choice of defeftse).
Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "dead-bang winning" ineffectiveness claim with respect
to these allegations.
Even if these were not matters of strategy, appellate counsel could not have demonstrated
that petitioner suffered any prejudice as a result of trial counsel's actions. Petitioner contends that
the failure to provide him with discovery and to keep him informed of the defense deprived him of
the opportunity to assert a claim of self-defense. However, the undisputed facts presented at trial
conclusively refuted any claim of self-defense. Therefore, appellate counsel overlooked no "deadbang winning" argument with respect to these claims.

Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions the Court enters the following:
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ORDER
1. The State's motion for partial dismissal without prejudice and for partial summary
judgment is GRANTED.
2. Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for neglecting to raise, on appeal,
trial counsel's alleged failure to call witnesses who would have testified regarding petitioner's state
of mind is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Russell Bisner
ProSe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on jj

July 2003 I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing

proposed FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, to:
Russell Bisner, #29334
Central Utah Correctional Facility
Aspen 220 Bottom
PO BOX 550
Gunnison, UT 84634

<uZ?/
<?~ <£^LS_
< ^

21

i^fhibrr 3

U^'MCE I ^

« H E M f c D I C A L fcXAMlINKK - S T A T E O F U T A H

EXAMINATION PROTOCOL
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION - OME Case # R19990002S
"i rie tjody is that of a slender, normally developed and adequately nourished appearing, white
male, received in a body bag, wrapped in a cloth and a plastic sheet, clad and with valuables as
described on the body receiving form. Examination of the clothing reveals blood staining as well
as multiple fragments of glass present on the upper portions of the shirt. No injuries of the
clothing are seen. The body weighs 80 kg, measures 185 cm in length, and appears compatible
with the stated age of 19 years.
The body is cool to the touch with firm rigor in the extremities and sparse blanching lividity on,
the anterior surfaces of the body except in areas exposed to pressure,,,
The scalp hair is brown and measures to 30 cm superiorly and posteriorly with short shaved w.
There is injury of the scalp as described below, There is blood and fragments of glass in the hau
A mustache and sparse beard are present on the face measuring to 1 cm
t ne ^yes have blue-gray irides, clear corneas, dilated symmetric pupils and sclerae and
conjunctivae without petechias There is evidence of injury of the eyelids as described below.
The ears, nose, and lips are normally formed and remarkable for injury as described below. There
is piercing of the earlobes. Blood is present in the left external auditory meatus, There is blood
on the face.
The teeth are natural and in a moderate state of repair. There is a small amount of bloody fluid
^ vi:hin the oral cavity. The tongue is without evidence of injury.
Examination of the neck reveals no scars, injuries or other abnormalities.
The chest and abdomen are normally developed and remarkable for a fresh scar in the right lower
chest, oriented horizontally, measuring 4 cm. No tattoos or injuries are seen.
^Examination of the upper extremities reveals a tattoo of what appears to be the letters "dig"
3 located just below the right antecubital region. In the letter "g" are a series of multiple needle
puncture wounds. Just above the tattoo is an irregular area of yellow-brown contusion,
measuring 4 X 1.5 cm with central needle puncture wounds. Incision in these areas reveals fresh
appearing underlying hemorrhage. Just below the tattoo, on the anterior right forearm, is a
ye low-brown area of contusion measuring 2,5 cm Ihe left antecubital fossa is remarkable for
a area of yellow-brown discoloration medially, measuring 4 X 1 cm with no visible needle
puncture wounds. In the central left antecubital region is a area of yellow-brown red-purple
discoloration with visible needle puncture wounds and underlying subcutaneous hemorrhage.
Examination of the wrists reveals no scars, The hands are received bagged. These are removed
to reveal smeared and spattered blood bilaterally and injury as described below. Wrapped about
the left hand is a chain with weights on either end. A gunshot residue sample is taken and
submitted as evidence^ The nails are short and smooth Mg~e37*^^
The lower extremities are symmetric, normally formed and remarkable for a scabbed abrasion
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measuring to 0.3 cm on the anterior central right thigh. On the distal anterior left shin is an
irregular scab measuring 0.2 cm with faint yellow-brown and red-purple contusion medially,
measuring 3.5 X 4 cm. No tattoos, scars, or edema is seen. The feet are unremarkable.
The back, anus, and genitalia reveals injury of the back as described below Oi the posterior
aspect of the right upper back laterally is a tattoo of the letters iCbv\ '" The penis is circumcised
EVIDENCE OF INJURY:
Penetrating Gunshot Wound of Head:
An atypical, indeterminate range gunshot wound of entrance is located behind the left ear. This
wound has a large main defect and is surrounded by multiple areas of superficial laceration,
puncture, and abrasion consistent with shrapnel injuries. The main defect is centered at a point
8,5 cm from the top of the head, 5.5 cm above the left external auditory meatus, and 13.5 cm
curvilinear to the left of the posterior midline. This defect is oriented in the 10 o'clock to 4
o'clock axis and measures 4.5 X 4 cm maximally, There is irregular marginal tearing and abrasion
of the wound. No identifiable sooting or stippling is seen. Extending anteriorly, inferiorly, and
posteriorly from the defect are multiple irregular skin defects surrounded by abrasion as well as
irregular superficial abrasions. These injuries range in size from 1.5 X 1.5 cm to 0.1 cm. They
are distributed in an area 14 cm vertically by 21 cm horizontally and extend from a point just
anterior to the left ear to the central left occipital region. Recovered in the scalp tissue associated
with these surrounding defects are multiple fragments of yellow metal and silver-gray metal
consistent with a bullet jacket and core. Recovered in the depths of a single defect is a piece of
irregular black plastic material. The projectile fragments and non-projectile material are
photographed and submitted as evidence.
The wound path passes through the scalp and causes an irregular perforating defect in the skull
with marked endocalvarial beveling, This defect measures to 2 cm maximally on the outer surface
of the skull. The wound path perforates the dura and passes into the left temporoparietal region
of the brain, continuing anteriorly and causing a perforation on the medial anterior left frontal lobe
inferiorly Phe wound track terminates in this location. Recovered along the wound track are
multiple fragments of yellow and silver-gray metal consistent with portions of projectile jacket and
core. These are photographed and submitted as evidence^
The wound path
downwards deviation.

_ ., ..id without ^significant upwards or

w

Associated injuries with the wound path include extensive calvarial fracturing over the left side
of the skull radiating from the entrance wound into the anterior middle and posterior fossae, with
fractures radiating into the right anterior fossa and ii no the coronal region superiorly, There is
sparse subdural blood and extensive subarachnoid hemorrhage over the left side of the brain and
medial portions of the right side of the brain. Extensive contusion hemorrhages are seen in both
the left and right frontal poles. Multiple secondary tracks caused by fragments of bone proceed
through the brain in the left cerebral hemisphere. There is palpebral ecchymosis on the right side.
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On the posterior lateral aspect of the left hand are a series of superficial lacerations and abrasions
consistent with shrapnel injuries, extending from the wrist to the base of the index finger, These
range in size from 0 5 to 0,1 cm.
Blunt Force Injuries:
On the central forehead is a superficial laceration measuring 2 X 0.6 cm, located 7.5 cm from the
top of the head and 1 cm to the right of the anterior midline. This wound has underlying subgaleal
hemorrhage in a area measuring to 3 cm. In the right upper forehead are a series of superficial
irregular abrasions measuring from 0.2 to 0,9 cm "I here is minimal underlying subcutaneous
hemorrhage associated with these abrasions. There is irregular speckled contusion of the medial
left upper eyelid in an area measuring to 1 cm. On the right cheek is a venically oriented 0,7 cm
abrasion. Behind these just adjacent to the right ear are two parallel linear abrasions measuring
I I a i id 2 en i with surrounding contusion in a area'measuring to 4 en: i. On the lowei T ight cheek
is a horizontally oriented linear abrasion measuring 1 cm. On the bridge of the nose is a faint
abrasion measuring 1 cm. On the tip of the nose is a faint 1 cm red-brown abrasion Just below
the right comer of the mouth is a 0.1 cm abrasion.
On the back of the right hand is a superficial laceration measuring 0.9 cm 'with no associated
hemorrhage. On the base of the back of the right thumb is a 0.4 cm dried red-brown abrasion.
On the back of the left hand are a series of faint red-brown indentations consistent with having
been left from the links of chain wrapped around the hand, On the palmar aspect of the proximal
- v banc n ,h ^ ^m dried abrasion.
til Il SIC)I I.

'v -.upuior right buttock a:e iv*

,.:. pa. ^._. . _i ^ jrple contubicn^ >n a area i neasuring 6

X 2 cm,,. •

INTERNAL EXAMINATION
BQPY CAVITIES: The body is opened by the usual thoracoabdominal, \ -shaped incision and
the chest plate is removed. No adhesions or abnormal collections of fluid are present in any of
the body cavities. All of the organs are present in normal and anatomical position. T L*r>
subcutaneous .fat, layer of the abdominal wall is 0.5 ci n thick.,,
HEAD (Central Nervous System):
There is evidence of injury of the head as previously
described. Other than injuries, the scalp is unremarkable. The calvarium has extensive fracturing
as previously described,,,. No other focal abnoi malities are seen The dura has been injured as
previously described. No epidural hemorrhage is seen,,,. "1 here is sparse subdural blood as
described above. The brain weighs 1520 grams. The leptomeninges are thin and delicate and
remarkable for subarachnoid hemorrhage, with no other focal abnormalities. The cerebral
hemispheres are asymmetrical secondary to injury. There is slight flattening of the gyri and
compression of the sulci Examination of the base of the brain reveals subarachnoid hemorrhage
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with no other focal abnormalities. The cranial nerves and blood vessels arc unremarkable.
Sectioning of the cerebral hemispheres reveals injury as previously described. No other focal
abnormalities are present There is blood within the ventricular system. Transverse sections
through the brain stem and cerebellum are unremarkable, The spinal cord is not examined.
NECK:
Examination of the soft tissues of the neck, including the strap muscles, the thyroid
gland and large vessels, reveals no abnormalities. The hyoid bone and larynx are intact,
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM; The heart weighs 310 grams. The pericardial surfaces.are
smooth, glistening and unremarkable, the pericardial sac is free of significant fluid or adhesions.
The coronary arteries arise normally, follow the usual distribution, and are widely patent, without
evidence of significant atherosclerosis or thrombosis. The chambers and valves exhibit the usual
size-position relationship and are unremarkable. Die myocardium is dark red-brown, firm, and
unremarkable; the atrial and ventricular septae are intact. The aorta and its major branches arise
normally, follow the usual course and are widely patent, free of significant atherosclerosis and
other abnormality. The vena cava and its major tributaries retiirn to the heart in the usual
distribution and are free of thrombi
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: The lungs weigh 540 and 460 grams, right and left, respectively.
The tracheobronchial tree has a small amount of bloody fluid wirhin it. The mucosal surfaces are
unremarkable. The lungs are slightly hyper-expanded and almost touch in the midline. The pleural
surfaces are smooil i , glistening and without congestion, adhesions, bullae, or significant
anthracotic pigment staining The cut surfaces of the lungs are well aerated with no evidence of
injury or other focal abnormality. No grossly apparent consolidations are seen The pulmonary
arteries are normally developed, patent and without thrombus or embolus..
LIVER AND BILIARY SYSTEM
Fhe liver weighs 1550 grams. The hepatic capsule is
smooth, glistening and intact, covering dark red-brown, moderately congested parenchyma with
no focal lesions noted. The gallbladder contains 20 cc of yellow-green, slightly mucoid bile; the
mucosa is velvety and unremarkable. The extrahepatic biliary tree is patent, without evidence of
calculi.
ALIMENTARY TRACT: The esophagus is lined by gray-white, smooth mucosa. The gastric
mucosa is arranged in the usual rugal folds and the lumen is empty. The small and large bowel
are unremarkable. The appendix is present. The pancreas has a normal gray-white lobulated
appearance and the ducts are clear,,
GENITOURINARY TRACT;
I he kidneys weigh 150 and 130 gi arm, right and left
respectively. The renal capsules are smooth and thin, semitransparent, and strip with ease from
the underlying smooth, red brown, slightly and, superficially lobulated conical surfaces. The
cortices are slightly congested, measure to 0.7 cm in thickness, and are sharply delineated from
the medullary pyramids, which are red-purple to tan, and unremarkable. The calyces, pelves and
ureters are unremarkable, The urinary bladder contains 120 cc of clear yellow urine; the mucosa
is gray-tan and smooth. The testes, prostate and seminal vesicles are unremarkable.
RETICULOENDOTHELIAL SYSTEM;

The spleen weighs 170 grams
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smooth, intact capsule covering red-purple, moderately firm parenchyma; the lymphoid follicles
arc unremarkable. The regional lymph nodes appear normal.
ENDOCRINE SYS .

"he pituitary, thyroid and adrenal glands are i inremarkable.

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM: Other than injuries as described above no abnormality is
noted in the bones and muscle encountered in the perfonnance of the autopsy.
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{]) Penetrating gunshot wound of head.
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scalp tissues.
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99-152

PRESENT:

Det. Travis Peterson = TP
Russell Bisner = RB
Officer Tom Tuft = TT

£
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TP:

Is that a little bit better ?

RB:

Yeah, I feel better now that I'm out of that cell.

TP:

I know that they already got all this information from you, but I need it
again. Spell your last name for me.

RB:

Bisner, B i s n e r

TP:

First name ?

RB:

Russ

TP:

Is it Russell ?

RB:

It's Russ.

TP:

Middle Initial ?

RB:

E.

TP:

What's your birth date ?

RB:

4/4/79

TP:

4/4/79 ?

RB:

Uh huh
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TP:

What's your home address ?

RB:

Same as where I got picked up front. 9118 South Shad Circle. Right where
they came and kicked in my door at.

TP:

They kicked in your door ?

RB:

Pretty damn close to it. Calling at 6:00 in the morning... (both talking)

TP:

What's your home phone number ?

RB:

944-6153. The same one they called.

TP:

Well, I wasn't there, okay.

RB:

(laughing).

TP:

You know why you're here, right ?

RB:

I actually don't. I just know I'm like... I got picked up at 5:00 in the morning,
close to 5:00 in the morning.

TP:

K. Let me explain something to you, okay. I'm here to talk about the truth
and nothing but that, okay. I'm not gonna play the beat around the bush
game. I have nothing to hide from you. K.

RB:

Nobody has anything to hide.

TP:

I'm gonna explain your rights to you cause I don't know your exact
involvement. I'm doing that to everybody. K. As of right now, everybody has
been really cooperative other than your outbursts, K. So let's turn that
around, get you back on the right road and let's go over what happened, get it
out, and get it over with. K.

RB:

K.

TP:

You being cool ?

RB:

I'm fine. I was just kind of felt uncomfortable being dragged all the way
down here and put in handcuffs without nothing ever told to me ever about
anything.
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TP:

111 explain it to you now. Um, but before we being, I do want to advise you of
your rights.

RB:

Uh huh.

TP:

Okay. And that is you do have the right to remain silent.

EB:

I know that.

TP:

You don't have to talk to me if you don't want to.

RB:

I got a lawyer if I want to, to.

TP:

That's right. But I, I have to explain it to you in the little way okay, so that,
so that I so can ask you questions instead of just listening to you, okay.

RB:

Un huh.

TP:

I want to understand everything. Urn, anything you say can be used against
you in court, if this case goes to a court. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. You
already knew that obviously. So you understand that part ?

RB:
TP:

If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed to represent
you. K. So if you don't have money for one, they'll give you one anyway.

RB:

Uhhuh

TP:

Okay. If you want. Um, do you understand everything so far ?

RB:
TP:

I need a verbal yes or no .

RB:

I agree.

TP:

Okay. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights. You don't have to
answer any questions or make statements.

RB:

Uhhuh
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TP:

K. So even at first if you want to talk, later you don't, you say you don't....
we're done.

RB:

Exactly. I can just do what ever I want basically.

TP:

Do you understand each of these rights that as I have explained them to you
?

RB:

I do.

TP:

Are you willing to talk to me now ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

I need a verbal yes or no.

RB:

I just want to find out what's happening.

TP:

K. I need a yes or no,

RB:

Yes.

TP:

Okay. Let's start with just helping me understand a little bit more of your
day yesterday. KL Why don't we start at about 7:00. Why don't you tell me
what happened from then on.

RB:

7:00 AM ?

TP:

7:00 last night.

RB:

Urn.... just kickin it. Just chillin with my friends and then we were just
drinking and that was it,

TP:

Kickin it. What do you mean by that ?

RB:

Watching TV on the DVD player at Justin's house.

TP:

At Justin's house ? So who all were you with ?

RB:

Everybody that's here with me now.

TP:

Justin....

RB:

Derek and Tim and everybody that was here with me now.

TP:

Who else ? I don't want. I know who is here now, but I want to know who all
you were with then.

RB:

I was with James and was with James and Dan and Chuckie, little Chuckie
and Dustin and everybody.

TP:

Okay. You were watching DVD, so on and so forth. Then what happened ?

RB:

Just (yawning - inaudible).

TP:

Kicking back at Justin's house ?

RB:

Just doing nothing. Calling girls and see what was going to happen tonight.

TP:

Was this at Justin's house ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

So then you were calling girls, then what happened ?

RB:

Urn... that was it. We were just like (inaudible).

TP:

You agreed to be truthful with right ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

Right ?

RB:

Well, I just want to know why like we're all being detailed anyway. Like was
what I was most interested in.

TP:

Well, there's pretty.

RB:

Well like... tell me what happened.. Why, why we're all being held here.

TP:

I want to know

RB:

Cause I got warrants, I know I got warrants.

TP:

Ya know what, I don't care about the warrants.

I know what happened.

RB:

I know you don't care about the warrants because otherwise I would already
be in Salt Lake County Jail, I don't really care, ya know.

TP;

There ya go. There ya go. I'm here asking you to help me now, okay. So
let's turn it around for a minute.

RB:

K.

TP:

I've already talked to everybody else.

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

I already know what they say occurred.

RB:

Well what did they say happened?

TP:

I'm not here to tell you what they said. I'm here to ask you what you know
and then I'll tell you what I know.

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

Sometime while you were at Justin's house, did you guys receive a phone call
from somebody that was mad ?

RB:

Um... I'm not sure cause we were all pretty drunk at the time. I don't really
even remember.

TP:

How much did you have to drink ?

RB:

Probably about two or three strawberry daiquiri's .

TP:

How big ?

RB:

Pretty good sized.

TP:

Pretty good sized. I mean, you don't weight that much, probably wouldn't
take a whole lot but I'm sure you can drink a little bit.

RB:

Yeah. Oh, I can drink yes.

TP:

I mean, I've got pretty drunk before and I can still remember what happened.
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RB: Uh huh
TP:

So I'm sure you pretty much remember what happened (inaudible) too.

RB:

So much, so much happened so quickly that you really can't remember.

TP:

K. Was there a fight tonight ?

RB:

Urn... I'm sure there was a fight between Tim and Dustin at first at Justin's
house.

TP:

K

RB:

We were all just chilling, like we went over the couch and then like back
against the wall a couple times I'm sure.

TP:

And then what happened ?

RB:

Just like fuckin arguing about nothing.

TP:

K.

RB:

And that was it.

TP:

Did you go anywhere after that ?

RB:

I don't think so.

TP:

How did you get home ?

RB:

I walked home.

TP:

From where ?

RB:

Urn, I think it was Justin's house.

TP:

You walked home from Justin's house ? Did you go anywhere else on the way
?

RB:

Uh uh.

TP:

Where did you guys go in Justin's truck ?
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RB:

Urn.... Went to the liquor store earlier (inaudible) that was it. That was like
early though in the night.

TP:

K. What about later in the night ?

RB:

That was the only place I would have gone with Dustin.

TP:

What about later in the night ?

RB:

I wasn't there... so

I don't know. I don't know if anybody did go any

where else.
TP:

You want me to be able to trust ya, right ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

Cause that's (inaudible) a whole lot on this, right ?

RB:
TP:

Uh huh
So why are you beating around the bush ? Thought you said that wouldn't
happen.

RB:

Well why is... why can't I find out what's happening ?

TP:

I've already talked to five other people and everybody said that you and
Justin and Derek and Dustin went somewhere in Dustin's truck.

RB:

Then where did we go ?

TP:

Shopko.

RB:

And what did we do there ?

TP:

That's what I'm asking you.

RB:

I don't know. What happened there cause I wasn't there.

TP:

Don't play stupid with me man. It's not worth it, K

RB:

Well what's... What (inaudible). I just want to know what's going to happen.
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TP:

Honest ? A whole lot of it weighs out on your truthfulness. If I can trust
you, and I can trust you're being honest with me, I can call lots of people and
we can work a lot of things out.

RB:

(inaudible) what happened is I was too fucked up and I don't remember.

TP:
v{001
K
%

Russ, if you're gonna lie to me and you're gonna deny things, I, I have
nothing else to do other than let you sit in Salt Lake County Jail until we get
this case screened.

j

RB:

See, I don't even know what the fuck happened cause ya know what all of us
were so drunk and shit faced....

TP:

Russ, you were not drunk enough you did not know what happened because
everybody else remembers.

RB:

No...

TP:

Everybody else admitted their part they played in it.

RB:

Ya know what my part was, is that I was drinking tonight and that was
about it. We went in Dustin's truck I guess to Shopko... Is that where we
went ?

TP:

Uh huh, Rainbo, 7-11. Did you go in 7-11 when they went in 7-11 ?

RB:

No.

TP;

K. Did you guys meet somebody over there ?

RB:

No (laughing) cause I don't remember that much of that. I'm serious. I do
not remember any of that.

TP:

I'm not stupid okay. I've drank plenty in my time and I've always remember
what I did, especially something as significant as what occurred tonight.

RB:

Well what was so significant that occurred tonight ?

TP:

That's what I want to know.

RB:

That's what I want to know too is cause I was not....
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:

Do you remember meeting somebody there ? Somebody else that was in
another truck?

RB:

No, cause I don't even remember going to the 7-11.

TP:

On three daiquiris?

RB:

No, I probably didn't drink three daiquiris, but I'm sure....

TP:

How much do you weigh ?

RB:

I weigh like 160.

TP:

What ? I don't understand why you are beating around the bush . Honestly,
I don't want to (both talking) because you're playing stupid with me and I
don't want to stupid.

RB:

Seriously, I do not know what the fuck happened when we went to 7-11 or
what. Like we went to 7-11...

TP:

Was there a fight in the parking lot of Shopko ?

RB:

Maybe I guess. Somebody might have hit somebody cause my hands got kind
of scared up.

TP:

That's right. Who did you hit ?

RB:

I don't know.

TP:

Who did you see hit who ?

RB:

(laughing). Like I said...

TP:

I'm not stupid. K. Wake up.

RB:

I don't know who hit who cause we were all....

TP:

You need to be... you need to be your own best friend right now Russ.

RB:

I got my own best friends.

TP:

K. but you need to get through this and the only way to get through it's by
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telling the truth and don't play stupid with me. You know a fight occurred.
You know an incident occurred. You know everything. Do you want to tell
me your side ?
RB

I don't know anything actually.

TP:

Russ.

RB:

Because I don't. I don't remember.

TP:

Now you're remembering there may have been a fight.

RB:

There was a fight. I remember that.

TP:

Between who ?

RB:

Somebody. I don't know who it was. It was hke Justin. Like somebody and
somebody.

TP:

How many people were there ?

RB:

Probably like three or four.

TP:

Who was there ?

RB:

There was like four of there people that we don't know and then hke my
friends, just like Dustin and Justin and all them.

TP:

Dustin, Justin, you and who else ?

RB:

And Derek and everybody that's here with me.

TP:

Was Tim there ?

RB:

I don't know cause I, I seriously cannot tell you whether or not anybody was
there.

TP:

Did you ride in the back of the truck or the front of the truck ?

RB:

I don't remember whether or not I did or not.

TP:

Russ.
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RB:

Fm so serious, I don't even remember.

TP:

Ya know what, I want to believe you , okay, but I can't because you
(inaudible) drunk enough that you don't know anything.

RB:

Well, what... what I'm wondering is why they kicked in my door, called my
house at 5:00 in the morning and were like..." well, we need you to come out
with your hands up (inaudible) "...

TP:

Yeah

RB:

I mean, what was that all about ?

TP:

Because we don't know you.

RB:

Yeah, well.... (inaudible) cause ya know what, you guys did... two detectives a
couple years ago arrest me there, at my house, keep coming to my door at
8:00 in the morning...

TP:

Who? Who?

RB:

A couple detectives, I don't know their names.

TP:

Then they're probably not here any more.

RB:

I spent five months for you guys out by the point in Genesis Youth Center
when I was a juvenile over stupid shit. None of us did that.

TP:

K. But I know what happened tonight and I don't know why you're not being
honest with me.

RB:

I don't know what happened tonight because nothing really did happen
tonight.

TP:

But I have explained to you that the truth weighs a whole lot. As of right
now I can't trust ya. You're lying to me Russ.

RB:

I don't even really know what happened tonight. Cause we were all just
fucked up so much anyway.

TP:

You know what happened and, and in your best interest it would be to tell me
what happened.
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RB:

Well, what are we being held on ?

TP:

Right now you're held on for questioning.

RB:

Just questioning ?

TP:

For right now.

RB:

Well...

TP:

And no, you're right, the door is locked, you are not free to leave.

RB:

Of course, but uh, yeah, what's the questioning about. Just about what
happened...

TP:

What happened in Shopko parking lot.

RB:

I know nothing.

TP:

There was a fight.

RB:

There was a fight I guess. Somebody must have done something that was
big cause damn they kicked in my door quick. 5:00 in the morning, I was
asleep. I'd been home for like two hours.

TP:

What time did you get home Russ ? So you got home about 3:00 ?

RB:

Like about 3:00, 2:30, 3:00.

TP:

And you were at Shopko. Did you walk home from Shopko, or....

RB:

Seriously, I do not remember where I did walk home from cause I was
so..like, I don't know, I was out of it. Where ever I walked home from, I
made it to my house.

TP:

Do yourself a favor. Think back to square one and remember because I know
you remember. You don't get drunk enough...if, if you are sober enough to
walk , you're sober enough for your mind to click.

RB:

Actually I wasn't sober enough to walk, I had a hard time.

TP:

You walked home. You walked home.
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Maybe that's how I got these scars on my hands dude.
TP:

If you wasn't sober enough to remember what's going on, you would probably
be laying in a gutter. You walked home, so you knew enough that was going
enough to get home.

RB:

I guess so. Well, like what are we being held on anyway ? Like why is
everybody being held anyway.

TP:

Until I find out what happened.

RB:

Well, what happened ? Cause like I don't even know myself cause I was
there, but like I wasn't there all the way.

TP:

Were there fists thrown ?

RB:

Dude, seriously...

TP:

Were there any other weapons.

RB:

Look at my hands. Dude my hands got a httle bit scars and shit up on em. I
don't remember how I got those. I am fucked up (inaudible).

TP:

Do you remember throwing any fists?

RB:

Do not remember throwing any fists.

TP:

Do you remember any other guys throwing any fists?

RB:

I think those guys did thrown some fists as we were calling up out of them... I
don't know.

TP:

What about a baseball bat ?

RB:

None of us used weapons ever, so... I don't know. Wouldn't have been us,
maybe them, but it wasn't us.

TP:

Knives ?

RB:

I didn't have my knife on me so...

TP:

Brass knuckes ? Guns ?
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RB:

I don't think there was any guns.

TP:

Take five minutes and think. K.

RB:

K

TP:

As soon as you decide, as soon as you decide you've got the truth, you, you let
me know. You just knock on the door and I'll be right back.

RB:

Fine actually. ( Detective Peterson left the room )
Hey... Ya know what.... (knocking on the door)
Ya know, Fm ready to go back to my cell (inaudible)

TP:

Sit. Sit here. What were you wearing tonight before you ended up in your
pajamas at your house ?

RB:

I think it was some sweat pants and this blue shirt.

TP:

What color were your sweat pants ?

RB:

Black

TP:

That's what you were wearing when you were over at Justin's house ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

And a blue sweatshirt ?

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

What shoes ?

RB:

My Adidas'

TP:

Huh ?

RB:

My Adidas'

TP:

Ya know what Russ, I know you're tired of this and ya know what, so am I.
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RB:

Aren't we all.

TP:

Like I told ya, as soon as we know the truth... well, I know the truth okay, I
want to hear the truth from you.

RB:

What is the truth. Tell me. Then I will tell you the truth.

TP:

Did somebody get hurt tonight Russ ?

RB:

Not me. Well, my hand did.

TP:

I know you didn't cause you're sitting here talking to me. But tell me about
somebody who got hurt.

RB:

I don't know.

TP:

Russ. There is no reason to lie, okay. I've already talked to three other people
that know. There is no reason for you to he. Ya know what you are going to
look like when this goes to court, that we've got these three people and
everyone of them told the truth and we've got little old Russ that says I don't
even know what you're talking about.

RB:

Cause I wasn't there.

TP:

You were there. You told me you were there.

RB:

See that's (inaudible). I wasn't there.

TP:

Russ, you told me you were there.

RB:

I know I was there, but I don't know what happened.

TP:

So tell me what happened when you were there.

RB:

We got in a fight I guess.

TP:

K. What happened during the fight ?

RB:

I don't know.

TP:

What did you do during the fight ?
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RB:

I think I hit the door or something.

TP:

With what ?

RB:

My fist cause that's where I think I got these cuts from. That was it.

TP:

K. Then what happened ?

RB:

I, I don't know what happened cause then we all....

TP:

You hit the door of what ?

RB:

Something. Like some truck or something.

TP:

K. how many people were in the truck ?

RB:

I think there was three.

TP:

There was three in the truck ? K. Then what happened ?

RB:

That's what happened. It was just a little fuckin scruff I guess then we all
scattered.

TP:

Did anybody on the other side have guns ?

RB:

I don't know actually, I , I have no idea.

TP:

If you seen a gun, you'd know it.

RB:

I guarantee I would know what a gun is if I seen a gun too. I know what a
gun looks like.

TP:

K. And everybody else there said ....

RB:

I have two guns, I'm sure you guys seen them when you raided my house,
yeah. Yes, I do have..own two guns.

TP:

K and everybody else said they seen a gun.

RB:

I don't even know which kind of gun it was. I, ....

TP:

You were right there.
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RB:

I do not know what kind of gun it was

TP:

I don't know what kind of gun, did you see a gun ?

RB:

I was behind everybody so I didn't really see anything,

TP:

Did you see a gun ?

RB:

No, well I don't know. Actually, I might have seen a gun, but...

TP:

K. So if you might have seen a gun, who might you have seen it with ?

RB:

I think it was the opposing parties.

TP:

K.

RB:

Pretty sure it was the opposing parties.

TP:

How many guns ?

RB:

I'm pretty sure there was just one if there was one.

TP:

Okay, and what were they doing with the gun ?

RB:

Trying to threaten us, I guess.

TP:

What were they saying ?

RB:

I, I seriously do not know cause I wasn't the first to arrive on the scene when
I was there.

TP:

K.

RB:

Other people got there before me.

TP:

K. Actually, correct me if I'm wrong and you admitted it at first and
everybody else admitted, you, Dustin, Justin and Derek all went in the same
truck to get there. So you arrived at the same time.

RB:

No. Well, that wasn't me. It wasn't really happening in Dustin's truck cause
none of us could have got there in Dustin's truck cause his trucks too small.
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(Both talking)

TP:

Two of you rode in the back and two of you rode in the front.

RB:

We did ?

TP:

Yeah. That's what everybody else said.

RB:

I really...

TP:

And they didn't have any time to make up stories.

RB:

I'm seriously, I do not remember.

TP:

Russ, honestly. I don't know why you're playing this game. You're only
hurting yourself.

RB:

I really don't know why either.

TP:

Then tell me the truth of what happened up there.

RB:

What ?

TP:

Did you hear any shots fired out of this gun?

RB:

I do not know.

TP:

Does your hearing work, can you hear me talking right now ?

RB:

Yeah, I can hear, my ears are not... my ears aren't fucked up from gun shots,
so I think I would have heard some gun shots.

TP:

Did you hear gun shots ?

RB:

I did not hear gun shots.

TP:

But everybody else did for a mile around.

RB:

They did huh ?

TP:

Yeah

RB:

Someone must have been shooting off after we were leaving then.
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TP:

Oh, no, not according to all your buddies.

RB:

I guess we must have been leaving after it was happening.
Already..someone was already popping off with it.

TP:

Did you ever touch the gun ?

RB:

Uh uh I never got my hands on a gun.

TP:

Ya know, there is a pretty distinct difference when you're not telhng the
truth. Just in your little non-verbal actions. Tell me the truth Russ, did you
touch the gun at all ? Even during the fight and wrestle ?

RB:

No, I did not.

TP:

So if we test your hands and arms, there's not going to be one ounce of gun
powder anywhere on them ?

RB:

Pretty sure there won't be.

TP:

I mean, you can't wash the shit off. So if s still going to show up.

RB:

I don't think so. I'm pretty sure (inaudible) no.

TP:

If a gun... has a gun been fired even within five feet of you in the last 24
hours ?

RB:

I'm pretty sure no.

TP:

Well, you ... I mean...

RB:

Maybe actually.... Cause ya know what, I was in that group of people and
people
if, if people did have weapons and gun shots were being fired, then
I guess I could have been there..where this all was ....

TP:

A gunshot is not something that you're going to forget Russ.

RB:
TP:

Dude, I'm serious.... I....
You hear a bang, you would know.. ( both talking)

RB:

You would hear, you would hear a gun shot. I know what a gun shot sounds
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like. They are loud, they ... they....
TP:

So has a gun been fired within five feet from you in the last 24 hours ? By
anybody ?

RB:

No. Not by my hearing, no. Cause I can't tell by my hearing. I don't think
so, no.

TP:

You would know a gunshot because everybody else heard it. A cop heard it
that was up the road.

RB:

Maybe there was gun shots, I guess. They must have been shooting at us
dude I guess.

TP:

K

RB:

That's why everybody scattered I guess. Maybe that's how I got my cuts,
when I was running I guess.

TP:

Did you hear gun shots or not ?

RB:

I think so I guess. Since.... yeah, yeah.

TP:

I don't know how anybody could think they heard a gun shot. It's either you
heard a gun shot. It's either you heard a gun shot or you didn't.

RB:

Seriously, I don't remember if I heard a gun shot or not because you know
what... I don't.

TP:

Are you on anything but alcohol tonight Russ ?

RB:

No.

TP:

The blood test is gonna show that one too.

RB:

Beans are pretty nice. Well, the only think I have in me is steroids other
than that.

TP:

You use steroids to work out ?

RB:

No, I use steroids for my uh, firm reduction program that I'm involved in.
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(Someone enters the room...
TP:

Thank you. This kit right here is gonna tell me whether or not you've been
around gunshots.

RB:

K.

TP:

Are you right handed or left handed ?

RB:

I'm.... right handed. If I was to decide not to want to do this, then I could
just go back and say no... right ?

TP:

For this ? This is actually part of evidence. You, you do have the right to say
no, and that's cool if you want cause I'll go on the phone and get a warrant to
do it.

RB:

Uh huh. So (inaudible) matters so might as well just do it now.

TP:

It's.... am I going to do it by force, no.

RB:

No, cause I don't want it done by force. Last time that happened, I got a
fuckin decatheter stuck up my dick and it didn't feel so good. So....

TP:

These kits are weird Tom. What happened to the good old ones.

TT:

Never used the white ones.

TP:

Neither did it. I've always used the ones in the paper. Let's see your right
hand. With gloves on, I can't get the bottle open. These are tight.

TT:

Let me pull the tab off.

RB:

I just don't want.. Ya want to know what I'm saying... cause I just don't want
to get myself in any trouble that I don't want to be in.

TP:

I totally understand what you're saying.

RB:

You understand what I'm saying.

TP:

Totally, and ya know what, if I was in your shoes too, I'd do the same ... the
only difference is, is it's pretty clear.... I mean, you watch TV as well as
anybody else, you tell the truth, things go so much smoother for ya.

(Inaudible)
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Honestly.
RB:

They usually do.

TP:

Um, especially when I know what happened. There's no reason to deny it
now. And is what we'll do is we will do these, I'll go run it through the
machine and uh.... come back and let you know. I mean, the only thing that
would work in your better interest right now is to tell me what the results are
going to be before they come back.

RB:

(inaudible). My hands are gonna look like they got shot residue.

TP;

It is gonna come back as that ?

RB:

Might cause I was around people that were shooting guns I guess.

TP:

K.

RB:

Cause them cops wear guns....

TP:

No... it will be a little bit more detailed. Gunshot residue is not gonna show
up unless the gun was in your hand. There is no reason for it. It's a direct
bill. No matter if it's a rifle, a hand gun, shot gun, anything else. Gunshot
residue shows up in these places. So do you want to play the truth or do you
want me to go run it through the machine and tell you what happens ?

RB:

I'd like to see what happens.

TP:

You'd like to see what happens ?

RB:

Cause... uh huh.

TP:

Won't bug me. The only thing I can say is like I told ya....

RB:

Hey, I'm trying to be as truthful

TP:

Truth plays a whole lot. K. But you're not being honest with me Russ.

RB:

I can't really be honest with I don't know the truth myself. I woke up at 6:00
this morning. 5:00 this morning was saying uh... you should come out with
your hands up.
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K, this takes uh.... five to ten minutes. Oh no, have a seat. Stay here. And
like I said, it will weigh in your favor if you'd be honest with me what the
results are gonna be (both talking).
RB:

(inaudible). My hands look like they could be coming back with that stuff on
em I guess. Cause....

TP:

Do you want to go talk about why is that before I go run it so I have your
truthful statement instead of this

RB:

Ya know what, gunshots did go off I guess because everybody Is saying they
did and if that's the case then so be it.

TP:

But I don't, I don't ...that's why I didn't want to tell you what everybody else
was saying because I want to know what you know Russ.

RB:

I'm... I was sitting....

TP:

Did gunshots go off or not ?

RB:

Gunshots I guess did go off because...

TP:

How many did you hear ?

RB:

I think it was two to three.

TP:

Who did the shooting ?

RB:

It was the other party.

TP:

K. who did they shoot at, do you know ?

RB:

I think it was warning shots.

TP:

Warning shots ? What do you mean by that ?

RB:

Just telling everybody to get back or something I guess, I don't know.

TP:

Somewhere during this right did you touch the gun ?

RB:

I'm sure I might have wrestled with it or something.
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TP:

Did the gun go off at all while you were wrestling with it ?

RB:

No. I, I'm not sure actually. Fm truthful about that. Fm not sure.

TP:

If this comes back positive, the gun was in your hand when it went off.

RB:

Well, it doesn't mean the gun, the gun, it was in my hand when it went off.

TP:

You had to have been touching it.

RB:

What ?

TP:

You had to have been touching it for this to come back positive.

RB:

Yeah. I had to been touching the gun so I had to been like wrestling with it
or something like the person

TP:

Is that possible ?

RB:

That is possible.

TP:

So you did touch the gun ?

RB:

I might have touched the gun. Fm sure I would have when we were wrestling
cause man I don't want to get shot I guess. If there... like I said, I really do
not know what did go on.

TP:

K.

RB:

But.... I don't want to get shot if all my friends were right there too. I was
hoi... if, if I didn't put up a struggle or grab the gun or whatever....

TP:

How did you stop yourself from getting shot ?

RB:

It was just, it was just to push it up or whatever, get it out of the way cause I
didn't want any of my friends to get hit or me.

TP:

What finally made these people go away ?

RB:

Seriously, I do not know. They must have just tooken off after like they
thought it was cool or something to bail real quick after that.
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TP:

Did the gun go off while you had a hold of it ?

RB;

I don't think so. Tm honest...truthful with that, I don't know.

TP:

We're not going back to I don't think so. It's either I did or I didn't. (End of
side A, start of side B).

RB:

Comes out the action too.

TP:

So it's either there or....

RB:

So if like you were holding the gun like (inaudible) boom like this and I was
wrestling with you like that, then it could get on my hands.

TP:

Possible.

RB:

Yes.

TP;

So did the gun go off while it was in your hand ?

RB:

If I was wrestling with him

TP:

Fm not saying if you were wrestling with him, were you wrestling with him?

RB:

I was, I was pushing off him. I didn't want

TP:

Did you touch the gun ?

RB:

I might have touched the gun when it was... I was pushing away...

TP:

You know the difference between putting your hands on the gun or a body.
We're your hands on his body or were your hands on the gun

RB:

I think my hands were on the gun pushing away and he might have fired
when I was pushing away cause I do....

TP:

While your hands were on the gun, did the gun go off ?

RB:

Ya know what, I'm for... honestly, I do not, Fm not sure if it did go off as there
was so much going on at the time. But it could have gone off, it might have.

TP:

Did anybody get hit.

Yes, it did go off but it did never....
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RB:

I don't think anybody got hit. I think It was straight up in the air when we
were wrestling..pushing (inaudible) it had gone straight up in the air.

TP:

How many shots do you remember going off ?

RB:

I think it was two or three, that was it. That was the most I think I did hear.
That was it. That was the most I think I did hear if I did. Which I don't
know cause I don't remember.

TP:

You said there was one time your hands were on the gun and it went off in
the air. Is that what you said ?

RB:

Yeah, like when I was ... my hands went completely on the gun like I was
holding it, but it was like I was pushing off on it. Defensively in my own case.
I was pushing off on it. If it did go off like that.

TP:

Is it possible that when it went off it hit somebody ?

RB:

I'm not sure. I'm sure it's possible. I mean, you know that as well as I do. It's
possible that it could have hit anybody.

TP:

But did you see (both talking)

RB:

What was the gun doing there in the first place is the problem?

TP:

That's what I want to know.

RB:

See, that's what I want to know too is who brought the gun in the first place.

TP:

Did you walk home after you left after this ?

RB:

I ran home.

TP:

K.

RB:

I'm sure I did.

TP:

You ran home, k. Did you take that gun with you ?

RB:

No, I didn't.

TP:

You did not ?

It wasn't still by the truck.
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RB:

I'm sure he still had it.

TP:

He didn't we've already found him and the gun is no where to be found.
Everybody said the gun went with you.

RB:

Everybody said the gun went with me ?

TP:

And if, the thing I'm getting at now is if it the gun laying on the side of the
road or in a ditch somewhere....

RB:

It's not.

TP:

Let's get it away so that the kids on the way to school don't pick it up.

RB:

The gun, the gun is not on the side of the road anywhere.

TP:

Then it's at your house where it's safe ?

RB:

It's at my house where it is safe. (inaudible) where it is safe.

TP:

Okay. So no school kids gonna pick it up on the way to school ?

RB:

No.

TP:

The gun that was at Shopko is at your house, unloaded, secure, nobody can
touch it ?

RB:

Yes, nobody can touch it.

TP:

What kind of gun is it ?

RB:

It is an SKS.

TP:

It's an SKS.

RB:

It's not my SKS, but it...

TP:

Who's...

RB:

I guess it's Darby's.

TP:

Darby's?
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RB:

I'm sure you guys already knew that.

TP:

So, it it's not your gun, can we go get it ?

RB:

Yeah, if I can go in and grab it myself and bring it out to you, unarmed, like..

TP:

I can't let you touch the gun buddy. I can't let you touch it.

RB:

Well....

TP:

I can probably go make a phone call and find out if we can get... if we can sign
a consent for us to go get it, Um, we can probably arrange for you to go with
to get it and you can point it out, but I can't let you touch. Not for our safety,
I'm sorry.

RB:

Well I just wanted to get it out of there, out of my house too.

TP:

And we want it out of your house, especially if it's not yours.

RB:

Ya know what, and I didn't mean to take that weapon.

TP:

You didn't mean to take it ?

RB:

No, I did not mean to take it. What did happen was not very clear on
anything.

TP:

Okay, tell me what happened then.

RB:

Really, that's all I know.

TP:

Oh, I thought you said you wasn't very clear on what happened.

RB:

I wasn't very clear on what happened all tonight, but I mean, I did end up
with the weapon and I did take it home and I put it safe.

TP:

K. So are you willing to sign a consent to search and we'll go up there and
collect the gun.

RB:

I'm not willing to sign the search and consent. I won't be willing to be
escorted...

TP:

Will you sign a consent for us to go get the gun and you go with us ?
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RB:

Yeah, if I'm willing to be escorted there to get it, I will, I will bring it out to
you or you can come with me down to where it is and I will give it to you.

TP:

Cool. Let me, let me go make a phone call and see if that will work cause I
got to get the gun, K.

RB:

K. that's what I'm....

TP:

Cool.

RB:

Hey urn.... Is this gonna work out in my favor ?

TP:

It's looking like it. Cooperation works out.

RB:

K. (Detective Peterson left the room) I can't believe they brought the gun
anyway. Well, these fuckin (inaudible). Okay now
K, this floor is
looking pretty comfortable. (Screaming) Fucking (inaudible)

TP:

Oh, that don't look comfortable.

RB:

(inaudible) I'm tired.

TP:

K. I do want to thank you for being honest., okay. I do think you're coming
around. K. There are still a couple details it's time to work out, okay. One,
you left the house, at Justin's house with him, Dustin, everybody else. Two
you went to Shopko parking lot with them where this fight ensued, right ?
(Inaudible) yes or no ?

RB:

Yes

TP:

I mean, cause this can mean different things to anybody, okay. So you were
at Justin's house... yes or no ?

RB:

Yes

TP:

You were at Shopko parking lot ?

RB:

Yes

TP:

There was a fight at Shopko parking lot ?

RB:

Uh huh . Yes
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TP:

There was a gun involved ?

RB:

Uh huh. And it was the opposing party's.

TP:

Okay, they brought it. The gun is now at your house ?

RB:

Yes

TP:

K. How did the gun get from his hands to yours ? During the fight ?

RB:

Uh, I think it was just from wrestled... I wrestled it or somebody wrestled
it..helped me wrestle it out of his hands.

TP:

How many times did the gun go off ?

RB:

I'm not sure. Actually, it's probably like three. It has a five round clip, so it
probably might have gone off all....

TP:

Five round clip and one in the chamber ?

RB:

If it was, if it was loaded up.

TP:

And one in the chamber ?

RB:

Fm not sure cause it wasn't my gun so....

TP:

We've collected six casings.

RB:

So that means one is in the chamber....

TP:

We had an officer that heard at least five of them.

RB:

(inaudible)

TP:

K. It's now time to be truthful.

RB:

It's truthful.

TP:

Solely truthful. How many times did the gun go off while it was in your
hands ?

RB:

Um, not sure. I'm.. I, it was... it never went off in my hands unless, like I
31

said it never went off in my hands....

r

P:

It did because the test came back, yes.

RB:

It only went off in my hands if I was pushing back, like I said, that was the
only way it went off.

TP:

The GSR kit says that it went off in your hand. It's all over actually. It's on
both your hands.

RB:

That was cause I was held... that was cause I was holding the weapon I guess
when I took it home though too, right ?

TP:

No. No, it's only when it fires. It's the little burst that comes off when it
fires. That is the only time.

RB:

That wouldn't have been me. I was not firing the weapon. Nope... If anyone
was firing the weapon it was him.

TP:

Russ. Did you fire the gun even once ?

RB:

No.

TP:

How come everybody else says you did ?

RB:

I don't know if I did or not. I don't think I did. I'm pretty sure I did not do it.

TP:

Russ, again this is not an I don't think.

RB:

I didn't actually. No, I did not.

TP:

Did the gun go off even once in your hands ?

RB:

It did not go off once in my hands. It only went off when I was pushing it off.
That's the only time it went off.

TP:

Well, (inaudible).

RB:

(inaudible - both talking ).

TP:

Did your hand ever touch the trigger ?
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RB:

Well, when I was carrying it home, I put it on safety and made sure it was all
safety up.

TP:

Were there any bullets in it ?

RB:

There was no bullets in it when I got it. I made sure.

TP:

Cause it had been unloaded with all six casings in the parking lot.

RB:

Somebody... somebody had already shot it off which was the opposing party.

TP:

How many did he fire ?

RB:

Well, it must have been six at least cause that's all there was was six.

TP:

Russ. You are feeding me full of shit, K. .

RB:

Fm not feeding you full of shit.

TP:

Wake up.

RB:

I didn't shoot the gun.

TP:

I talked to everybody involved. Even Dustin from West Valley is now here
okay. Nobody has anything to hide. There's no reason to lie.

RB:

I wasn't shooting the weapon.

TP:

Did you accidentally pull the trigger ?

RB:

No, Fm not. No I did not. And if, if that was the case, where my hand was
involved in that, then it was during the wrestling of getting the weapon. It
was...( Both talking)

TP:

You're at your buddy's house at a party, a phone call comes in which is a little
start of a fight which you guys go to Shopko for. K.

RB:

Uh huh

TP:

A baseball bat's involved right ?

RB:

No.
33

TP:

Dustin (or Justin) already produced the bat. It was out of his truck.

RB:

Well, that wasn't... I had no knowledge of it.

TP:

Did you see a baseball bat ?

RB:

No, I did not.

TP:

That's how the gun got taken out of the guys hands so you had to have been
there cause you're the one that ended up with the gun.

RB:

I had no knowledge that the baseball bat was there.

TP:

Russ.

RB:

I'm serious, I did not. I had no knowledge of the baseball bat.

TP:

K. How did the gun get from his hands to yours ?

RB:

When we were wrestling, I guess I ended up with it after that and then

TP:

Were you wrestling on the ground or standing up ?

RB:

No, I think he was still in the truck when he... I ended up with it then I, I
backed off after it had already gone off I guess and then that's when I....

TP:

When the gun went off, did it hit him ?

RB:

Did it hit him ?

TP:

Yes.

RB:

I don't think so. I'm not sure. I'm pretty sure it didn't.

TP:

More than once Russ.

RB:

More than once what ?

TP:

The gun hit him.

RB:

More than once ?
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TP:

Uhhuh

I! I i

How many times did it hit him ?

TP:

I don't know, but I know it's more tha n once.

RB:

Well, I was not involved in that. That was....
Russ, you're the only one that touched the damn gun.

RB:

TP:

Yeah, but, you know that was only i n the w restling. I :i lever did (inai idible)
pull the trigger
So it's a wrestling match between you and Darby. Who else touched the gun
?

RB:

Nobody else. It was me and In 111,

TP:

You and him. And there's one person shot and one person not.

RB:

That would have been him because he was the one holding the gun. I did not
have control over the weapon.

TP:

You ended up with control of the weapon.

RB:

After I, after (inaudible) by him.

TP:

Do you remember your 1 mi kirns ninning off saying " no, no, no Russ, no" ?

RB:

No.

TP:

They do.

RB:

Well, I don't. That was cause it wasn't me.

TP: Are you ready to be honest or not ?
K B, Let me be honest that I didn't do anything. Nothing ever happened. It was
nobody's fault.
TP:

I'm not saying...
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RB:

If anything did happen, it was nobody's fault.

TP:

I'm not saying it was....

RB:

If anything did happen, it was nobody's fault.

TP:

I'm not saying who's fault it was. I want to know who h a d the gun when it
hit Darby.

RB:

Darby had it cause t h a t was his weapon. He was holding the gun and I

TP:

There was more t h a n that.

RB:

That was it.

TP:

As you walked away, did the gun go off ?

RB:

No.

TP:

When your first took control of the gun, did it go off ?

RB:

No. Cause they were, they were already gone.

TP:

Even by accident ?

RB:

All the shells were already gone when I had control of the weapon. When it
was gone.... the action... (both talking)

TP:

So it went off six times in the truck ?

RB:

The action, the action was already open and that's when I had the control of
the gun and that's when I ....

TP:

So did it go off six times in the truck ?

RB:

I guess so, yes.

TP:

Because them casing flipped quite a ways and everyone them have been
collected..

RB:

Yes, they do. They fly. I know they do.
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TP:

Did you see them fly ?

RB:

No. Cause L... no, I do not remember if they flew or not. I remember t h a t

TP:

How many times did you hear the gun go off ? You were there .

RB:

I heard it go off like at least four to five times if not more.

TP:

K, and whose hands were they in when it went off ?

RB:

It was in Darby's.

TP:

Are you saying he shot himself ?

RB:

Yeah.

TP:

Russ.

RB:

I am saying that.

TP:

Your own buddies aren't saying that.

RB:

Well, I did not shoot him, ever.

TP:

Even by accident. Was the gun in your hand when it hit him ?

RB:

No.

TP:

Be honest with me, be honest with yourself.

RB:

The gun was not in my, the gun was not in my h a n d when it hit him, ever.

TP:

Even by accident ?

RB:

Even by accident. It was not... if... the gun never became like until it got to
me. It was only... it was empty already. And when it got to me it was empty.

TP:

But during the fight over the gun, the gun went off six times.

RB:

Yeah, and that's when he still had control of the weapon.

TP:

And you walked away and he didn't. What did he do after you left, or when
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you started to leave ?
RB:

Fm not sure cause we....

TP:

Was he still yelling at ya ?

RB:

Who ?

TP:

Darby.

RB:

I, I'm not sure. Actually, that's when we all....

TP:

When was the last time you heard a word out of his mouth ?

RB:

I guess it was probably as we were running up to the car and he was pointing
a gun at us. That was probably it.

TP:

He ran up to the Nissan truck ?

RB:

No. As, as like he was coming onto us like that, that's the last words I heard
was... actually, I didn't even hear any words. I didn't hear any words. All I
seen was gun. That was it.

TP:

And the gun ended up at your house and Darby ended up shot.

RB:

I guess so. Fm serious, I did not know that he'd been shot. I had no... I did
not shoot him, ever. Never had control of the weapon until it was already
unloaded and that's when I took the gun ...

TP:

The only other two people... the only two people that touched that gun while
you were there is you and Darby.

RB:

Me and Darby.

TP:

And Darby is shot and you're not.

RB:

Exactly, but I ended up with the weapon.

TP:

And you ended up with the weapon and took it home.
put it in your house ?

RB:

In a very safe spot.
38

And where did you

TP:

Where?

RB:

Somewhere. What's the deal ?

TP:

I want to know where the gun is.

RB:

What's gonna happen with me ? I know where the gun is. The gun is safe
for right now. What's, what's up ? Like, what's wrong with Darby ? Tell me
what's...

TP:

We'll just get a search warrant for the gun, okay. That's no big deal.

RB:

I know. I know.

TP:

I don't even need you for that. I need you for your truth.

RB:

Well that's what I'm trying to figure out here.

TP:

Ya know what, it's in your best interest to tell the truth Russ.

RB:

And that's what I'm saying.

TP:

Everybody else here told the truth...

RB:

What is the truth ?

TP:

I don't know why you're denying it.

RB:

There is no...

TP:

The gun went off more than once when it was in your hand and it hit Darby.
Did it or did it not ?

RB:

Did it.. It didn't.

TP:

How come every body else says it did ?

RB:

Cause it didn't.

TP:

It did. Be truthful with yourself Russ.

RB:

K. I want a Lawyer now.
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TP:

Alright. We're done.

RB:

I'm getting sick of this.

TP:

No. You sit down.
END OF INTERVIEW
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RALPH W. DELLAPIANA, #6861
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, #7267
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,

RUSSELL E. BISNER,

Case No. 991900723FS
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

Defendant.
The Defendant, RUSSELL E. BISNER, by and through counsels of record, RALPH W.
DELLAPIANA and MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, pursuant to Rule 16 Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and the United States,
i hereby requests the following materials be provided:
Trans/fiptrNptten statement orrecording^f statement jirom John\lussell Dj
by Offic&r Albra/d.

~^

^JZ*

Tr/nscripts. wptten statements or recordmg ofX a t e m e n t s from Mac Macintosh,
fd Brad Dihn&*6Y
3. J

W,0

fr^

Copy of video interviews with Justin Koontz, Tim Thornblad, Derek Pearson,

Dustin Symes, Chris Lyman and Russell
liminary hearing^jjcluding

JtheiK^ddress, phone numbers and criminal records; in^udine information regarding the details
Wany cooperationa^reementsVwritten or unwritten) betweenWither police officei'oKriie D. A. 's
oflQce andnerfential witnesses, ^ncluding^ffers of immuniW, offers or leniency ot other
incentives designed to elicit cooperation such as the threat of prosecutor for the homicide as a
party.
and bookina^phot
AlffihoWjgrapfts' and^od^o tapesj>f/ne crlpie scene anc^ffi^vidence, incjjioing
Shy aiagYamsjana digital pRflfo dis
I All photjglaphs and ^eoitape|)of dielalleged vtftiims vehicle, ariy suspect
vehicles anfi any susracts residence/room V>r liviM areal including allWidencaraocumVntec
Photos ormdebs to /nclude\hos^from 4085 Tfcflcer Road, 2 ^ 1 WoodchucKWay, 9119 Shad
Circl\2f74 Fafcop Way.
Results/tt the invei!tei^^archpf!^

Nissan tfb^k and the alleg£0-**ctmis green

truck.

Salt Lake County Police Report number 99-2122 including any and all
supplements.

2

Woodchuck Way; 2574 Falcon Way.
Copy oNtie time-line^pfevents prepa*^ii23i><^
H}

Results of all GS^T tests performed on Ru^ell BisneW Justin koontjf, Dere!

Pearson\ Di^tin Syqies, or <jjrfy other suspect, including GSR results fron^the jtfeged victim,
Darby GoTub.

^ ^ ^

^

(8. ) Results of syringes found at the crime scene, on the alleged victim or in his
vehicle.
$19.y
>

Harris.
/50\

Tox report on the possible marijuana found at 2431 Woodchuck Way by Officer

-no W»W
Test results of all blood work and/or analysis recovered from crime scene, alleged

victim or any suspect or suspect vehicle.
Test-results from all ^htss-fiiecgs or fragments found onjlis-alfegga victim at the
crime scene.
/ 2 2 y \ Video tape from surveillance camera from Henrie^s bry (Jleamflffi^aif(!K§!hopko.
^23>
&

OfficgHSt^enson's report (#99-298) ^n criir^nal mischief near /he crime scene.
Bl(/)d test results from Justin Kooraz and Der§k Pearson shirt?.
\

/

\

bst results from\all of Russell Bfsner's clothing;.
Photograph of all suspects after Aheir arrest.
Transcript of mini-cassftte tapg recorded by Offic^f Thoma
Photographs of injuries d& Ddtek Pearson.
ist of all evidence seized from 9118 Shad Circle, including the location of such
evidence and any photographs or videos of that evidence.
3

foy.

Results of tests on marijuana pipes found in the alleged victims green truck.

3-tr—Photographs from the autopsyvResults of all substances on evidence found on the alleged victim during the
autopsy.
/33y?

Results of blood stain patterns.

/<3dQ All test results from any evidence which has or will be analyzed, including;
bullets, fragments, casings, guns, bats, hair, blood, glass, fingerprints.
d injhe^lleged victim(s grepiffrut:

Results of unknow151ack substance

r

WW

¥6. ^iegiblef cdy of Officer Brett Mgrtiifs one page i^ort
Pages 1-5 of\he police repdrt of Officer #188;

i

./

DATED this ^Z_dayotPebruary, 1999.

W. DELLAPIANA
Attorney for Defendant

:<£i

M ^ f r t f w X j NIELSEN
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney Office, 231 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this ZZ

day of February, 1999.

S
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT L. STOTT, 3131
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
STATE'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
-vsRUSSELL E. BISNER,
Defendant.

Case No. 991900723FS
Hon. Stephen L. Henriod

The State, by and through its council, Robert L. Stott, answers the defendant's
Supplemental Request For Discovery:
The^mtenstHlement of John Ri*£§ell Dmry^fras previously beenjpfdvided.

A

copy of the tape of Officer Albrand s interview of Mr. Drury is enclosed
A copy of the tape<rf^&cer Peterson's interview of Mac MacinloefrT^ehclosec
There ili^transcrip^^frtten statement, or recohiiq^of JoshuaJ^wtJSriy, Shane Davis, or Brad
Diamond.
The video interviews of Justin Koontz, TimJffertfiFlad, Derek PearSUIl, DliSlin
'Symes, Cris Lyman^rfia Russell Bisn^^e^JvtwWSre at the District Attorney's Office for the
deldlll^ IU View or copy.
The State has n^t^et determinefrs^itngsses 1 mi iii^-ptejimina
^jDocjJarfg sheet of Russel^Bi3ner has already been providedT^Sn«lused is his_
booking photo.

STATE'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
Case No. 991900723FS
Page 2

jf

i C ^ ^ ^ D i a g r a m s have previously been provided. A cgpy for th^^efense of all police

photosNb enclosed. Video t a p ^ o f theVcene and/or evideifce are available to\ppy at the DA's
Office. Enclosed is a dijdta^hoto disk a n ^ c o p v ^ f t h e photos on the disk.

tl

Pr^ffllfilY provided in police reports.
\y piuvidtd in puliLiTTeports.

'10.)

Pending lab resi
jerprint work aong^rmis weapon.

Tclosed.
(16/)

Will furnish when state obtains it.

17.

No tests have been performed.

18.

No tests have been performed.

19.

No tests have been performed.

20.

Pending

21.

No tests have been performed.

(^22^

Available to view or copy.

23.

Previously provided.

24.

Pending

25.

Pending

26.

Copies enclosed.

27.

Copy of tape enclosed.

28.

Copies available.

STATE'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
CaseNo.991900723FS
Page 3

29.

Previously provided - photos available, video available to copy or view.

30.

No tests have been performed.

31.

Photos taken by Sandy Police are available.

We don't have the Medical

Examiner's photos as of yet.
32.

Pending

33.

Pending

34.

Pending

35.

No tests have been performed.

36.

Typed copy of Officer Mark's report enclosed.

37.

Previously provided.
DATED this 9th day of March, 1999.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney

ROBERT L. STOTT
Deputy District Attorney

STATE'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
CaseNo.991900723FS
Page 4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Answer To
Defendant's Supplemental Request For Discovery was delivered to Ralph W. Dellapiana, and
Matthew G. Nielsen, Attorney's for Defendant Russell E. Bisner, at 424 East 500 South, Suite
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the/^^day of March, 1999.

RALPH W. DELLAPIANA, #6861
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, #7267
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vRUSSELL E. BISNER,

Case No. 991900723FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.
The Defendant, RUSSELL E. BISNER, by and through counsels of record, RALPH W.
DELLAPIANA and MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, pursuant to Rule 16 Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and the United States,
hereby requests the following materials be provided:
1^.

Copy of all videostaken in the above^enlitled rase, including video ofyiHe~2riine

scene, interviews, je^ches and surveillance.
2.

of all witnesses State intends to call at trial, including their address, phone

numbers^imd^ rap sheets, as well as any information regarding the detail of any written or oral
cooperation agreemeTTNaetJveen any police agency or officer, the State and_potei
nngejBEinLigsults from me jdJegeTTrrraiqej- weaponjperto wr
on alLsaSpects lncludihu^ll'luiduuL

Dustin Symes and Darby Golub.
6.

Test results from^jfwlges found^the crime scene.

taken from any suspeg]
10.

Officer Stevens report (#99-298) regarding criminal mischief near crime scene.

11.

Any te5tTresultS42erfom

12.

All test results from ai^/evidence whicfcrhas or will be analyzed, including;

clothing.

bulletv-easmgsrfragments, glass, hair, blood,
DATED this

/T7
^>

day of May, 1999.

RALPH W. DELLAPIANA
Attorney for Defendant

J?Z. ••
MATTHEW G/NIELSEN
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney Office, 231 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of May, 1999.

DAVE) E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROBERT L. STOTT, 3131
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
DISCOVERY

-vsRUSSELL E. BISNER,
Defendant.

CaseNo.991900723FS
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, Robert L. Stott, answers the defendant's
Supplemental Motion For Discovery:
1.

A copy of Officer Albrand's interview of John Drury has previously been

provided.

A copy of Officer Peterson's interview of Mac Macintosh has previously been

provided. As previously stated, all other videos are available to view or copy at the District
Attorney's Office.

(^r^^hen the list is finalized, a copy will be provided.
3.

Fingerprint report on the murder weapon has previously been provided. Report

from Department of Treasury of firearm ownership is enclosed.
4.

Enclosed.

5.

No GSR tests were performed.

6.

No tests performed.

7.

No tests performed.

8.

No tests performed.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
CaseNo.991900723FS
Page 2

9.

Kevin Patrick's report is enclosed and all other reports have been provided.

10.

Previously provided.

11.

Previously provided.

12.

Previously provided.
DATED this 17th day of May, 1999.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney

ROBERT L. STOTT
Deputy District Attorney
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Eggers has already completed and filed the transcript dated
9.
07/2000

Notice of Appeal Filed

07/2000

Certificate of Service

19/2000

Docketing Statement Filed

Notice of Transcript Filed in
27/2000
n Way fi led his transcripts in district court on

1/24/00.

18/2000
Default Letter Sent
trict court. Record is past due.
01/2000
Record Filed
. pleadings, 1 envelope exhibits, 1 sealed confidential envelope,
vols, transcripts dated: 3/31/99, 5/17/99, 8/26/99, 8/24/99,
9, 8/25/99, 8/24-25/99, 8/24/99, 8/24-25/99, 10/1/99.
d in 6-A.
02/2000
Set Briefing Schedule
ant's brief is due on or before April 14, 2000.
03/2000
Appearance of Counsel
ine E. Lilly and Ralph W. Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender
ation, enter an Appearance of Co-counsel of record for the
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er 30, 1999, under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
ure.
20/2000
Opposition to Motion
s Memorandum m Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Stay Briefing.
18/2000
Extension of Time for AppellanStipulatio
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to reconsider on of the time-extending motions of Rules 50(b)
Utah Rules Civil Procedure is not valid. Watkiss & Campell v. FOA
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H prejudice, resulting in loss of defendant's appeal. The trial
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e defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on December 30, 1999.
05/2000
Re-set Briefing Schedule
ant's brief is due on or before 10/10/00.
29/2000
Misc. Letter
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10/2000
Extension of Time for AppellanGranted
10/12/2000 PHB
and stipulation for a 14 day extension of time to file appellant's
Third request for an extension.
12/2000
Extension Granted
PHB
HEREBY ORDERED that the due date for the filing of Appellant's
is enlarged to October 24, 2000.
24/2000

Appellant's Brief Filed

27/2000
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from Russell Bisner requesting a print out of the docket of his

Also, Mr. Bisner requests that the court cc: him on all
.pondence etc.
31/2099

ed By

Appellee's Brief Due

Phone

Due

11/27/2000

Date

CATHERINE L. LILLY (7746)
Attorney for Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East Fifth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
RUSSELL BISNER,

Case No. 20000026-SC

Defendant/Appellant.
F. JOHN HILL, Director of Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, and CATHERINE L. LILLY, attorney for
defendant/appellant, hereby move this Court for an Order allowing
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to withdraw as court
appointed counsel in the above entitled matter on the grounds
that a potential conflict of interest exists between Mr. Bisner
and the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

It is suggested

that RICHARD P. MAURO and MICHAEL R. SIKORA be appointed to
represent the defendant/appellant.
DATED this /f k day of March, 2000.

CebU
F. LM3HJ\T {HILL, Director
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,

-7m I (..LP

Lih

CATHERINE L. LILLY
Attorney for Appellant

*

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CATHERINE L. LILLY, hereby certify that I have caused a
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the Attorney General's
Office, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854 this /Sit

day of March, 2000.

CATHERINE L.

DELIVERED/MAILED this

L I L L Y O

day of March, 2000.

CATHERINE L. LILLY (7746)
Attorney for Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East Fifth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

ORDER TO WITHDRAW AS
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

RUSSELL BISNER,

:

Case No. 20000026-SC

Defendant/Appellant.
Based upon motion of counsel and due to a conflict of
interest and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association withdraw as court appointed counsel in the above
entitled matter.
DATED this

day of March, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CATHERINE L. LILLY, hereby certify that I have caused a
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the Attorney General's
Office, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854 this ISU day of March, 2000.

:ATHERINE L. LILLY

CATHERINE L. LILLY (7746)
Attorney for Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801)532-5444
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

ORDER TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff/Respondent
v.

:

RUSSELL BISNER,

:

Case No. 20000026-SC

Defendant/Appellant
Based upon the withdrawal entered by Catherine L. Lilly
as court appointed counsel;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that RICHARD P. MAURO and MICHAEL
R. SIKORA be appointed to represent the defendant/appellant in
all future proceedings.
DATED this

day of March, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CATHERINE L. LILLY, hereby certify that I have caused
a copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the Attorney General's
Office, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854 this I5H. day of March, 2000.

CATHERINE L. LILLY

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of March, 2000.
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Let m e ask you, were y o u able to determine

2 the range of the firing, in other w o r d s , h o w far away
3 w o u l d the rifle have been at the time of the shooting?
4
A. I classified this as an indeterminate-range
5 w o u n d , which m e a n s that it had n o ranging features at
6 all. W h e n a gun is fired close to an individual, w e
7 can see things other than where the bullet actually
8 goes in, there can b e soot or smoke staining about the
9 w o u n d if i t ' s very close. In slightly farther away
10 situations, y o u m a y see pieces of gun powder that
11 actually get driven into the skin and cause tattooing
12 or stippling. In this case I s a w none of that. All I
13 s a w w a s the hole and the shrapnel defects with none of
14 those other ranging features.
15
Q. Could y o u say that this w a s not a close
16 shooting?
17
A. That w o u l d be consistent with m y findings,
18 that the weapon w a s probably at least beyond four feet.
19
Q. A n d y o u found absolutely n o gun p o w d e r
20 evidence?
21
A. N o soot, n o stippling.
22
Q. D i d y o u examine the clothing, too?
23
A. A s best I could with the blood staining, and
24 I s a w n o soot or stippling on that.
25
Q. Let m e ask you, did y o u have an occasion
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1 specifically pursuant to your duties to go to the scene
2 of this crime?
3
A. Yes, I did go to the scene in this instance.
4
Q. A n d that would have been on the morning of
5 January the 6th, during the morning?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. D i d y o u see the truck where the b o d y w a s
8 found?
9
A. Y e s , I did.
10
Q. A n d w a s the v i c t i m ' s body still in it?
11
A. Yes. H e w a s still in the vehicle when I
12 first arrived, and then w e removed h i m from the vehicle
13 during the process of investigating the scene.
14
Q. W o u l d y o u have happened to examine the
15 w i n d o w s of the truck?
16
A. Y e s , I did.
17
Q. D o y o u r e m e m b e r what condition they were in?
18
A. Y e s , the driver's side w i n d o w w a s shattered
19 with fragments of glass still in place. I believe
20 there w a s also breakage of the back cab w i n d o w .
21
Q. Like where a bullet w o u l d have entered or
>2 something?
>3
A. Possible, yes.
>4
Q. D o y o u r e m e m b e r the passenger side?
>5
A. I do not recall the passenger side.
:ARLTON W A Y , RPR
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Q. N o w , were y o u able to determine from the

2 fragmentation of the w i n d o w on the driver's side
3 whether or not the w i n d o w w a s u p or down at the time?
4
A. It w o u l d have been consistent with the w i n d o w
5 being raised.
6
Q. A n d then the glass shattered. H o w could y o u
7 tell that?
8
A. A s I say, the w i n d o w w a s incredibly broken
9 and shattered. There w a s glass throughout the interior
10 of the vehicle and as well as on the victim.
11
Q. A n d were there particles of glass still in
12 the frame where the w i n d o w fits?
13
A. Small amounts of glass were still retained,
14 yes.
15
Q. N o w , did y o u also examine the area of the
16 passenger door - excuse m e , of the driver's door to
17 determine whether or not y o u could see any projectile
18 markings?
19
A. Yes, I did.
20
Q. What did y o u do and what did you find?
21
A. Basically, I w a s looking to see if I could
22 see what if anything that bullet m a y have struck before
23 it hit the individual, and what I found w a s a very
24 distinct crease in the back pillar, what is called the
25 V pillar, of the driver's side which w a s consistent
Page 2 5 4
1 with a grazing impact of a projectile.
2
Q. Is that area y o u are talking about the area
3 where the door closes into?
4
A. Where the door actually closes, yes, rather
5 from where it hinges.
6
Q. N o w , I believe y o u also mentioned that as y o u
7 are doing your autopsy, y o u found in the bullet w o u n d s
8 itself some black plastic material?
9
A. Y e s , I did.
10
Q. D i d you see anything that w a s similar to that
11 at the scene?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. What w a s that?
14
A. That w a s part of the frame around the door
15 had black plastic.
16
Q. Seemed to be consistent with what y o u found?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. H o w about the glass itself that y o u s a w
! 19 there?
20
A. The fragments that I s a w distributed
21 throughout the truck cab as well as in the remnants of
22 the w i n d o w looked the same as what I saw on the body.
23
Q. N o w , this marking that you saw by what
24 appears to have been a projectile, w a s that consistent
25 as far as its direction with your findings in the

Page 251 - Page 254

1 autopsy itself?
2
A. Yes, with the victim in the driver's seat
3 where that bullet struck would correlate very well with
4 what I found on the individual.
5
Q. Would this indicate to you then whether or
6 not the bullet struck that frame prior to hitting
7 Mr. Golub?
8
A. That would be consistent, yes.
9
Q. I am going to show you a couple of pictures
10 if I may. First of all, State's Exhibit 22. I'll ask
11 you if you can identify what's depicted in that
12 picture?
13
A. What I am seeing is a fairly close-up
14 photograph of the truck and the back pillar, the V
15 piller, with impact sites consistent with a grazing
16 projectile strike.
17
Q. Is this the area which you've already
18 testified to that you saw that night?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Yes?
21
Q. Does this picture accurately depict what you
22 saw?
23
A. Yes.
24
MR. STOTT: I would ask for the introduction
25 of 22.
Page 256
1
MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, I haven't seen
2 it. I don't know...
3
MR. STOTT: I think you've seen it. Maybe
4 not blown up.
5
MR. DELLAPIANA: No objection, Your Honor.
6
THE COURT: All right. There is no objection
7 to 22?
8
MR. DELLAPIANA: No, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: It is received.
10
(State's Exhibit No. 22
11
was received into evidence.)
12
MR. STOTT: I am going to show you what's
13 been marked as State's Exhibit 21. I will ask you if
14 you can identify what's depicted here?
15 A. This is a slightly farther away view of the
16 same area of the truck with an individual sitting in
17 the driver's seat and a dowel lined up along the
18 grazing strike zone and pointing into the back of the
9 individual's head.
!0
Q. Now, that dowel, how is that consistent with
!l the projectile marking and path that you observed?
2
A. The dowel is oriented horizontally. It is a
3 flat. It's in line with the three strikes on the ~
4
MR. DELLAPIANA. Your Honor, excuse me, I am
5 going to object to him to describing the picture any

IARLTON W A Y , RPR

801 -238-7532

Page 257
1 further and what it reflects until it is admitted into
2 evidence.
3
THE COURT: All right. That objection is
4 sustained.
5
MR. STOTT: I'd move for its introduction,
6 Your Honor.
7
MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, I object to its
8 introduction. I don't think it accurately depicts what
9 happened. I don't think they've laid an adequate
10 foundation for what's in there.
11
THE COURT: As I understand it, Doctor,
12 Exhibit 21 is intended to be a demonstrative of your
13 scenerio of what occurred?
14
THE WITNESS: A reconstruction, yes.
15
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, I'm
16 persuaded that there's sufficient foundation, and
17 accordingly your objection is overruled. Exhibit 21 is
18 received.
19
(State's Exhibit No. 21
20
was received into evidence.)
21
MR. STOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.
22
Doctor, I'm going ask you to come down here
23 by the Jury and let's show the Jury these pictures and
24 then you explain the significance of these pictures and
25 what they show. I'm going to ask you to keep your
Page 258
1 voice up loud. We'll start with 22.
2
A. 22 is that — the one that I described as the
3 close-up picture and it shows the strikes on the
4 various portions of the door and window of the vehicle.
5 You can see that we've got a line that goes along with
6 where the projectile just grazes along and strikes.
7
Q. Did you say there was three?
8
A. I see three sites which would be consistent
9 with three strikes consistent with the various layers
10 of the door.
11
Q. Now, is there some black material there which
12 is consistent with what you found at the autopsy?
13
A. Yes, there are two things which could have
14 produced that, one would be this black material here
15 and then this is the plastic the rubber that actually
16 holds the glass in place.
17
Q. Do you see some glass fragments there? Do
18 you see there no glass being held in place where the
19 window has been up?
20
Now, the other picture, would you please? Is
21 that 21?
22
A. This is Number 21 that I'm now showing you.
23
Q. Now, will you tell the Jury what that
24 depicts?
25
A. This is what we are describing where someone
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Case Follow-up
On 010699 I responded to 2095 E 9400 S at the request of Lt.
ack to assist with the shooting incident. I arrived at 0633 hrs. When
rrived I met with Lt. Nosack. He advised me of the situation and
ed if I would respond to the victim's residence and notify his mother
his death. The mother's name was Mary Beth Golub.I left the scene and
uested dispatch to call the on call chaplain to meet me at the office.
At approximately 0734 hrs Chaplain Rick Korsmo met me at the
ice. I advised him of what we needed to do. He understood and we
ponded to 3882 W Angus Dr. We arrived there at 0756 hrs. We made
:act with a daughter by the name of Crystal. She stated the her
ler and her father were not there. She also stated that her mother
Ld not be home until later that day. Crystal then gave me the cell
le number of her dad, Ed Golub. We then left. We did not tell Crystal
circumstances of why we were there.
When I got to my car I called Ed Golub on his phone. He stated
should meet with us at 9000 S State St in Sizzler's parking lot. The
slain and I responded. We arrived there at 0812 hrs. When Ed arrived I
him sit in my car. Chaplain Korsmo advised him of what had happened,
stated he that he had heard about the incident this morning and when
illed him he suspected that Darby was involved. Ed went onto say that
>y had had a drug problem for the last two or two and a half years.
)y had used marijuana,LSD,methaphetamine and who knows what else. He
his ex-wife, Mary Beth, had put Darby in rehab programs and in
.tary schools but nothing had worked. Ed stated that Darby had gotten
"ied back in July or August. He married a Natalie Morby and they had
iree month old son. Darby and Natalie have had financial problems and
ilie was living with her mother in Sandy.The mother's name was Helga
>y. Ed gave us her phone number.
I then asked Ed if he knew how to contact Mary Beth. He stated
only place he knew of was at her home. I advised him that we had
t there and she wasn't there and we were told by Crystal that she
dn't be home until later. He stated that she was probably in Heber
' with her boyfriend and he didn't know how to contact her.
The chaplain tand I then offered any way we could to help him. Ed
ed that he would be fine and just wanted to go to work and be with
friends.
The chaplain and I then responded back to the scene. I contacted
Nosack and asked him if he wanted us to contact the wife, Natalie,
tated yes.
I had dispatch locate an address from the phone number. They
ed it came back to 9677 S Birchwood Wy. The chaplain and I responded
e. We arrived at 092 9 hrs. We rang the door bell and knocked on the
. We got no response. We left there and returned to the office. The
lain stated that he would keep trying to contact the wife and the
er and if he made contact he would call me.
At approximately 1230 hrs dispatch contacted me and advised that
had a Natalie Golub call in a missing person report on her husband
she wanted to speak to an officer. Natalie did not give an address
a phone number. I called the number and got a recording. I left a
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:sage. Approximately ten minutes later Natalie called the office. I
>ke with her. I asked her if I could speak to her in person. She
ted yes and gave me the address of 1784 E Sunrise Meadow Dr. I
ised her that I would be there shortly. She then asked if Darby was
d. I advised her that I would rather speak to her in person. She
ted ok. She sounded very upset on the phone.
I then contacted Chaplain Korsmo and we responded to the address,
alie met us on the front porch. I identified us. Her first question
is Darby dead. I asked if we could step inside. SHe showed us in. We
in the living room and Chaplain Korsmo told her what happened. She
an to be very upset and stood up. When her friend Amber grabbed her
collapsed onto the floor crying. She then stated he was the one in
shooting this morning. I advised her that he was. I then asked her
n the last time she saw him. She stated last night about 0130 hrs.
was standing in front of the residence we were at and he drove by.
hid because she didn't want to talk with him because they had gotten
D fight earlier and he had hit her. I asked her what happened there.
She stated that her and the baby were at Darby ! s mother f s house
South Jordan with Darby. She had gone into a room and Darby became
{ upset and began yelling and screaming and hit her. He told her that
was not to go into that room ever. The only thing she saw in that
a was a pink box. After the confrontation they began to leave. Darby,
*lie and the baby went out to the truck. When the got to the truck
ilie put the baby and the diaper bag into the truck. Darby forgot
>thing and went back into the house. When Darby did this Natalie
:>bed the baby and ran to the local LDS Church. When she got there she
:acted a bishop. She explained to him what happened and asked him for
.de. The bishop gave her and the baby a ride to Amber's work.
When she got there she told Amber what happened. Amber then
ed her mother and had her mother come pick them up and take them to
ir's house. Natalie stayed the night there.
I then asked Natalie if she ever knew if Darby had a gun. She
ed that Darby had an SKS rifle with a folding stock and Amber had
L him with a chrome colored handgun.I asked Amber if she could
ribe it. She stated it was silver or chrome and it had copper
red grips on it. I asked her if it was a revolver or a semi auto,
stated she didn't know the difference. I then showed her what my gun
s like. She stated it was similar to mine. My gun is a semi auto. I
d her where she saw the gun. She stated they were at a billiards
e and Darby had it out. I then asked Natalie where he kept his guns.
stated that he kept them at his house and in his truck. I then asked
why he had them. She stated that he had them for protection.
Natalie then asked if anyone had been arrested. 1 advised her
someone had been arrested but that I didn't know the circumstances.
the stated that she wondered if it had to do anything with a guy
Russ. I asked why. She stated that a couple of weeks ago Russ gave
y three hundred and forty dollars so Darby could by meth for Russ.
Y took the money and went to a guy named Shane but never delivered
drugs or the money to Russ. They had seen Russ a couple of times
* then at the 7-11 on 9400 S 2175 E and Russ would ask about the
/ but not in an upset manner. I asked Natalie what Darby did with
noney or the drugs. She stated that she didn't know.
I then asked Natalie if Darby was using drugs. She stated that
:hought Darby might still be using marijuana and meth, but he would
her that he wasn't. At one point Darby told Natalie that he was
.ng as an informant for DEA but then later stated that he wasn't.
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While talking with Natalie her parents arrived. After leaving a
iness card with the case number and my phone number the chaplain and I
t.
The chaplain and I returned to the office. The chaplain then left
stated he would keep trying to contact Mary Beth. I advised Sgt.
i and Lt. Nosack of what I had found out.
On 010799 Det. Peterson, Lt. Nosack, and myself returned to the
cing lot area at 2100 E 9400 S at approximately 1300 hrs. We began
cing around infront of the businesses for any further evidence. Lt.
ick found a possible location of where a bullet may have struck the
it of the building near the salon. I began to look west of there and
id three pieces of lead that were lying on the cement walkway. I
fied evidence technicians Bart Webb and James May of the findings and
collected the items.
I continued looking further and I noticed what appeared to be a
et hole through the lower part of the P in the Party Time sign. This
also pointed out to evidence technician's Bart Webb and James May.
r to their follow ups for the collection of the evidence.
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Article I, Section 7, [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
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Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the fiinction of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
No History for Constitution
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Article I, Section 24. {Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
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law.
A M E N D M E N T IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
AMENDMENT VII
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
A M E N D M E N T IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
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Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.
But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
AMENDMENT XIII
(Proposed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratified December 6, 1865.)
Section L Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
(Proposed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868)
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Section 2 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of Electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
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years of age be taken in a room other than the court room, and be televised by
closed circuit equipment to be viewed by the jury in the court room. All of the
following conditions shall be observed:
(2)(a) Only the presiding judge, attorneys for each party, persons necessary
to operate equipment, and a counselor or therapist whose presence contributes
to the welfare and emotional well-being of the child may be with the child
during his testimony. The defendant may also be present during the child's
testimony unless he consents to be hidden from the child's view, or the court
determines that the child will suffer serious emotional or mental strain if he is
required to testify in the defendant's presence, or that the child's testimony will
be inherently unreliable if he is required to testify m the defendant's presence
If the court makes that determination, or if the defendant consents:
(2)(a)(i) the defendant may not be present during the child's testimony,
(2)(a)(ii) the court shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the
defendant;
(2)(a)(hi) the court shall advise the child prior to his testimony that the
defendant is present at the trial and may listen to the child's testimony;
(2)(a)(iv) the defendant shall be permitted to observe and hear the child's
testimony, and the court shall ensure that the defendant has a means of
two-way telephonic communication with his attorney during the child's testimony; and
(2)(a)(v) the conditions of a normal court proceeding shall be approximated
as nearly as possible.
(2)(b) Only the presiding judge and attorneys may question the child.
(2)(c) As much as possible, persons operating the equipment shall be
confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror so the child cannot
see or hear them.
(2)(d) If the defendant is present with the child during the child's testimony,
the court may order that persons operating the closed circuit equipment film
both the child and the defendant during the child's testimony, so that the jury
may view both the child and the defendant, if that may be arranged without
violation of other requirements of Subsection (2).
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse or of a sexual offense
against a child, the court may order, upon motion of the prosecution and for
)•!
good cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or victim younger than 14
years of age be taken outside the courtroom and be recorded. That testimony
is admissible as evidence, for viewing in any court proceeding regarding the
charges if the provisions of Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the
following provisions:
(3)(a) the recording is both visual and aural and recorded on film or
videotape or by other electronic means;
(3)(b) the recording equipment is capable of making an accurate recording,
the operator is competent, and the recording is accurate and is not altered,
(3)(c) each voice on the recording is identified; and
(3)(d) each party is given an opportunity to view the recording before it is ^
shown in the courtroom.
(4) If the court orders that the testimony of a child be taken under
Subsection (2) or (3), the child
may TO
notDECISIONS
be required to testify in court at any
NOTES
proceeding where the recorded testimony is used.
Application
Compliance with other provisions.
Construction
Improper admission.
Cited

Application.
, J cixcuft^
"Testimony of child witness by cio&e^ ^ ^ - j
ermI
television was appropriately P
,» tes^S
the evaluator testified that the crui
mony would degrade, that she would
^

l w ^ v ^ ^ . v , uuu uuau one wuuiu. buner emotional stress lasting for a few days or weeks if
required to testify m defendant's presence
State v Widdison, 20C0 UT App 185, 397 Utah
Adv Rep 16

Compliance w i t h o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s .
Normally, the trial court must comply with
the requirements of both this rule and § 76-5411 when considering videotaped out-of-court
statements of child victims of sexual abuse
State v Lamper, 779 P 2 d 1125 (Utah 1989)
Because § 76-5-411 explicitly incorporates
Subdivision (1) of this rule, all requirements of
both provisions must be met for proffered outof court statement to be admitted Although the
piovisions are couched m slightly different
teims, both seek the same end — a determination that proffered out-of-court statements are
sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be admitted State v Seale, 853 P 2 d 862 (Utah) cert
denied, 510 U S 865, 114 S Ct 186, 126 L Ed
2d 145 (1993)

L/onstruction.
This rule is permissive, not exclusive Noth
m g in the language of the rule can be fairl
construed to support the contention that othe
methods to accomodate child witnesses are pro
hibited State v Hoyt, 806 P 2 d 204 (Utah Ct
App 1991)
Improper admission.
Admission of videotape of interview betweer
five-year-old victim and Division of Family Ser
vices worker was error because defendant was
unable to explore contradictory or confusing
portions of the victim's testimony, and prejudi
cial because the tape was the most damning
evidence presented at trial State v Lenaburg,
781 P2d 432 (Utah 1989)
Cited m State v Bullock, 791 P 2 d 155 (Utah
1989), State v Pecht, 2002 UT 4 1 , 48 P 3 d 931.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah L a w Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L Rev 443
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 U t a h L Rev
449
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child Necessary Protection for the
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights 7 , 1986 Utah L
Rev 461

J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y L a w . — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81
(1989)
A.L.K. — Closed-circuit television witness
examination, 61 A L.R 4th 1155.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(a)(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(a)(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(a)(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(a)(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(a)(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable followm
g the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
o the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
^sanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause
shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
r°lfCU^°r ^° a dequately prepare his case.
W Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclor
^s at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a

( ) w£S duty to m a k e

dlsclosure

-

mat e ^f}len convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information

The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the fiirttier
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses
from harassment, abuse or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on
the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the farther
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is
appropriate Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, m whole or m part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to
(h)(1) appear m a lineup,
(h)(2) speak for identification,
(h)(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions,
(h)(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime,
(h)(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise,
(h)(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion
(h)(7) provide specimens of handwriting,
(h)(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body, and
(h)(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time
of the alleged offense
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance
shall be given to the accused and his counsel Failure of the accused to appear
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem
appropriate
(Amended effective November 1, 2001)
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amend
ment added the last sentence m Subdivision (e)
and 'that limitations on the further dissemma-

tion of discovery be modified" in the first sen
tence of Subdivision (f)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
In general
ApphcaDility
Continuing duty LO disclose
Depositions
Discretion of court
Failure co request discovery
Noncompliance
—Factors considered
Nondisclosure
—Burden of proof

—No reversal
—No violation of rule
—Prejudice required
—Remedies
—Violation of rule
—Waiver of error
Physical evidence
—Stolen property
Prosecution request
Required disclosure

_State
Volun tar y prosecutorial response
Witnesses
Cited
In g e n e r a l .
Discovery powers are conferred upon both
the circuit courts and the district courts State
Easthope
668 P2d 528 (Utah 1983)
v
Applicability.
This rule is inapplicable if the defendant does
not request evidence State v Martin, 1999 UT
72 984 P 2d 975
Continuing d u t y t o disclose.
Even if there is no court ordered disclosure, a
piosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls within
the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to cause
prejudicial error State v Carter, 707 P 2 d 656
(Utah 1985), State v Knight, 734 P 2 d 913
(Utah 1987)
Under this rule, which imposes a broader
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor than
does the federal rule, the prosecutor is obligated to make disclosure on a continuing basis
without a request Parsons v Galetka, 57 F
Supp 2d 1151 (D Utah 1999)
Depositions.
This rule did not support defendant's argu
ment that he was entitled to depose witnesses
whose testimony had not been transcribed at
the preliminary hearing, held ten years earlier,
oi whose memory was central to their testimony, Rule 14(h) exclusively governs the taking of depositions in criminal cases State v
Willett, 909 P 2 d 218 (Utah 1995)
Discretion of c o u r t .
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in
granting or refusing discovery and inspection
and its determinations on this subject will not
be overturned on appeal unless the court has
abused its discretion State v Kmll, 656 P 2 d
1026 (Utah 1982), State v Lairby, 699 P 2d 1187
(Utah 1984), overruled m part on othei
grounds, State v Ossana, 739 P2d 628 (Utah
1987)
Subdivision (g) giants a trial court ample
discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party
resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules State v Larson, 775 P2d 415 (Utah
1989)
Failure to r e q u e s t discovery.
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
failure to provide him with a police report
describing a witness' testimony prior to trial
was not entertained no request for discovery,
w
ntten or oral, being made at any time State v
looker 709 P2d 342 (Utah 1985)
-to show that defense counsel's failure to
Jnov e * or formal discovery was ineffective assisn c e ai
;?
*d prejudicial, defendant had to show
at filing a formal discovery motion would
a
^e yielded exculpatory information that was
^ supplied under informal discovery pursuto the prosecutor's "open file policy" Par° n s v B a m e s , 871 P2d 516 (Utah 1994) cert

denied, 513 U S 966, 115 S Ct 431, 130 L Ed
2d 344 (1994)
Although defendant cited U R C r P 16 U
support his argument t h a t h e was entitled tc
depose witnesses whose testimony h a d no
been transcribed at the preliminary h e a r i n g
held ten years earhei, or whose memory was
central to their testimony, Subdivision (h) o
this rule exclusively governs the taking of dep
ositions m criminal cases and defendant failec
to show how his circumstances fell within the
requirements of Subdivision (h) S t a t e v
Willett, 909 P 2 d 218 (Utah 1995)
Noncompliance.
The crux of a Subdivision (g) motion is a
requnement that the moving party show t h a t
the other party has failed to furnish discovery
as required by the rule State v Larson, 775
P 2d 415 (Utah 1989)
—Factors considered.
In ruling on a motion to exclude piosecution
evidence because of a failure to make a full and
accurate response to a defendant's request, a
trial judge must consider and weigh a n u m b e r
of factors, such as (1) the extent to which the
prosecution's representation is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or
strategy that could prejudice t h e outcome (3)
the culpability of the prosecutor m omitting
pertinent information or misstating the facts,
and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense
investigation would have discovered the omitted oi misstated evidence The prosecution has
a duty to make a correct and complete disclosure, but defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to make a leasonable investigation
State v Kallin, 877 P2d 138 (Utah 1994)
Nondisclosure.
— B u r d e n of proof.
In nondisclosure cases the burden is on t h e
state to peisuade the court t h a t the error m
denying a motion for discovery did not unfairly
prejudice the defense State v Martin, 1999 UT
72, 984 P 2 d 975
—No reversal.
In a trial for murder the prosecution's failure
to provide discovery material concerning testimony regardmg the defendant's carrying a
scabbard did not require reversal since a curative order adequately advised the jury about
the inadmissibility and questionable n a t u r e of
the testimony and moreover, there was no
inference at trial that defendant actually used
the knife Thus, the testimony was not so
prejudicial as to undermine confidence m the
verdict as there was no substantial likelihood
that the outcome would have been different
without it State v Archuleta, 850 P 2 d 1232
(Utah), cert denied 510 U S 979 114 S Ct
476, 126 L Ed 2d 427 (1993)
—No v i o l a t i o n of r u l e .
State s failure to disclose to defendant before
trial ceitain jail records which corroborated
defendant's testimony that he requested medical treatment while in jail did not violate defendant's discovery rights where there was no

showing in record ft om which it could be lairiy
inferred t h a t prosecution knew or should have
known that defendant's request for medical
treatment would ever be an issue or of any
importance at trial State v Fierst, 692 P 2d 751
(Utah 1984)
Where the defendant failed to provide his
attorneys with information regarding an incriminating statement he made to a cellmate,
there was no discovery violation on the part of
the state State v Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 989 P 2d
52
Under Rule 16(a)(1), the prosecution does not
have a duty to disclose records to which it may
have access under Government Records Access
and Management Act (Title 63, Chapter 2) but
which it does not possess nor intend to use
State v Spry, 2001 UT App 75, 21 P 3 d 675
—Prejudice required.
The defendant's claim of reversible error for
nondisclosure of evidence failed because the
defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result had previously undisclosed fingerprint evidence and
handwriting testimony been excluded State v
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P2d 1065
—Remedies.
Dismissal for a discovery violation is proper
only when all other attempts to mitigate damage caused by the unexpected evidence have
failed State v Christofferson, 793 P2d 944
(Utah Ct App 1990)
— V i o l a t i o n of r u l e .
In a battery prosecution, the government's
complete failure to respond in any way to a
discovery request denied the defendant a reasonable opportunity to compel discovery of the
criminal record of the prosecution's only wit
ness, relieved the defense of any responsibility
to show "good cause," and was prejudicial error
warranting reversal and remand for a new
trial Salt Lake City v Reynolds, 849 P2d 582
(Utah Ct App 1993)
In a prosecution for sexual abuse, where the
state failed to provide defendant with an expert's report until the afternoon of the first day
of the trial, the trial court erred m denying a
continuance and allowing the expert's testimony State v Begishe, 937 P 2 d 527 (Utah Ct
App 1997)
— W a i v e r of e r r o r .
Where the trial court, after denying a motion
to comple discovery, mdicated that it would
consider a request to continue the trial date if
necessary, defendant, by not requesting a continuance at that point, essentially waived his
right to claim error later State v Larson, 775
P 2d 415 (Utah 1989)
The defendant's failure to mitigate the impact of unexpected testimony resulting from a
discovery violation by objecting to its admission
or moving for either a continuance or a mistrial
precluded his claim that it was error to deny his
motion to dismiss State v Christofferson, 793
P 2 d 944 (Utah Ct App 1990)
By failing to make a timely request for a
continuance after a prosecution witness unexpectedly gave inculpatory testimony contrary

fendant waived his Rule 16 challenge to the
witness's testimony State v Rugebregt, 965
P 2d 518 (Utah Ct App 1998)
Physical evidence.
—Stolen property.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion m
denying motion to produce stolen automobile
for inspection by defendant charged with automobile theft where the automobile had been
released and returned to its owner over three
months before defendant's request for its production and there was no showing of its evidentiary significance to the defense State v Kmll
656 P 2d 1026 (Utah 1982)
Prosecution request.
'Good cause' under Rule 16(c) requires the
prosecution to establish only the materiality of
the information requested from the defense
before the defense is required to make such
information available to the prosecution State
v Spry, 2001 UT App 75, 21 P 3 d 675
Required disclosure.

—State.
Due process requires the state to disclose
even unrequested information which is or ma>
be exculpatory State v Worthen, 765 P2d 839
(Utah 1988)
Since Utah R Evid 412 does not require
exclusion of evidence of an alleged rape victim's
previous false allegations of rape, where such
evidence would have been relevant to the vie
tun's credibility, the refusal of the trial court to
allow the defendant the opportunity to uncover
such evidence was error State v Martin, 1999
U T 7 2 984 P 2d 975
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
There are two requirements that the prose
cution must meet when it responds voluntarily
to a request for discovery First, the prosecution
either must produce all of the material re
quested or must identify explicitly those por
tions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided Secondly,
when the prosecution agrees to produce any of
the material requested, it must continue to
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to
the defense State v Knight, 734 P 2d 913 (Utah
1987)
Witnesses.
A circuit court judge acted well within his
discretion in ordering the state to disclose the
identity of a witness and the details of a crim
m a l transaction the circuit court found to be
material to a pending criminal prosecution
where the state itself provided "good cause for
purposes of Subdivision (a)(5), by representing
t h a t it needed to keep defendant's money to use
at trial, when the only logical use of the money
would of necessity entail proof of the details of
the transaction in which the informant was
involved Cannon v Keller, 692 P2d 740 (Utah
1984)
After the defendant injected a degree of sur
prise into the proceedings, the State reacte
properly by contacting a rebuttal witness

known to nave some expertise m the relevant
area and notifying defense cousel as soon as
possible who he was and what his general
purpose would be Therefore, the state was not
precluded from calling this rebuttal witness not
disclosed before trial in circumstances where it,
in good faith, had no reason to expect the need
for the witness before trial State v Tennyson
850 P2d 461 (Utah Ct App 1993)

Cited in State v Fierst, 692 P 2d 751 (Utah
1984), State v Collier, 736 P 2 d 231 (Utah
1987) State v Griffiths, 752 P 2 d 879 (Utah
1988), State v Bishop, 753 P 2 d 439 (Utah
1988), State v Sawyers, 819 P 2 d 806 (Utah Ct
App 1991), State v Menzies, 889 P 2 d 393
(Utah 1994), State v Vargas, 2001 UT 5, 20 P 3d
271, State v Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, 47
P3d 115

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah L a w R e v i e w . — Comment, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986
Utah L Rev 75
C.J.S. — 22A C J S Criminal Law § 486 et
seq
A.L.R. — Right of accused m state courts to
inspection or disclosure of evidence in possession of prosecution, 7 A L R 3d 8
Right of defendant in criminal case to inspection of statement of prosecution's witness for
purposes of cross-examination or impeachment, 7 A L R 3d 181
Accused's right to inspection of minutes of
state grand jury, 20 A L R 3d 7
Intel ference by prosecution with defense
counsel's pretrial interrogation of witnesses 90
ALR3dl231
Accused's right to discovery or inspection of
"rap sheets" or similar police records about
prosecution witnesses, 95 A L R 3d 832
Accused's right to depose prospective witnesses before trial in state court, 2 A L R 4th
704

Sanctions against defense in criminal case
for failure to comply with discovery requirements, 9 A L R 4th 837
Right of accused in state courts to inspection
or disclosure of tape recording of his own statements, 10 A L R 4th 1092
Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution,
45ALR4th310
What is accused's "statement" subject to s t a t e
court criminal discovery, 57 A L R 4th 827
Criminal law dog scent discrimination lineups, 63 A L R 4th 143
Right of defendant in criminal contempt proceeding to obtain mformation by deposition, 33
A L R 5th 761
Illegal drugs or narcotics involved in alleged
offense as subject to discovery by defendant
under Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 109 A L R Fed 363

Rule 17. The t r i a l .
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend m
person and by counsel The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may
consent m writing to trial m his absence;
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present, and
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried m the following order
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is m custody,
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody,
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance, and
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a j u r y
m
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
^ntten demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified
111
Section 78-46-5, U C A 1953.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting
or acting m criminal case 85 A L R 5th 471

,, «**, uoi oo gruesome or
offensive that their absence would have resulted m a more favorable outcome for defendant State v Wellb, 603 P 2 d 810 (Utah 1979)
Clerical mistakes.

uisqu<uim,dw.uu ui j u u 6 C W l ^^ ^ i & v^v,iUCU
different case against litigant — state cases, 85
A L R 5th 547

Rule 29A. Change of judge as a matter of right.
(a) Notice of change In any criminal action commenced after April 15, 1992
m any district or justice court, all parties joined in the action may, by
unanimous agreement and without cause, change the judge assigned to the
action by filing a notice of change of judge The parties shall send a copy of the
notice to the assigned judge and the presiding judge The notice shall be signed
by all parties and shall state (1) the name of the assigned judge, (2) the date
on which the action was commenced, (3) that all parties joined m the action
have agreed to the change, (4) that no other persons are expected to be named
as parties, and (5) that a good faith effort has been made to serve all parties
named in the pleadings The notice shall not specify any reason for the change
of judge Under no circumstances shall more than one change of judge be
allowed under this rule in any action A change of judge under this rule is
available only after a judge has been assigned to the case for trial. A notice of
change may not be filed prior to or during a preliminary examination
(b) Time, The notice shall be filed no later than 7 days after notice of
assignment or reassignment of judge Failure to file a timely notice precludes
any change of judge under this rule
(c) Assignment of action Upon the filing of a notice of change, the assigned
judge shall take no further action in the case The presiding judge shall
promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the
action If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether the
notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action
(d) Nondisclosure to court No party shall communicate to the court, or
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking
consent to a notice of change
(e) Rule 29 unaffected This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 29
(Added effective April 15, 1992, amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1
1996.)
Compiler's Notes. — In a minute entry
dated J a n u a r y 21, 1993, the U t a h Supreme
Court provided that this rule "originally
adopted on an emergency basis effective April

15 1992, has now been published for public
comment The Advisory Committee proposed
amendments to paragraph (b) Those amend
ments are adopted, effective May 1, 1993 '

Rule 30. Errors and defects,
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect t
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record a
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by t
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, U R Cr P 10

Indictments and informations, haimlesb
rors, U R Cr P 4

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Admission of photographic evidence
Clerical mistakes
—Defendant's right of allocution
Harmless error
Minor defect
Substantial right affected
—State's burden of persuasion

Variances
Cited
A d m i s s i o n of photographic e v l d e n c f .
Even though admission of photograph
manslaughter victim served only to c r e a w a S m
tional impact on jury, their admission

\
«
J
.-j

their deliberations, to which no objection w a
taken State v Bergwerff, 777 P 2d 510 (UtaJ
Ct App 1989)
Admission of defendant's prior offenses w a
harmless error as there was no reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result withoul
the admission of the prior bad acts evidence
State v Featherson, 781 P 2 d 424 (Utah 1989)
Minor defect.
Conviction for fornication would not be reversed because information charged defendant
with having committed offense with one
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, w h e r e
identity of woman was sufficiently established
State v Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P 89
(1912)

^-Defendant's right of allocution.
The defendant's due process right of allocu
tion was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held
m his presence, where he was addressed by the
judge and elected to speak, and an amended
judgment subsequently entered by the trial
court, at which the defendant was not present
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a
coirection of a clerical mistake m his sentence
State v Lorrah, 761 P 2d 1388 (Utah 1988)
Harmless error.
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge
Substantial right affected.
of female under age of 18 years, although it was
Court could not reverse judgment unless
eiTor to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts of
some substantial right of defendant had been
sexual intercourse after one relied on for coninvaded State v Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P 271
viction, such error was not prejudicial to defen(1918)
dant so as to require reversal State v Mattivi,
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on
39 Utah 334, 117 P 31(1-911)
appeal merely because some error or irregularWhere defendant in murder prosecution conity may have occurred, but will be overturned
tested every step taken by state during
only if the error or irregularity is something
progress of trial and was afforded every opporsubstantial and prejudicial m the sense t h a t
tunity to defend charge, and his counsel inthere is a reasonable likelihood t h a t in its
sisted upon every right to which the law entiabsence there would have been a different
tled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not
result State v Hutchinson, 655 P 2 d 635 (Utah
guilty was received on legal holiday did not
1982), State v Rimmasch, 775 P 2 d 388 (Utah
constitute prejudicial error State v Estes, 52
1989), State v Mitchell, 779 P 2 d 1116 (Utah
Utah 572, 176 P 271 (1918)
1989)
In a prosecution of a state fish and game
Where preprinted form affidavit m support of
warden for appropriating state money to his
o\\ n use, an instruction m which the court read a search warrant was left blank concerning t h e
date of the informant's observations and the
the entire statute on misuse of public money
date the information was given to the affiant,
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice
any defect in the affidavit caused by the blanks
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded
was lequired to be disregarded where the deState v Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P 968
fendants
did not contend the blanks in any way
(1922)
infringed upon their substantial rights State v
The admission of testimony at trial m violaAnderton, 668 P 2 d 1258 (Utah 1983)
tion of defendant's constitutional confrontation
For an error to require reversal, the likelirights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
hood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
where such testimony was merely cumulative
high to undermine confidence m the verdict
State v Chapman, 655 P2d 1119 (Utah 1982)
State v Knight, 734 P 2 d 913 (Utah 1987), State
Trial court's instruction that flight from scene
of cnme of aggravated burglary amounted to v Laiferty, 749 P 2 d 1239 (Utah 1988), aff'd,
776 P 2 d 631 (Utah 1989), competency evaluaimplied admission of guilt was erroneous, but
tion found invalid and conviction vacated, 949
^as not prejudicial, smce there was other eviF 2 d 1546 (10th Cir 1991)
dence sufficient to sustain a conviction State v
Jury verdict would not be upset when there
Bales 675 P2d 573 (Utah 1983)
was no indication t h a t trial court's improper
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on
action in reassigning the case without a written
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
order of the court affected defendant's rights
n
ght not to take the stand did not require
State
v Speer, 750 P 2 d 186 (Utah 1988)
reversal where the other evidence of guilt was
The Supreme Court's standard for dealing
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections
with non-constitutional error is that the court
Prevented the prosecutor from making any real
will not reverse a conviction unless the error is
P° n t of the failure to testify, and the judge's
substantial and prejudicial m the sense t h a t
r llck a n d decisive admonition to the jury and
there is a reasonable likelihood t h a t m its
ai hfT° r f u r t h e r obviated any harm that
absence there would have been a more favorfnt have resulted from the comments State
able result for the defendant State v Johnson,
tucker 709 P2d 313 (Utah 1985), overruled
.uta°«*er grounds State v Long, 721 P2d 483 771 P2d 1071 (Utah 1989)
*i 1986)
Admission of witness's hypnotically enhanced testimony was harmful error at defen^uTe r ne ° US i n c l u s i o n o f mtent to defraud an
dant's
trial for first-degree murder because,
% ^eme ^ ^ *^ e m ^ o r m a t l o n a s comprising an without such testimony, there was a reasonable
^r>s\h
^ g r a v a t e ^ arson was harmless er- likelihood that the outcome would have been
*ai j a t e r e a c o r r e c t instruction on the subject
more favoiable for defendant, l e , he might
r
$,
^ V e n to the jury immediately before
have been convicted of second degree murder or
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— Allowed.
f judgment was m favor of applicant, he was
ltled to costs as a matter of course, even as
unst a public officer at least where officer
ed arbitrarily capriciously and in bad faith
iad, however been the policy m this junsdici not to allow costs against the court or
ge It was within court s discretion to award
ts both m trial court and on appeal Fowler v
lman 76 Utah 414 290 P 358 (1930)
- Not allowed.
n proceeding for issuance of alternative writ

and try action dismissed by him on appeal from
justice court, held, plaintiff was entitled to
recover costs as against all defendants other
than district judge State v District Court, 39
Utah 1, 114 P 143 (1911)
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PARTI

Damages.
— Attorney fees.
In mandamus proceeding, ' damages" which
applicant could recover included attorney's
fees, where properly shown Colorado Dev Co
v Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P2d 9L4 (1938)

GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-35a-101. Short title.
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act "

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
on. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am Jur 2d Mandamus
95 et seq , 63AAm Jur 2d Prohibition § 88
seq
\ J S - 55 C J S Mandamus §§ 342, 375 et
, 73 C J S Prohibition §§ 49 51
LL.R. — Attorneys fees in mandamus prodings 3 4 A L R 4 t h 4 5 7

Mandamus, under 28 USC^ § 1361, to obtarn change in prison condition or release of
federal prisoner, 114 A L R F(>d 225
Key Numbers. - Mandamus *=» 177, 190,
Prohibition c=> 28, 35

>-35-10. Disobedience of writ — Punishment.
When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ of prohibition has been issued
d directed to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, if it appears
the court that any member of such tribunal, corporation, board or person
on whom such writ has been personally served has, without just ^excuse,
used or neglected to obey the same, the court may, upon motion, impose a
e not exceeding $500 In cases of persistence in a refusal of obedience, the
irt may order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is obeyed, and may
ike any orders necessary and proper for the complete enforcement of the
it
[istory: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
jp., 104-35-10.

Cross-References.

— Imprisonment

to

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-101, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 1.
Compiler s Notes. - As enacted, tnis chapter did not contain a Part 2

Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 235
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies.
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as
provided in Subsection (2) Procedural provisions for filing and commencement
of a petition are found m Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) This chapter does not apply to
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense,
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

compel performance, § 78-32-12

78-35a-103. Applicability - Effect on petitions.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
m . Jur. 2d. — 52 Am Jur 2d Mandamus
82, 63AAm Jur 2d Prohibition § 93
.J.S. - 55 C J S Mandamus §§ 360, 361,

73 C J S Prohibition § 52
Key Numbers. - Mandamus «= 186, Prohibition «= 33

CHAPTER 35a
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
Part 1
General Provisions
tion
J5a-101
J5a-102

Section
78 35a-103
78-35a-104

Short title
Replacement of prior remedies

78-35a-105

598

Applicability - Effect on petitions
Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule
Burden of proof

Except for the limitation peuod established m Section 78-35a-107, this
chapter applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after JulyJ 1
1996
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-103, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

78-35a-104. Grounds for relief - Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has
been convicted and sentenced foi a criminal offense may file an action in the
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds
599

V, (SL] the conviction was obtained or tne sentence wa - imposed in violation
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitut ton,
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute the t is m violation of the
United States Constitution or U t a h Constitution, or he conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected,
(c) the sentence was imposed m an unlawful man ler, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner,
>£~(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or U t a h Constitution, or
Jtf*(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because
(1) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the
evidence m any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence,
(n) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence t h a t
was known,
(m) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence,
and
(IV) viewed with all the other evidence, t le newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates t h a t no reasonable trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received
2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled ti the benefit of a rule
nounced by the United States Supreme Court, Utaii Supreme Court, or
ah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction oecame final shall be
verned by applicable state and federal principles of re troactivity
listory: C. 1953, 78-35a-104, enacted by
1996, ch. 235, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996 ch 235

became effective on Vpnl 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art V1 Sec 25

i-35a-105. Burden of proof.
The petitioner h a s the burden of pleading and proving )y a preponderance of
3 evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief The
spondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitio ler has the burden to
>prove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
listory: C. 1953, 78-35a-105, enacted by
1996, ch. 235, § 5.
]ffective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 235

became effective on Vpnl 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art V. Sec 25

}-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception.
1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chaj ter upon any ground
at
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial oi on appeal,
600

(dj was raised or addressed m any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised m a previous request for
post-conviction relief; or
* ^ (e) is barred b ^ the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107
^M2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on
a basis t h a t the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise t h a t ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel
History: C. 1953, 78-32>a-106, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 235

became effective on April 29, 1996 pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed w i t h m one y e a r
after the cause of act on has accrued
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on t h e latest of
the following dates
(a) the last da} for filing an appeal from the entry of t h e final j u d g m e n t
of conviction, if no appeal is taken,
(b) the entry ot the decision of the appellate court which h a s jurisdiction
over the case, if en appeal is taken,
(c) the last da}' for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in t h e U t a h
Supreme Court oi the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for wi it
of certiorari is filed,
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the
entry of the decis ion on t h e petition for certiorari review, if a petition for
writ of certiorari is filed, or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which t h e petition
is based.
(3) If the court finds t h a t the interests of justice require, a court m a y excuse
a petitioner's failure to file withm the time limitations
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 82, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996,
ch. 235, § 7.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1995, ch 82, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-31 1, as
enacted by Laws 1979, ch 133, § 1, setting a
three-month time limit on t le right to petition
for a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present
section, effective May 1, 19S5
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 199«>, renumbered this
section, which formerly apj eared as § 78-12-

31 1, added Subsection (4), redesignating
former Subsection (4) as (3), deleted former
Subsections (3) and (5) concerning applicability
to time limitations and motions to correct a
sentence, in Subsections (1) and (2) deleted
"pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure' after "entitled to relief", and in
Subsection (2) deleted 'in a petition for postconviction relief" after "cause of action '
Cross-References. — Extraordinary relief,
Rule 65B, U R C P
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,
LStitutionahty of former section
phcabihty.
etitions for writs of certiorari and manda3 were not subject to the statute of hmitais that was intended to govern petitions for
ts of habeas corpus Renn v Utah State Bd
'ardons 904 P2d 677 (Utah 1995) (decided
ler former section)
,

Constitutionality of former section.
The three-month imitation period formerly
contained m this sec tion was an unreasonable
hmitation on the con .tatutional right to petition
for a habeas corpus vnt, it violated petitioners'
rights under Utah Const, Art I, Sec 11 to seek
a civil remedy m state courts Currier v
Holden, 862 P2d 1->57 (Utah Ct App 1993),
cert denied, 870 P2d 957 (Utah 1994) (decided
under former section)

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 9.
Effective Dates. - Lews 1996, ch 235

78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction.
Any party may appe al from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction p u r s u a n t to
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2 i-3
History: C. 1953, 78-35.1-110, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 10.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 235

-35a-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice.
1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence, or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or
sentencing proceeding as appropriate
2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be
stayed for five days Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner thai the respondent will
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gr r es notice at any time
during the stay period t h a t it intends to take no action, the court shall lift
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of tiie petitioner
(c) If the respondent gives notice t h a t it intends to retry or resentence
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters
t h a t may be necessary
[istory: C. 1953, 78-35a-108, enacted by
L996, ch. 235, § 8.
Iffective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch 235

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

>-35a-109. Appointment of counsel,
1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
on the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint count el on a pro bono basis
unsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not
appointed to represent the petitioner under this seel ion
2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
lowing factors
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations t h a t will require
an evidentiary hearing, and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated ist ues of law or fact t h a t
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication
3) An allegation t h a t counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
m o t be the basis for relief m any subsequent pcst-conviction petition.
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became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25.

CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1
78-36-2
78-36-3
78-36-4
78-36-5
78-36-6
78-36-7
78-36-8
78-36-8 5
78-36-9
78-36-10

Section
"Forcible entry" denned
"Forcible det uner" denned
Unlawful detainer by tenant for
term less t i a n life
Right of ten mt of agricultural
lands to hold over
Remedies a\ailable to tenant
against undertenant
Notice to qui! — How served
Necessary parties defendant
Allegations permitted m complaint — Time for appearance
— Service of summons
Possession bond of plaintiff —
Alternative remedies
Proof required of plaintiff — Defense
Judgment foi restitution, dam-

78-36-10 5

78-36-11
78-36-12

78-36-12 3
78-36-12 6

ages and rent — Immediate
enforcement — Treble damages
Order of restitution — Service
— Enforcement — Disposition of personal property —
Hearing
Time for appeal
Exclusion of tenant without ju
dicial process prohibited —
Abandoned
premises
ex
cepted
Definitions
Abandoned premises — Retaking and rerentmg by owner —
Liability of tenant — Per
sonal property of tenant left
on premises

78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by
fraud, mtimidatioi or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances
of terror, enters upon or into any real property, or,
(2) after enterii g peaceably upon real property, t u r n s out by force,
t h r e a t s or menacing conduct the party m actual possession
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-1.

Cross-References. — Burglary and criminal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206
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